Not Convinced Determinism Makes Sense of Moral Responsibility. Convince Me It Does

[Mudhammam]

Thank you for replying. I'm surprised the other responses consisted only of ignorance of the philosophical problem and the ready embrace of moral relativism. Many of the "New Atheists" obviously don't agree with postmodernism and neither do I. In fact, the only way to accuse religion of promoting evil (rather than merely going "left") is to have some objective compass of morality by which to judge religious teachings as immoral. As to your point about the potential punishment that goes into our brain processes, I'm not really sure how that's relevant. Can atheists justify moral duties--in conjunction with determinism--why a person OUGHT to do something, even if doing so results in punishment for that individual instead of reward? Daniel Dennett and Sam Harris seem to hold that determinism and moral duties can co-exist, unless I've misunderstood their views, and I'd like to understand that better.

The other responses are what they are because this subject has (recently) been done to death on this forum.
When I mentioned punishment... perhaps "consequences" should have been more apt a word. Lots of information go into making some decisions and behaviors. As to the consequences, the absence of detailed information makes one use probabilities.... what are the odds this present will please my wife? what are the odds I get caught if I rape that cute cheerleader? what are the odds people will think less of me, if I speak my mind?
If the perceived intuitive probability (stemming mostly from past experience) supports a given behavior, then it is carried out.... it seems this would be one of the last processes before actually carrying out the behavior... many considerations must come before this one: "Do I want to waste time doing this?" "Can I do it?", etc....

Now the "ought"... Looking back at history, the "ought" seems to be a product of society.
Ought we have slaves? - some time ago, it was our duty to have slaves... and the slaves' duty to be slaves... did that make it right? it seems yes. (I'd disagree, but I'm in the now)
Ought we have slaves, now? no. Do some of us wish we had slaves? definitely!
The difference being? a different perception of the value of each human individual at the level of the national code of law.



Society also has some weight in the decision making process of the brain. Some individuals will sacrifice themselves for the betterment of the social group of which they are a part... others will never do so... willingly.

That makes sense but to clarify are we only morally responsible to the extent that we get caught and punished for immoral acts (both those immoral acts we committed and the moral ones we failed to do)? Or is there some transcendent truth, as rationality might be considered, something part of natural law, that we are in some way responsible to (karma, perhaps, in its truest sense) EVEN IF the present is always determined by the past?

As to your thoughts on moral duties, I think you ran into the inevitable problem with your slavery example. Of course, we both view that as morally reprehensible now, but was it *actually* morally wrong to view slavery as a duty then (or again at some point in the future with enough brainwashing) if its nothing more than societal projection?

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@Apophenia Are you sure Harris isn't a compatibilist like Dennett? I was under the impression that he was.

Anyhow, @OP this question is a bit nonsensical. Firstly, it's trying to pose a problem for compaitiblist views on morality while simultaneously not recognizing that if it is actually a problem for compatibilists (I don't think it is), then it is also a probblem for libertarian concepts of free will. Take this for example: If I did not 'chose' to do otherwise than I in fact did, why didn't I? Under the libertarian concept of free will, how can I be held responsible for not choosing to choose? This is the regress problem, basically. It makes no sense to talk about choosing to choose what you choose, or choosing to think what you think.

This is among the reasons why few philosophers hold to the libertarian view, and those who do are nearly all theists. In fact, the percentages of philosophers who are some kind of theist (~14%) is approximately the same as those who adhere to libertarian free will (~14%), although I admit I can't remember what the crossover is, so take this bit as a reasonable inference.

No doubt the concept of free will seems somewhat incoherent though I'm sure those studied in philosophy could argue otherwise. But its because I can't make sense of "choosing to choose what I choose," as you say, that I can't understand how many atheists embrace the notion of moral responsibility, or objectivity for that matter, if each human bios is ultimately pre-programmed by its own genetic history and concurring environment. By the way, I don't mean to imply that these philosophical questions are better explained by theists.