I think that guy calling Plantinga an idiot was a little unfair at points.

(November 21, 2013 at 6:36 pm)whateverist Wrote: Nor would they apply to the universe if that is understood as having proceeded from a form of nothingness which contained everything as one of its potential states .. which seems to be the correct description by the way.

Are you trying to argue that the Universe is not made of material and did not have a beginning? Are we now going back to the steady state theories of the 1920s?

(November 21, 2013 at 6:46 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: @Stal Everything I've read keeps saying he's a reformed epistemologist and has delivered heavy critiques of the evidentialist approach.

That’s odd because I have seen him argue against presuppositionalism, so maybe he is just not very consistent in his position. :/

I have no clue. But I don't think reformed epistemologists can be equated with presuppositionalists. Presupps. have to think they're right to begin with and will openly admit they cannot be wrong. I doubt Plantinga would go that far. William Lane Craig has (by arguing from religious experience equally automatic, indisputable proof), but I would expect Plantinga to be a cut above that.

Maybe I'm just wrong.

(November 22, 2013 at 7:45 pm)MindForgedManacle Wrote: I have no clue. But I don't think reformed epistemologists can be equated with presuppositionalists. Presupps. have to think they're right to begin with and will openly admit they cannot be wrong. I doubt Plantinga would go that far. William Lane Craig has (by arguing from religious experience equally automatic, indisputable proof), but I would expect Plantinga to be a cut above that.

Maybe I'm just wrong.

Yes, I have trouble pinning down exactly what he means by the term Reformed epistemology. At times it seems evidential in nature and other times seems presuppositional. I do know that his critique of presuppostionalism was based completely upon a mischaracterization of their position, so it appears that at times Plantinga can be a bit sloppy (note: his critique of presuppositionalism was based upon an interviewer’s question so I do not believe the mischaracterization was intentional but was rather based upon a lack of understanding).

(November 22, 2013 at 10:09 pm)Vincenzo "Vinny" G. Wrote: Now we both agree that in order for the argument to succeed, P1 must hold true. But about P1,
a) We can concede that it is epistemically possible,
b) We don't know that it is metaphysically possible.

Exactly.

Quote:But you also seem to be saying regarding MN (or God, in the MOA), that until MN (God) is shown to be incoherent, the proposition that it could be true (or the conception of God being coherent is true) is defensible, even though this only takes us to epistemic possibility.

So at best the MOA would say "So far as I'm aware, God exists" or the MN would say "So far as I'm aware, MN is true".

But in order to demonstrate metaphysical possibility, normally the appeal is to conceivability IIRC. I've seen some people frame the issue such that "Unless you can show some metaphysical incoherency, it is reasonable to believe it's possible."

But you seem to be saying something different. You're saying that the proponent has to bear a positive burden to show metaphysical possibility.

What exactly is the burden here? How can it be met, whether for God, or MN, or anything else?

Sorry, I've been a bit sloppy, but I think I can clear it up.

What I'm doing when I make the modal argument for atheism is showing that what theists are trying to do is fundamentally flawed. I'm not saying that they have to meet a burden of proof that metaphysical naturalists don't, I'm showing that if - like proponents of the MOA for God's existence - I treat P1) as metaphysically possibility rather than epistemic possibility (which is what both P1s only are), then the arguments stalemate.

So the point is neither side can use this kind of argument unless they've demonstrated beforehand that God's existence is metaphysically possible. But if they could or had done that, why would they need this MOA? The whole point of ontological arguments - from what I understand - is to essentially turn God's existence into an analytic judgement, i.e to make God's existence entailed by the very definition of God. If they had already coherently defined God into such, they wouldn't need the MO argument to show it because he would have to exist. I'd say Kant sort of ruined that kind of argument.

So, the main thing to get is that theists have to realize their are viable atheistic modal arguments as well that call into question this approach via stalemate (and if it doesn't, they can actually can go against religious theisms). Unfortunately, most Christian/Muslim apologists aren't usually told this by the bigger name apologists who wave around this argument as having established God's existence (William Lane Craig, as always; though he sometimes flip-flops on this). Funnily enough, there's this fairly popular YouTube theist called "InspiringPhilosophy" who claims the argument is irrefutable and that this particular objection is just philosophers "biting the epistemic bullet". What a crock.

---

In other words, these arguments don't establish metaphysical possibility, they have to be supplemented with further powerful arguments. Theists in the know will sometimes supplement it with Robert Madoyle's argument about "great-making" properties. I don't think his argument works either, partly because it's entirely subjective. A being with "great-making" properties cannot have "lesser-making" properties and such. -sigh-

And I think that without a successful ontological argument, religious theists loose what is in principle probably their best possible argument. I think generic theism like deism has a better shot at establishing itself. I've heard some cosmic consciousness arguments that I admit are a little bit compelling, at least in terms of persuasiveness.

(November 22, 2013 at 7:13 pm)Statler Waldorf Wrote:

(November 21, 2013 at 6:36 pm)whateverist Wrote: Nor would they apply to the universe if that is understood as having proceeded from a form of nothingness which contained everything as one of its potential states .. which seems to be the correct description by the way.

Are you trying to argue that the Universe is not made of material and did not have a beginning? Are we now going back to the steady state theories of the 1920s?

Not at all. It just seems that empty space turns out to not be irreversibly empty. With or without the help any pre-existing being to pronounce "let there be ..", the material and immaterial seem to be interchangeable.

(November 6, 2013 at 10:42 pm)Vincenzo "Vinny" G. Wrote: Okay, so there are smart atheists and there are dumb atheists.

Some dumb atheists make some piss poor arguments. Here I'll deal with one that comes up a lot.

1) "If God created everything then who created God?"

This is one facepalmtastic objection. Typically the atheist is some 12 year old who thinks he's "refuted religion". If he is, it's no use trying to reason. But if there are smart atheists, they ought to know why this is a terrible argument:

a) There are various beings that are called "God", and they all have different features. But philosophically, the most rigorous concept of God is called the "Maximally Great Being", or a being that possesses all the categories of greatness to such a degree that nothing greater can be conceived. Such a being is almost always thought to be personal rather than impersonal.

b) One of the features of this maximally great being is it's role as the "First cause" or "uncaused cause". To understand what this is, you have to look at everything in the world in terms of cause-effect relations. Everything contingent has a cause that leads backwards in a causal chain. Does the causal chain go on infinitely, or is it finite? Theists argue that the causal chain is finite, and it begins at an uncaused cause, or first cause which was not itself caused by anything. This is God.

If you disagree with this idea, you can either:
i) Challenge the claim that the causal chain is finite, arguing that it is infinite in the past.
ii) Challenge the claim that the first cause must be God.

What you cannot do is imply that God needs to be caused by something.

The original God had to have always existed, he was never born. This god has existed in all timelines since time is irrelevent that dimension. He has created many demi-gods who in turn created other gods. To the point that no intelligent being in the universe knows the original god.

Anyhow, atheists claim the the big bang was created by mother nature, a freak accident. Yet one can argue mother nature is GOD.