The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[Rational AKD]

I really think you need to take some courses on metaphysics and Immanuel Kant, the latter of which Plantinga - in my opinion - has a shit understanding of. But my main focus will be on your argument.

good because i would hate this to simply be ad hominem exchange.

Wrong from the word go. I would say the concept of god is logically contradictory, so your argument is a complete nonstarter for me.

if you read the purpose, you would realize this objection is irrelevant to the purpose. but you do seem to have a nag for missing details of my posts. and i'm sure you have several failed arguments to support your position such as the ones we most recently discussed. but that's your prerogative if you want to hold onto failed arguments.

Furthermore, P3 is patently false, and for now I'll ignore the fact that omnipotence is a vacuous word. What does the ability to do anything thing logically possible have to do with being contingent? Without answering this, you can add a bare assertion fallacy to the list of your argument's errors.

i'm sure you also didn't read the posts here. there are 2 parts to the definition of omnipotent, an active definition and a descriptive one as i said here:

there are 2 aspects of omnipotence. an active aspect: the ability to do anything logically possible; and a descriptive aspect: cannot be vulnerable or overcome by anything. the descriptive aspect is what makes P3 correct. if God were made of matter, he would be vulnerable which contradicts his omnipotence so he can't be made of matter.

and if you're dissatisfied with that definition then, like with most all your objections, i can simply change the semantics by replacing the word 'omnipotence' with 'omni-invulnerability' or something. maybe someday you'll realize how silly it is to argue semantics.

Now, the problem your argument runs into that it can't escape (and neither can Plantinga's modal version) is that it COMPLETELY looses track and confuses of epistemology with metaphysics. Saying that because something is *supposedly* conceivable is therefore possible is purely epistemic. All you are saying is that "As far as I know, X can exist".

not the way i'm using the word conceivable. i think the argument would look a little better if i replaced the word conceivable with coherent since that's a better word to use here. but regardless, i'm using metaphysical possibility from P1, showing it's logical implication of metaphysical necessity, and showing metaphysical necessity entails actual existence.

It isn't until the existence of X has been conclusively demonstrated that X can be said to be actually known to be a true metaphysical possibility.

sometimes i wonder if you deliberately make this stuff up. Stanford Encyclopedia obviously proves you wrong:

Φ is metaphysically possible if and only if Φ is true in some metaphysically possible world.
Example: It is metaphysically possible that some physical particle moves faster than the speed of light.

Φ is metaphysically necessary if and only if Φ is true in all metaphysically possible worlds.
Example: It is metaphysically necessary that Queen Elizabeth is a human.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modali...stemology/

lets see how many ways this proves you wrong. do you have to demonstrate something to show it's true in a metaphysically possible world? no. has it been demonstrated that physical particles move faster than the speed of light? no. yet is that listed as an example of a metaphysical possibility on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy site? yes. again, do you make up your own rules of philosophy?

But did I actually prove anything? NO. Valid modus ponens yes, and the ONLY way to dispute the argument is to say metaphysical naturalism is incoherent, but I haven't shown anything because, like with your argument, I'm making a retarded jump from epistemology to metaphysics.

what you seem to miss is that argument can only be valid given the modal ontological argument is valid (which you obviously don't think is true). otherwise possibility of naturalism in a possible world doesn't at all show impossibility of God in a possible world. so if hypothetically we were to say the MOA is valid, then your modal naturalism argument would be valid; however, you can only show P1 is true by showing P1 of the MOA is false. so it still doesn't get around debunking the MOA even if your argument is valid.

And without proving that God is an actual metaphysical possibility the argument is useless. But if you could do that (you can't) the you wouldn't need the argument.

again, that is not in the purpose of the argument; though i'm sure you didn't even read that part. but if i were to prove P1, i would probably do so with the modal perfection argument.

