Pascal's Wager (the new version)

[CleanShavenJesus]

If we factor atheism into this probability, that gives me a 1 out of 22 chance of converting to the correct religion. With my probability, no matter what major religion you believe in (now counting atheism as one of them), you still only have a 1in 22 chance of being part of the correct religion/ideology. Meaning that my chances are as good as yours. Neither of us has a better chance of getting it right. Because we have no knowledge and no basis to go off of. We're just shootin' in the dark. Atheism or Islam, Christian or Buddhist. Each one has the same probability of being correct - 1:22

I think you may be overlooking a key element in the wager. (And, yes, I've been doing the same thing.) In any wager, the value of the prize is a critical factor in determining the worthiness of the wager, and the element of proportion with respect to how much one should wager. Economists have postulated that the value of an outcome is the product of its probability multiplied by the absolute worth of the outcome. (And again, this is an are where human reasoning departs from the rational road. An example of this would be to ask, if you have to rescue a floundering ship filled with 600 people, which should you prefer: a) a 100% chance of saving 200 people, or b) a 1/3 chance of saving all 600, with none saved otherwise. According to many theories of value, these are equivalent choices as the outcome in both is, on average, saving 200 people. Most people don't see it that way though from the standpoint of their intuitions.) When you include the possibility of an actual infinite in the equation, that term swamps the relative contribution of other terms (generally; if another term approaches zero as fast as a particular term approaches infinity, the results are less clear [forgive me, it's been 30 years since I studied this stuff]). Which I think ultimately means that it has to be attacked on grounds related to the transfinite. (Such grounds do exist, imo.) It is interesting to note, however, that many of the same people who would argue that you can't have an actual infinite when it suits them for the purpose of Kalam or other cosmological arguments, those same people are all too eager to embrace the possibility of an actual infinity when it works in their favor (as it does here).

To be perfectly honest (since I'd just make a fool of myself if I didn't admit it), your post kind of went over my head. You're saying that the value of an afterlife and what you receive by believing in the correct God affects the formula/wager? And if there is a God, the value of life increases if my belief is correct? I just want to make sure I understand you.

If that is what you're saying, I do not see how it would affect what I said. Pascal's Wager does a lot of assuming. Like you said (or I think you said) at the end of your post, the idea of an actual infinity works more in the favor of the ones supporting Pascal's Wager. But my theory states that the belief in no God, atheism, can also be factored into the wager because it's just as much a belief in a higher entity (in being that it is a lack of belief, so it is still a point of view/belief), as any religion.

Atheism and any theism have equal worth here because the probability of one of them being true is exactly the same. The Wagerer might say "it's better to believe in God because it is something, and atheism claims that there is nothing." No matter what religion you choose to believe in, atheism now included, if you're wrong, you're pissing the real God off either way.

I'm seeing this more from a probability standpoint and trying to drift away from the "worth" argument because I don't see how that argument can hold water in a rational thinking process. But you did say that this is where the human reasoning and rational road split.