RE: Terrible Atheist Argument #1
November 22, 2013 at 11:02 pm
(This post was last modified: November 22, 2013 at 11:12 pm by MindForgedManacle.)
(November 22, 2013 at 10:09 pm)Vincenzo "Vinny" G. Wrote: Now we both agree that in order for the argument to succeed, P1 must hold true. But about P1,
a) We can concede that it is epistemically possible,
b) We don't know that it is metaphysically possible.
Exactly.
Quote:But you also seem to be saying regarding MN (or God, in the MOA), that until MN (God) is shown to be incoherent, the proposition that it could be true (or the conception of God being coherent is true) is defensible, even though this only takes us to epistemic possibility.
So at best the MOA would say "So far as I'm aware, God exists" or the MN would say "So far as I'm aware, MN is true".
But in order to demonstrate metaphysical possibility, normally the appeal is to conceivability IIRC. I've seen some people frame the issue such that "Unless you can show some metaphysical incoherency, it is reasonable to believe it's possible."
But you seem to be saying something different. You're saying that the proponent has to bear a positive burden to show metaphysical possibility.
What exactly is the burden here? How can it be met, whether for God, or MN, or anything else?
Sorry, I've been a bit sloppy, but I think I can clear it up.
What I'm doing when I make the modal argument for atheism is showing that what theists are trying to do is fundamentally flawed. I'm not saying that they have to meet a burden of proof that metaphysical naturalists don't, I'm showing that if - like proponents of the MOA for God's existence - I treat P1) as metaphysically possibility rather than epistemic possibility (which is what both P1s only are), then the arguments stalemate.
So the point is neither side can use this kind of argument unless they've demonstrated beforehand that God's existence is metaphysically possible. But if they could or had done that, why would they need this MOA? The whole point of ontological arguments - from what I understand - is to essentially turn God's existence into an analytic judgement, i.e to make God's existence entailed by the very definition of God. If they had already coherently defined God into such, they wouldn't need the MO argument to show it because he would have to exist. I'd say Kant sort of ruined that kind of argument.
So, the main thing to get is that theists have to realize their are viable atheistic modal arguments as well that call into question this approach via stalemate (and if it doesn't, they can actually can go against religious theisms). Unfortunately, most Christian/Muslim apologists aren't usually told this by the bigger name apologists who wave around this argument as having established God's existence (William Lane Craig, as always; though he sometimes flip-flops on this). Funnily enough, there's this fairly popular YouTube theist called "InspiringPhilosophy" who claims the argument is irrefutable and that this particular objection is just philosophers "biting the epistemic bullet". What a crock.
In other words, these arguments don't establish metaphysical possibility, they have to be supplemented with further powerful arguments. Theists in the know will sometimes supplement it with Robert Madoyle's argument about "great-making" properties. I don't think his argument works either, partly because it's entirely subjective. A being with "great-making" properties cannot have "lesser-making" properties and such. -sigh-