(September 15, 2013 at 1:12 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: I call Dennett a zombie because his speculations lead him to conclude that mental properties, like qualia and intentionality, are illusions. His claim is that intentionality, which applies to the whole brain, can be broken down into smaller parts. As such, specific brain functions contribute to the overall sense of intentionality with smaller, more specialized intentions. He carries this process all the way down to individual neurons and concludes that intentionality disappeares. Poof. The problem with this is that even a very small bit of something is still something, so you cannot completely get rid of intentionality. He intends to show that intentions do not exist. That makes Dennett a modern day sophist. He uses verbal slight of hand to distract from his circular logic. Thus you have knowing subjects incapable of actually knowing. There goes reason. Poof.
If you extend this naturalistic logic to morality you get a similar result, since the distinction between living and inanimate things disappears. Life becomes a stable electro-chemical reaction. So if humans are moral agents, it is the result of an amoral physical process. That is a contradiction.
As I've said before, I'm not familiar with Dennett's arguments or philosophical position - but I've been told that my own position often resembles his. However, if Chad's summary here is an accurate representation of Dennett's philosophy then I would like to state for the record that mine is nothing like it.
However, it'd be an error to call this logic "naturalistic" or to assume that all naturalistic philosophies take the same position with regards to intentionality, qualia, reason or morality.
