Not Convinced Determinism Makes Sense of Moral Responsibility. Convince Me It Does

[Angrboda]

Also, how the hell do I hide this obnoxiously long quote so that you don't have to scroll through everything we already stated multiple times?

A small tutorial on quoting....

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[quote='genkaus' pid='555722' dateline='1386227917']

"Choice" is a difficult concept to analyze without the metaphysical preconceptions. Specifically, within the classical determinism/free-will debate, the concept of "choice" is regarded as antithetical to determinism. And it is those ideas about choice that inform our view about "control".

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For example, suppose I go to a restaurant, look over the menu and consider the following factors a) the steak here is good and within budget, b) the lobster is better but expensive, c) the chicken was undercooked last time. Thus, I come to a decision and make the "choice" of ordering steak. Now, a determinist would say that since these factors were processed by my consciousness to give a logical result, there was no actual choice involved. A believer of free-will might argue that "I" had a certain leeway, that the output of these factors was not binding and therefore the element of choice was involved.
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Results in:

"Choice" is a difficult concept to analyze without the metaphysical preconceptions. Specifically, within the classical determinism/free-will debate, the concept of "choice" is regarded as antithetical to determinism. And it is those ideas about choice that inform our view about "control".

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For example, suppose I go to a restaurant, look over the menu and consider the following factors a) the steak here is good and within budget, b) the lobster is better but expensive, c) the chicken was undercooked last time. Thus, I come to a decision and make the "choice" of ordering steak. Now, a determinist would say that since these factors were processed by my consciousness to give a logical result, there was no actual choice involved. A believer of free-will might argue that "I" had a certain leeway, that the output of these factors was not binding and therefore the element of choice was involved.

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Or, selectively quote:

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[quote='genkaus' pid='555722' dateline='1386227917']
Where both these positions go wrong is with the assumption that "I" am an observer apart from the actual causal chain. Even the determinist regards the processes that went into the decision making as somehow separate from the "I" - and the question both parties argue over is whether or not that observer can affect the causal chain while remaining separate from it and they give their opinion regarding choice based on it. They assume that if this a-causal observer can affect the causal chain, then he can exert control and has choice and if he can't, then both control and choice are illusions
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[i]Your first response here...[/i]

[quote='genkaus' pid='555722' dateline='1386227917']
But if we accept that the observer, the "I", is a part of the causal chain, then the previous idea regarding choice becomes meaningless. Both control and choice cannot come from something beyond but must be a part of the causal chain itself. So, in this scenario, the way we re-examined our idea about free-will (what is it supposed to be free from), we also need to re-examine the idea about choice and control.
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[i]Your second response here...[/i]

Results in:

Where both these positions go wrong is with the assumption that "I" am an observer apart from the actual causal chain. Even the determinist regards the processes that went into the decision making as somehow separate from the "I" - and the question both parties argue over is whether or not that observer can affect the causal chain while remaining separate from it and they give their opinion regarding choice based on it. They assume that if this a-causal observer can affect the causal chain, then he can exert control and has choice and if he can't, then both control and choice are illusions

Your first response here...

But if we accept that the observer, the "I", is a part of the causal chain, then the previous idea regarding choice becomes meaningless. Both control and choice cannot come from something beyond but must be a part of the causal chain itself. So, in this scenario, the way we re-examined our idea about free-will (what is it supposed to be free from), we also need to re-examine the idea about choice and control.

Your second response here...

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