The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[MindForgedManacle]

Purpose:
Just to be clear, the purpose of this argument is to prove the mere possibility that God exists implies his actual existence. with the success of this argument, the only burden I have to fulfill is to prove God is possible, then logic dictates he actually exists. God here is defined generically as an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect being. this definition may be consistent with any monotheistic or deistic theology. this argument does not prove Christianity is correct. it does prove atheism is incorrect.

I really think you need to take some courses on metaphysics and Immanuel Kant, the latter of which Plantinga - in my opinion - has a shit understanding of. But my main focus will be on your argument.

Argument:
P1: the concept of God has no contradictions in itself.
P2: if the concept of God has no contradictions, it is conceivable.
C1: therefore God is conceivable.
P3: if God's existence were dependent upon an external factor, he wouldn't be omnipotent.
P4: the concept of God includes omnipotence.
C2: therefore God's existence is not dependent upon an external factor.
P5: if something's existence is not dependent upon an external factor, then it necessarily exists in and of itself (given it is conceivable).
C3: therefore God's existence is necessary in and of itself.
P6: something that necessarily exists must actually exist.
C4: therefore God exists.

Wrong from the word go. I would say the concept of god is logically contradictory, so your argument is a complete nonstarter for me. Furthermore, P3 is patently false, and for now I'll ignore the fact that omnipotence is a vacuous word. What does the ability to do anything thing logically possible have to do with being contingent? Without answering this, you can add a bare assertion fallacy to the list of your argument's errors.

Now, the problem your argument runs into that it can't escape (and neither can Plantinga's modal version) is that it COMPLETELY looses track and confuses of epistemology with metaphysics. Saying that because something is *supposedly* conceivable is therefore possible is purely epistemic. All you are saying is that "As far as I know, X can exist". It isn't until the existence of X has been conclusively demonstrated that X can be said to be actually known to be a true metaphysical possibility. And this is where I would run an ontological argument for metaphysical naturalism to make said point:

P1) If metaphysical naturalism is true in any possible world, then God cannot exist.

P2) Metaphysical naturalism is true in some possible world.

C) Therefore, God cannot exist.

But did I actually prove anything? NO. Valid modus ponens yes, and the ONLY way to dispute the argument is to say metaphysical naturalism is incoherent, but I haven't shown anything because, like with your argument, I'm making a retarded jump from epistemology to metaphysics.

the argument was constructed such that there should only be one controversial premise, the first premise. every other premise and conclusion logically follows from that one premise. thus, the only way atheism could be correct is if it is impossible for God to exist. the mere possibility of his existence implies his actual existence.

And without proving that God is an actual metaphysical possibility the argument is useless. But if you could do that (you can't) the you wouldn't need the argument.

Objections:
3. why is P3 true?-- because of God's existence were dependent upon an external factor, that would be a weakness for him. for example, if God were made of matter, then he wouldn't be omnipotent because we can break down matter therefore we could break down God. God must therefore transcend matter, not depend on it.

I have no clue how you got that. Being contingent is a red herring when discussing omnipotence.

4. I don't get how you get C2-- C2 is derived from C1, P3, and P4. the fact that God is conceivable means it is not impossible for him to exist. P3 shows that it is impossible for God's existence to depend upon an external factor due to his omnipotence, yet P4 shows that omnipotence is part of the conception of God. this inevitably means C2 is correct.

Again, a naive confusion of epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility.


This is why most philosophers aren't theists (73% atheist, 12% non-theistic positions, 14% theist). They don't try to play fast and loose with their ontologies. I beg of you, read up some Kant because this is just old and longsince given up (except by apologists).