RE: The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic
February 14, 2014 at 2:27 am
(This post was last modified: February 14, 2014 at 2:32 am by max-greece.)
Quote:Just to be clear, the purpose of this argument is to prove the mere possibility that God exists implies his actual existence. with the success of this argument, the only burden I have to fulfill is to prove God is possible, then logic dictates he actually exists.
Prove? I'm not sure any logical argument can do this. A unicorn is possible, as are centaurs, dragons, fairies, The Alien, E.T. and my friend Billy with a 10 foot willy.
Quote:God here is defined generically as an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. this definition may be consistent with any monotheistic or deistic theology. this argument does not prove Christianity is correct. it does prove atheism is incorrect.
There are innumerable conundrums that God cannot solve so we will end up playing with the definition of the word omnipotent. Can God make a weight so heavy he cannot lift it? And so on.
Omniscient suffers from the same issue, only worse. Can God know both the location and the direction of travel of an election, for example?
Morally perfect. Either this is self referential or we are measuring God against an external measure. If its self referential then its meaningless. If its against an external measure then your definition of God is dependent on an external factor.
Quote:Argument:
P1: the concept of God has no contradictions in itself.
P2: if the concept of God has no contradictions, it is conceivable.
C1: therefore God is conceivable.
P3: if God's existence were dependent upon an external factor, he wouldn't be omnipotent.
P4: the concept of God includes omnipotence.
C2: therefore God's existence is not dependent upon an external factor.
P5: if something's existence is not dependent upon an external factor, then it necessarily exists in and of itself (given it is conceivable).
C3: therefore God's existence is necessary in and of itself.
P6: something that necessarily exists must actually exist.
C4: therefore God exists.
As you recognise P1 is already problematic, but P2 is also problematic in that there are contradictions in the morally perfect being which is not dependent on an external factor (C2).
P5 is questionable. If something is not dependent on an external factor that it can exist but I do not see why it has to. Suppose we re-define God to be morally reprehensible - do any of the arguments collapse? I can't see any of P1-P6 that are undermined in any way by this change. Therefore a morally reprehensible God exits, given that it can exist in the same way.
A morally reprehensible God is the basis of maltheism. Can a morally reprehensible God exist at the same time as a morally perfect God?
Oh crap - spent an hour composing a post and almost every point you make has already been raised by the time you actually add it.
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