RE: why things are rather than not...and necessary existence
June 17, 2012 at 9:29 pm
(This post was last modified: June 17, 2012 at 9:31 pm by Angrboda.)
(June 17, 2012 at 6:45 am)Tobie Wrote: My point is that theories such as the big bang theory are models that if ran, can produce the same or similar results each time, and can be tested against more than one parameter. Most, if not all, ideas of god are not good theories for a few reasons. They are not particularly testable, because none describe the mechanism that the god(s) used to create the universe, so the creation myth cannot be tested. There is only dubious evidence ( that cannot be verified ) of predictions made by them, and the events they were predicting are even more dubious. Unless you can describe perfectly how a god created the universe, there is no basis to believe one did.
This is reminiscent of Alvin Plantinga's modal argument for the existence of God. In his argument, he postulates a certain kind of God as necessarily existing, however, examination of his argument shows that the term 'God' is just a placeholder for certain, minimal attributes, and that 'the universe' satisfies those attributes as well as anything like the gods of religion. These arguments don't really postulate that 'God' exist/ed, so much as 'a something' existed, and that something, unlike our current somethings, had the capacity to be the cause. Three things about this. First, it's obvious that something is being brought in solely for that property and that property alone, and is little more than a deus ex machina. Second, it's relatively easy for that something to become just like our current something, only in a closely related form, instead of requiring something radically different, like a thinking force; nature yields to a slightly different nature. Third, this is obvious equivocation: using the word God in a very limited sense, while at the same time pretending your argument demonstrates the existence of the larger entity of 'God'. It's dishonest.
It's also important to note that what happens at the boundary conditions is seldom simply a linear extension of conditions in the middle.