I figured I'd go back and remake that anti-omniscience argument I made a while back, since there were some inapplicable responses I got, possibly as a result of poor detail on my part.
Terms:
Knowledge - Let's keep it simple (for me) and go with the good ol' justified true belief definition of knowledge (let me know if this causes problems with the argument) and truth is a correspondence between a belief or assertion, and reality.
Omniscience - Having all possible knowledge, regardless of the type of knowledge. Total omniscience, in other words.
Known unknowns (KU) - Knowledge which one knows that they don't know. It can be simplified as knowing the question, but not the answer. For example, I know that I don't know what exactly is 100ft below me.
Unknown unknowns (UU) - Knowledge which one doesn't even know that they don't know. This can be simp as neither knowing the question nor the answer. It seems self-evident that these can't be ruled out.
If you my argument is unclear (or possibly erroneous), I'll try to concisely explain what I mean. If knowledge is defined as a justified true belief, then even if your belief is true, it could merely be luck that it is. So it seems you need at least a third thing to make something knowledge: justification. But if you consider the question "Is there anything that I don't even know that I don't know?", you realize that even if the answer is "No", you couldn't justify that belief because it entails making the following contradictory statement: "I know that there is nothing that that I don't even know that I don't know." By definition, if it exists, you wouldn't even know you didn't know it. Whether or not it does exist is irrelevant, because it applies either way.
This makes it unjustifiable to think that you have no unknown unknowns, and thus you cannot call the belief knowledge. And this prevents you from knowing if you've acquired all possible knowledge among your unknown unknowns. Among other things, this argument would also invalidate Plantinga's ontological argument for God's existence as unsound on the first premise.
Did I just fuck with your brains?
Mine hurts a bit. xD
Terms:
Knowledge - Let's keep it simple (for me) and go with the good ol' justified true belief definition of knowledge (let me know if this causes problems with the argument) and truth is a correspondence between a belief or assertion, and reality.
Omniscience - Having all possible knowledge, regardless of the type of knowledge. Total omniscience, in other words.
Known unknowns (KU) - Knowledge which one knows that they don't know. It can be simplified as knowing the question, but not the answer. For example, I know that I don't know what exactly is 100ft below me.
Unknown unknowns (UU) - Knowledge which one doesn't even know that they don't know. This can be simp as neither knowing the question nor the answer. It seems self-evident that these can't be ruled out.
Argument Against Omniscience Wrote:1) Necessarily, if a conscious being cannot rule out having UUs, said mind has [at least] one KU: What are my UUs?
2) No conscious being can rule out having UUs due to the impossibility of the contrary (i.e it's incoherent to state "I know that there is nothing I don't even know that I don't know", because it's unjustifiable and thus not knowledge).
3) Therefore a being cannot know it has acquired knowledge all possibly knowable UUs (in other words, even if it's in fact true that a being has no UUs, it couldn't be known that one doesn't have them (remember, JTB) because it is a claim that cannot be justified) because there is an unknowable KU.
4) Omniscience is defined as having all possible knowledge.
C1) Given (1 - 3), (4) is not a possible attribute.
[The argument could end here, but nah]
5) 'God' is defined as a being who, if he exists, must possess (4).
C2) Given (C1 & 5), God does not exist.
If you my argument is unclear (or possibly erroneous), I'll try to concisely explain what I mean. If knowledge is defined as a justified true belief, then even if your belief is true, it could merely be luck that it is. So it seems you need at least a third thing to make something knowledge: justification. But if you consider the question "Is there anything that I don't even know that I don't know?", you realize that even if the answer is "No", you couldn't justify that belief because it entails making the following contradictory statement: "I know that there is nothing that that I don't even know that I don't know." By definition, if it exists, you wouldn't even know you didn't know it. Whether or not it does exist is irrelevant, because it applies either way.
This makes it unjustifiable to think that you have no unknown unknowns, and thus you cannot call the belief knowledge. And this prevents you from knowing if you've acquired all possible knowledge among your unknown unknowns. Among other things, this argument would also invalidate Plantinga's ontological argument for God's existence as unsound on the first premise.
Did I just fuck with your brains?
Mine hurts a bit. xD
