The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[Rational AKD]

I do remember. Perhaps you remember me from that thread. I found your "logical" arguments as unconvincing then as I do now.

I believe I tried responding to that post but was frustrated because my computer was bugging out while I was typing causing me to lose all my work over and over again. your objection is not relevant to this argument since it still fulfills the purpose. however, you will find your answer here.

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With that in mind, Bullinger’s fourth list of idiomatic verbs deals with active verbs that “were used by the Hebrews to express, not the doing of the thing, but the permission of the thing which the agent is said to do” (p. 823, emp. in orig.). To illustrate, in commenting on Exodus 4:21, Bullinger stated: “ ‘I will harden his heart (i.e., I will permit or suffer his heart to be hardened), that he shall not let the people go.’ So in all the passages which speak of the hardening of Pharaoh’s heart. As is clear from the common use of the same Idiom in the following passages” (1968, p. 823). He then listed Jeremiah 4:10, “ ‘Lord God, surely thou hast greatly deceived this people’: i.e., thou hast suffered this People to be greatly deceived, by the false prophets….’ ” Ezekiel 14:9 is also given as an example of this type of usage: “ ‘If the prophet be deceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have deceived that prophet’: i.e., I have permitted him to deceive himself.” James MacKnight, in a lengthy section on biblical idioms, agrees with Bullinger’s assessment that in Hebrew active verbs can express permission and not direct action. This explanation unquestionably clarifies the question of God hardening Pharaoh’s heart. When the text says that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart, it means that God would permit or allow Pharaoh’s heart to be hardened.
https://www.apologeticspress.org/apconte...ticle=1205

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It isn't with me, as I already told you. "God" is at best a nebulously defined concept, different for each person who believes.

which is why I clearly defined it in the Purpose portion of my post.

In the case of your argument, it boils down to "We define Yahweh as omnipotent. Therefore he must exist because otherwise he wouldn't be omnipotent, would he?"

I showed this is not true in objection 2.

I've never heard a coherent description and certainly not a consistent one. So do you know what it is or not?

sure.
1. he is an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect immaterial mind.
2. relative to our reality, he is everywhere, outside himself he is nowhere for nothing exists apart from him (which means all of us and our reality are constructs of his thoughts).
3. irrelevant. if he is coherent he exists according to this argument.

Going by that same logic, by changing only one property of god (the physical likeness of spaghetti) and leaving all others, why is it so suddenly bizarre? It isn't self-contradictory, so I fail to see the problem.

because you aren't taking just one attribute so you can add one. you're taking everything away from the concept of spaghetti that makes it spaghetti. you can't just say it's immaterial, but you must also say it's no longer food, it no longer has shape color or sense. it other words you're saying it's an omnipotent spaghetti monster that is not spaghetti and is not a monster since it's immaterial.