Just a short note. Christians are always blathering about God's gift of freewill and claiming that atheistic determinism puts an end to moral responsibility. However, the fact is that it is difficult to extract any conclusion other than determinism from the theistic premise of an omnipotent, omniscient deity. Before the 19th century virtually all arguments for and against determinism were in a theological context.
The 18th century writer Sam Johnson was very troubled by the idea of determinism and argued against it with his biographer Boswell who had been brought up as a Scottish Calvinist.
The 18th century writer Sam Johnson was very troubled by the idea of determinism and argued against it with his biographer Boswell who had been brought up as a Scottish Calvinist.
Quote:Boswell: "The argument for the moral necessity of human actions is always, I observe, fortified by supposing universal prescience to be one of the attributes of the Deity." Johnson: "You are surer that you are free, than you are of prescience; you are surer that you can lift up your finger or not as you please, than you are of any conclusion from a deduction of reasoning. But let us consider a little the objection from prescience. It is certain I am either to go home tonight or not; that does not prevent my freedom." Boswell: "That it is certain you are either to go home or not, does not prevent your freedom; because the liberty of choice between the two is compatible with that certainty. But if one of these events be certain now, you have no future power of volition. If it be certain you are to go home to-night, you must go home." Johnson: "If I am well acquainted with a man, I can judge with great probability how he will act in any case, without his being restrained by my judging. God may have this probability increased to certainty." Boswell: When it is increased to certainty, freedom ceases, because that cannot be certainly foreknown, which is not certain at the time; but if it be certain at the time, it is a contradiction in terms to maintain that there can be afterwards any contingency dependent on the exercise of will or anything else." Johnson: "All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it."I sympathize with Johnson's perplexity, and his last statement wonderfully epitomizes how we all feel on the subject. However, I think he is a long way from having proved free will.
If you could reason with religious people, there would be no religious people — House
