RE: How Free Will and Omniscience Works
September 3, 2012 at 5:32 pm
(This post was last modified: September 3, 2012 at 5:34 pm by Mystic.)
Free-will and knowledge of the future is a paradox.
A problem with the OP is in the following:
Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting.
If this is the case, while he does will for democrats, it's not free-will if it's all determined. For example, if he thinks about the prospect about immediate American defeat in Iraq and therefore will definitely not vote for Democrats, then that negates his free-will. Just thinking about the issue will force him to a decision.
If various factors make Donald vote either way - and free-will is not a factor, then there is no free-will.
For free-will to be a factor, you cannot say Donald will vote x given y or t given s, there must be a choice, in which you cannot say he will vote either way and it's not deterministic.
Therefore a problem with your analogy is that it had determinstic view from the start.
Another problem is that it has nothing to do with future knowledge, because, while the device can force the person to stop his free-will decision and will ignoring the whole deterministic part from the start, it cannot have forced the person to originally will either way, only having forced one will AFTER he wills the other way, and in this case, we know his will was originally free but then impeded upon...but the problem with future knowledge is that there is no orginal free-will as in the case of the analogy (ignoring the whole determinstic problem already mentioned).
A problem with the OP is in the following:
Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting.
If this is the case, while he does will for democrats, it's not free-will if it's all determined. For example, if he thinks about the prospect about immediate American defeat in Iraq and therefore will definitely not vote for Democrats, then that negates his free-will. Just thinking about the issue will force him to a decision.
If various factors make Donald vote either way - and free-will is not a factor, then there is no free-will.
For free-will to be a factor, you cannot say Donald will vote x given y or t given s, there must be a choice, in which you cannot say he will vote either way and it's not deterministic.
Therefore a problem with your analogy is that it had determinstic view from the start.
Another problem is that it has nothing to do with future knowledge, because, while the device can force the person to stop his free-will decision and will ignoring the whole deterministic part from the start, it cannot have forced the person to originally will either way, only having forced one will AFTER he wills the other way, and in this case, we know his will was originally free but then impeded upon...but the problem with future knowledge is that there is no orginal free-will as in the case of the analogy (ignoring the whole determinstic problem already mentioned).
