Berkeley's Idealism

[genkaus]

In your writing you make a distinction between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’. For me this is a problem. It suggests that ‘concrete’ means an actual real thing as opposed to ‘abstract’ which means something that is only apparent and thus not ‘real’. Thus when I hear ‘concrete’ I think of a ‘thing’, something that exists. Whereas, you seem to use ‘concrete’ as synonymous with ‘substance’.

I do make a distinction between an 'abstract' and a 'concrete', but it is not as you understood it. A concrete is a real thing, an abstract is the product of our mind which is the result of our perception of the real thing. At this point, you'd be the one equating physical reality with reality. A concrete exists in physical reality, an abstract in conceptual reality.

To my thinking the formal and the substantial are both attributes of the ‘concrete’ real thing. Confronted with a real thing, we perceive that it has a form and we also perceive that it has a substance. Form by itself does not make a thing real until fleshed out by substance. Likewise, substance by itself does not make a real thing unless it takes on a form. Even at the smallest scales of reality, we infer both s&f from the quark’s existence. I disagree with the physicist that said, “reality is just structured nothingness.” Out of nothing, nothing comes, etc.

A concrete does have formal attributes - but only when it is perceived. You cannot speak of any formal attributes of an object unless it is perceived. Substance, however, is enough to make an object real, even absent any perception.

To clarify, there are three consideration while talking about attributes of a concrete. Firstly, it exists - and it exists as a structured substance. This existence is independent of anyone's perception of it. At this level, there can be no formal (i.e. conceptual) attributes assigned to it. e.g. there is something inside the breadbox (or maybe there isn't). Now, if there is, then its existence and mode of existence does not depend upon us. However, it does not have any formal (as in conceptual or abstract, not structural) - attributes just yet.

Next is perception. This is the step where the formal attributes come in. With perception, we identify the structure and the substance and the formal properties come in. e.g. I open the box and see a lump of matter. I can see through it - formal attribute: transparency. It does not deform easily - formal attribute: solidity. Light splits within it: refractiveness. It scratches other surfaces : hardness. And so on. Substantially, the object had all these properties from the beginning, formally, it didn't.

Finally, I abstract out all these formal attributes from the concrete example in front of me and I put it under one header - "Diamond".

Consistent with my terminology, a fantastic thought, is still a real thing, i.e. a thought. In objective reality, the thought manifests itself as a formal state in the brain’s substance. Researchers recognize this when they look at an MRI and observe the retrieval of a memory or other mental activity. The person getting the MRI has a much different view. For the person various experiences collected into the impression of their grandmother, for example. In my terminology, experiences correspond with the substance of a memory and the impression with the form of a memory. How I think these conjoin I’ll explain below.

You are confusing between the form of the memory and the content of the memory. For example, the formal attributes of a book would be "leatherbound", "thick", "has pages". The content represents a completely different abstract - the story.

The point here would be - though a pure form ("a story" or a "memory") does exist, it cannot exist independently of some other concrete ("the book" or "brain").

Here I want to avoid the inherent vagueness of ‘consciousness’ and ‘self-awareness’. Each of us observes the contents of consciousness, our own subjective sensations and perceptions. Experiences themselves are facts, even if what the experiences represent are only fantasies, and are thus self-evident, not contingent.

The vagueness between consciousness and self-awareness is easily resolved. Consciousness is simply awareness of something - anything. Even a plant that senses changes in temperature can be considered conscious. Self-awareness is consciousness of consciousness.

Now, is the observation of consciousness, i.e. consciousness of consciousness, self-evident? We are aware of our experiences, thoughts and emotions - but is that awareness automatic? If it was automatic, then there is no reason as to why anything that is conscious would not be self-aware. Even if it was automatic among humans, then babies would be self-aware from birth. The sizable gap between being conscious and being self-aware suggests that self-awareness is a learned awareness and not automatic, though it seems to come automatically to us now.

Following up on a earlier promise: In my terminology, experiences correspond with the substance of a memory and the impression with the form of a memory. How I think these conjoin I’ll explain below.

Actually, memory - being a concrete itself - would have a substance and a form, independent of its content.

I envision reality extending along a line from the infinite to the infinitesimal. On the infinite end of the line you have one Ideal Form, the complete form of the totality. As you move along the scale, away from the infinite toward the infinitesimal, you get various lesser forms made of compound substances. At the far end of the scale sits primal matter, the irreducible infinitesimal substance of the totality.

Hold it for a sec. Here, you once again use the words "Ideal Form".

Given that you the usage of the word was changed previously, you need to re-clarify what it means here.

Since, in my view, functional descriptions of interactions at scales between the everyday and quantum level, do not support subjective experiences, I predict a finer scale of materiality that has fundamental proto-conscious properties. A pan-psychic substance such as this would conjoin with forms of subjective experience to become real things.

That would be unnecessary. While the complete explanation may not be present yet, the basics regarding consciousness and subjective experiences are understood and do not require invocation of an unknown materiality.

As I previously argued, the absence of property within the contents of the object does not negate the property itself.

The problem I see that needs a hypothesis is this. The brain continually adapts the connections between neurons into new shapes that encode a real official standard that expands or adjusts when we are presented with an outlying example, one not already reflected in the neural model of reality. For example, from childhood we learn to identify dogs after repeated exposure to various kinds of dogs. Once that neural model has been formed (by the process I’m trying to describe) the child compares new particulars against the model. Four legs and a tail, check. Floppy ears, check. Etc. How does the brain know to adjust the model or form new categories when confronted with an outlier like a three-legged dog? I’m saying that the brain compares its neutrally encoded model with an “official standard” that exists at a different scale than the everyday, relationships (forms) encoded in larger composite substances, like a community.

This is as far as I’ve gotten with this line of inquiry respecting demarcation points, etc. From here it’s uncharted territory to me.

As I see it, this would be where the process of abstraction comes in. While a lot of formal properties are available for the process of abstraction, only some of them are selected to formulate an abstract concept. Those properties become the defining properties for that abstract.

Consider this example. A child is exposed only to iPads as computers from the beginning. Unless taught about what are the defining characteristics of a computer are and simply told that "this is a computer", he'd formulate his own abstraction as to what a computer means. "Single physical body" - check, "touchscreen" - check and so on. This abstraction would only strengthen the more he's exposed to different types of iPads. So, when finally confronted with a desktop, he might not identify it as a "computer", since it has none of the defining features he selected.

However, if he's correctly informed that a computer means "something that computes", he can easily correct himself by identifying that "yes, iPad is still a computer since it does that and so is an abacus". This way, the correction of the standard is possible.