This is basically just Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. Here are some ways to dismantle the argument:
-Take on the Coherence view of truth. This argument relies on the correspondence theory of truth - that truth is ' out there' - which is popular, but also has known problems. Adopting the coherentist view that truth refers to statements that cohere together renders the argument unsound. As would the Pragmatist theory of truth.
-Evolution isn't teleological. It's a result of population mechanics given an organisms abilities determine their probability of propagating their genes.
-You don't need the entire truth to know part of it. Even assuming a correspondence view of truth, I can know with absolute certainty that there are some truths which are "self-attesting". That is, they prove themselves to be true. These include things like the law of identity (A=A) and the law of non-contradiction (A ¬= ¬A). This is the case in all worldviews. How I come to apprehend these inherent facts and that I do is irrelevant to their truth.
-Assuming this actually posed a problem for naturalism (it doesn't), I could just as easily think of a state of affairs for a theist wherein they too cannot be certain that (generously assuming God exists) their cognitive faculties are not the result of a cosmic trickster.
Does the mere fact that I could throw some aspect of one's cognitive ability actually throw the entire thing into doubt? Or does it reveal that at base, all worldviews have to take certain assumptions as axiomatic truths from which to progress? To say otherwise is contradictory to various necessary truths.
-Take on the Coherence view of truth. This argument relies on the correspondence theory of truth - that truth is ' out there' - which is popular, but also has known problems. Adopting the coherentist view that truth refers to statements that cohere together renders the argument unsound. As would the Pragmatist theory of truth.
-Evolution isn't teleological. It's a result of population mechanics given an organisms abilities determine their probability of propagating their genes.
-You don't need the entire truth to know part of it. Even assuming a correspondence view of truth, I can know with absolute certainty that there are some truths which are "self-attesting". That is, they prove themselves to be true. These include things like the law of identity (A=A) and the law of non-contradiction (A ¬= ¬A). This is the case in all worldviews. How I come to apprehend these inherent facts and that I do is irrelevant to their truth.
-Assuming this actually posed a problem for naturalism (it doesn't), I could just as easily think of a state of affairs for a theist wherein they too cannot be certain that (generously assuming God exists) their cognitive faculties are not the result of a cosmic trickster.
Does the mere fact that I could throw some aspect of one's cognitive ability actually throw the entire thing into doubt? Or does it reveal that at base, all worldviews have to take certain assumptions as axiomatic truths from which to progress? To say otherwise is contradictory to various necessary truths.
