(December 5, 2013 at 3:41 pm)genkaus Wrote: Read your own argument - it defeats your point. You can talk about something the world has as independent from the other things the world has, but not independent from the world itself. The fact that you've had to keep adding the qualifier "apart from itself" proves it. So, the point is, a necessary truth existing is contingent upon the existence of reality.
you entirely miss that it would only require a world because of semantics, not necessity. the fact that it exists means it exists in a world, but that doesn't express a contingent relationship. or if it does, it's more like a relationship of a world and at least one thing existing. i'll try to simplify it with this statement-- "a world exists if at least one thing exists." and the fact that I qualified it with "apart from itself" isn't adding anything new since to be necessary is to exist without being contingent on anything external. to say it is contingent upon itself is just playing semantics. in modal logic, necessary is defined as "true in all possible worlds" and that's the definition I subscribed to in the argument.
Quote:No, I start with a fact (not a proposition) and formulated a proposition from it. Thus proving that a proposition can be contingent upon non-propositions.but you realize the facts aren't necessarily true in the since they couldn't possibly have happened any other way. for example, Obama is president but it is possible that he would not have become president. thus his presidency is contingent upon the facts leading up to the event to where he became president.
Quote:Good. So you understand the argument then. We have propositions that are contingent upon non-propositions and that is where their truth-value comes form. Necessarily true propositions are not required.they are still required since the events can only be expressed as propositions and when they are we realize that they aren't necessary themselves. sequences of events can conceivably different, which leads to the problem "why is anything true at all?" unless you're going to take up a position that all events of reality are necessary in the sense they couldn't have possibly been different (which would be an extreme determinist position) then you can't deny the facts aren't necessarily true.
Quote:I didn't get into perception to begin with. What we are talking about is the truth of the proposition contingent on facts - not the nature of facts themselves. And given the mutable nature of reality, facts change.give an example of a fact that has changed.
I do not feel obliged to believe that the same God who has endowed us with senses, reason, and intellect has intended us to forgo their use and by some other means to give us knowledge which we can attain by them.
-Galileo
-Galileo