(September 12, 2013 at 9:43 pm)InevitableCheese Wrote: This is absolutely opposite of what Feser discusses. In his words on "form and matter":
Quote:The ordinary objects of our experience are irreducible composites of potentiality and actuality, of the capacity for change and something that persists through the change. In particular, they are irreducible composites of matter and form. The blue rubber ball is composed of a certain kind of matter - namely rubber - and a certain form - namely, the form of a blue, round, bouncy object. The matter by itself isn't the ball; after all, rubber could also take the form of an eraser, or a doorstop, or any number of things. The form by itself isn't the ball either; you can't bounce blueness, roundness, or even bounciness down the hallway, for they are mere abstractions. It is only the form and matter together that constitute the ball. Hence we hzve Aristotle's famous doctrine of hylomorphism...
This section simply repeats Aristotle's theory of substance. As far as philosophy goes, this is nothing more than a copy-paste job. The only mistake here he makes is regarding objects as irreducible composites of form and matter. The phrase 'irreducible composite' is self-contradictory. If its a composite, it can be reduced to whatever it is composed of.
(September 12, 2013 at 9:43 pm)InevitableCheese Wrote: And in the next section:
Quote:So, form and matter considered by themselves are, in general anyway, mere abstractions; they exist in the mind,, but not in reality.[1] Still, they are different aspects of reality - in this case, of the ball. The form is not the matter and the matter is not the form. Even if, contra Plato, the form of the ball doesn't exist by itself[2]; neither is it true to say after the fashion of materialism that the ball is "just a piece of matter."[3] Nothing is just a piece of matter, for matter cannot exists without form, and form (being the principle that accounts for permanence) isn't material (matter being the principle that accounts for change)[4].
And here's where the errors and equivocations come flooding in. Going through them one by one:
[1] - This is the first indication that he confuses Aristotelian form with Platonic Forms. His statement is applicable to Aristotle's forms. However, in the previous argument, he said - "Consider first that when we grasp the nature, essence, for form of a thing, it is necessarily one and the same form, nature, or essence that exists both in the thing and in the intellect". Either the form is an aspect of reality that exists in mind (thus compatible with Aristotelian metaphysics) or it exists in reality (where it is something like Platonic Forms).
[2] - Here, even with rejection of Plato's theory, he is implicitly assuming that Plato's Forms and Aristotle's forms refer to one and the same concept.
[3] - This just indicates an abysmally poor understanding of materialism.
[4] - Did he really say that? If so, that just indicates a poor understanding of Aristotle. According to him, it is the matter which is permanent and the form which changes. The substance (house) is built out of matter (bricks) and form (laid in specific way). When the form is destroyed (layout is eradicated), the substance ceases to exist while the matter (bricks) continue to exist. The reversal here - saying that form is permanent and matter changes - is another example of equivocating with Platonic Forms which are considered unchanging and eternal.
