Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, and Metaphysics

[InevitableCheese]

Aristotle rejects the existence of Platonic Forms altogether. His view is that the essence of the object (which I and Feser incorrectly called 'form') is determined by its substance. The Platonic Forms have no place in his metaphysics.

This is absolutely opposite of what Feser discusses. In his words on "form and matter":

The ordinary objects of our experience are irreducible composites of potentiality and actuality, of the capacity for change and something that persists through the change. In particular, they are irreducible composites of matter and form. The blue rubber ball is composed of a certain kind of matter - namely rubber - and a certain form - namely, the form of a blue, round, bouncy object. The matter by itself isn't the ball; after all, rubber could also take the form of an eraser, or a doorstop, or any number of things. The form by itself isn't the ball either; you can't bounce blueness, roundness, or even bounciness down the hallway, for they are mere abstractions. It is only the form and matter together that constitute the ball. Hence we hzve Aristotle's famous doctrine of hylomorphism...

And in the next section:

So, form and matter considered by themselves are, in general anyway, mere abstractions; they exist in the mind,, but not in reality. Still, they are different aspects of reality - in this case, of the ball. The form is not the matter and the matter is not the form. Even if, contra Plato, the form of the ball doesn't exist by itself; neither is it true to say after the fashion of materialism that the ball is "just a piece of matter." Nothing is just a piece of matter, for matter cannot exists without form, and form (being the principle that accounts for permanence) isn't material (matter being the principle that accounts for change).

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Sometimes philosophers seem to not understand that knowledge has advanced since Plato, Aristotle et al. As amazing as their contributions to so many fields have been, we know so much more now. Aristotle advocated ideas that were clearly incorrect. We've attained a tremendous amount of knowledge by refuting and challenging these ideas. That's how knowledge advances. Although I haven't read said book it seems from your synopsis like a complicated version of an argument from authority.

Feser talks about this in the 5th chapter, "Descent of the Modernists". He pushes that our immorality is because we abandoned Aristotelian metaphysics, and the morality it implies. He also talks about how science never refuted Aristotle's metaphysics (although disproving his science, of course), and that the main reason modern philosopher's began leaving them is because "we'll end up spending more time contemplating first principles and the state of our souls and less time thinking up new gadgets." The push for science, and the desire to better this material life, spawned modernists. He also blames Martin Luther and John Calvin for pushing that wealth is good/poverty is bad, and supporting individual conscience over Aristotelian Scholasticism.