Berkeley's Idealism

[genkaus]

Before continuing the conversation I would like to express my sincere gratitude for your willingness to participate in a truly philisophical discussion. Thank you.

Likewise.

You restated that fairly well, but I meant more. A concrete, or real, thing has both formal and substantial attributes. Form and substance cannot be found independent of each other. Nevertheless we still talk about a thing’s form or a thing’s substance.

There seems to be certain ambiguity in the use of the word "form" - previously used as ideal form and now being used as equivalent of an abstract.

Getting to the argument - yes, a concrete has both formal and substantial attributes, but it is only the substantial that is inherent to it. The formal attributes are the consequence of perception ans abstraction of the given concrete. These two cannot be "found" independent of each other, because the very act of "finding" results in formal attribution.

Here is what I’m asking you to do: Consider this process in light of the premise that “every form has a substance and every substance has a form.” This means, when we generalize features to create abstractions those abstractions are themselves realized as a concrete, or real, thing. The portrait is an abstraction of the person AND it is also a concrete object made of paint on canvas. The painting has both formal and substantive aspects. To extend this example, if I now make a drawing of the painting, then the drawing is an abstraction of formal features found in the concrete painting.

While you are correct in thinking that we do create abstractions by generalizing concretes, you are mistaken in that every abstraction would therefore have a concrete. That's because there is another way abstractions can be created - from preexisting abstractions. For example, from my perceptions I've got abstract concepts about my body, my arms etc. Similarly, from observing the birds, I've concepts about their wings. Now, within abstraction, I can imagine myself with wings, flying through the air, but this is an abstraction without any concrete counterpart.

Because classical physics operates according to deterministic principles that themselves have no experiencial component. In this scheme consciousness is an illusion produced by brain functions. The self-refuting part is that the illusion of a subjective experience is itself a subjective experience.

The error here is the assumption that since there is no experiential component to be found reductionally, there could be no experience holistically. The example I like to use here is that of a clock measuring the passage of time. While you cannot point to any component that is responsible for the measurement, the clock as a whole is capable of it. Arrangement of components in a particular way is capable of resulting in attributes that cannot be found in any of the components themselves. These are referred to as emergent properties.

The role of the conscious observer is also self-evident. “Cognito Ergo Sum.” We must account for both the self-evident truth that we are self-aware experiencers of reality (without giving in to Idealism) and the equally self-evident truth that concrete things are made out of something (without settling for Materialism).

Here we reach an irreconcilable difference. I do not consider consciousness or self-awareness to be self-evident for the following reasons.

1. If consciousness was self-evident, then every conscious being would be self-aware, i.e. aware of its own consciousness. That is not the case, since a majority of the animal kingdom is conscious, but not self-aware.

2. Even in humans, the external awareness comes before any awareness of oneself. Functions such as thought and memory are only possible to a self-aware being. The fact that we were conscious for a long time before we became capable of either, means there is a difference between consciousness and self-awareness, which would not be there if it were self-evident.

3. I do not agree with Cogito Ergo Sum, because it seems to me that it replaces the cause with the consequence. I'd say, Sum Ergo Cogito, i.e. I exist therefore I think. Alternatively, I'd formulate it as - I exist, therefore I think, therefore I know I exist.

I think that was the understanding that Descartes intended when he formulated the phrase. It is the knowledge of your existence that is the consequence of your thought - not your existence itself. Thus, your role of a conscious self-aware being is not self-evident, but contingent.

To hold a position rationally does not require one to prove that it is so against all commers. All that is required is a reasonable hypothesis. The concept of ideal form only means that there is a ultimate and universal standard that informs our proximate truths just as the idea of primal matter only means that there is a universal and fundamental ground in which the various forms can manifest themselves. While such a position is not conclusive, I find it entirely reasonable.

As you said, the hypothesis should be reasonable and as I said, for this hypothesis to be reasonable, you should show that the proposed ideal form could exist - not that it does, but that it is possible. Plain assumption of that possibility does not make the hypothesis reasonable. Just because you can conceive of such an ideal form, does not mean that the concrete of such could exist.