I have no clue how you got that. Being contingent is a red herring when discussing omnipotence.

it certainly is not a red herring. there are many who would agree that God (by the definition i used) is possible, or that he can exist in at least one possible world. if they disagree that he is necessary, then they would have to think he is contingent. since the majority of atheists don't think God is impossible, all of them would have to think he is contingent.

Again, a naive confusion of epistemic possibility with metaphysical possibility.

again, an abject failure on your part. according to Stanford "It is metaphysically necessary that Queen Elizabeth is a human." just like it is metaphysically necessary that Queen Elizabeth is a human, it is metaphysically necessary that God is omnipotent. from that, as we can see in the argument, this means it is also metaphysically necessary that he exists so long as it is not metaphysically impossible that he exists.

I'm like a mental midget when it comes to formal philosophy, but how is "omnipotent" not self-contradictory?

how is it self-contradictory?

And how is "god" not contingent when every instance of "god" derives from some idiot flapping their gums about "god?"

that's an assumption on your part. sounds like a wishful thinking fallacy "i don't want your conclusion to be true so your argument is wrong."

Haha, are you taking a piss? Here you changed from stating a few hypotheticals (e.g. if it exists, its existence must not be dependent upon an external factor because blabla) and in the next step just dropped the conditional "if it exists" and called it a proof? That's just a cheap exploitation of imprecise language, nothing more.

incorrect. P4 is speaking of metaphysical necessary since the definition is necessarily part of the concept. C2 is hypothetical in nature, but P5 is deductive in nature not hypothetical. it is P5 that has reduced the hypothetical nature from the premises, not P6; C3 is where the metaphysical possibility has been dropped from the premises and now it is a metaphysical necessity. P6 merely shows that metaphysical necessity of existence also entails actual existence.

P6 should actually read "if it exists, something that necessarilty exists must actually exist"

but that premise you made up is flat out wrong and isn't even close to representative of my P6. my P6 merely states that if something is metaphysically necessary, it must also be actually true.

P6 is a delayed begging the question, because it misrepresents C3: Why isn't C3 already your proof?

because the argument has many unnecessary steps for the purpose of thoroughness, as you should be able to see from the beginning. i didn't have to start with P1, i could have started from C1. i really didn't need P6 because everyone should be able to know necessary A= true A as the very definition of necessary is that it is impossible to be false. but you know, some people have horrific deduction skills so that's why P6 is there. it has nothing to do with C3 being hypothetical, it expresses metaphysical necessity.

Same already with the step to C2, where suddenly you conveniently forget that what you are actually arguing is that if God exists, his dependence cannot be dependent upon an external factor - because it would otherwise violate your definition of what a god is.

because, according to Stanford at least, definitions are metaphysically necessary to concepts. for example, non-square circularity is metaphysically necessary because square circularity is metaphysically impossible (this is what they would call in philosophy the principle of explosion). at the same time, because non-square circularity is necessary, non-square circularity is also true. again, that's what P6 is meant to show.

ONTOLOGICAL LOGIC APPLIED IN REAL LIFE

you obviously don't know the difference between de re and de dicto modality. to say "my bank account has $1 million" is a statement de dicto, and as such it is not a necessity of the bank account. in fact, it's 2 statements de dicto, first that the bank account is yours and second that it has 1 million dollars. as such, since neither of those things are necessary de re, they don't work in such an argument.

So...god is a concept in our minds, then? Makes sense...

no, as i said before God is an immaterial mind. since there are clear examples of things that are immaterial (color, sound etc.) it is certainly possible for the mind to be immaterial. and given most would claim there is no clear defeater for extreme solipsism, most have already admitted it is possible for mind to be immaterial. therefore, it is possible for God to be an immaterial mind.

And it is possible for something to rely on an internal factor for its existence? How would we know?

again, there are several things that necessarily exist. i also have an argument to support this: http://atheistforums.org/thread-21748.html

Like I said before, I highly doubt that omnipotence is even theoretically possible. Aside from it not being self-contradictory, why would it be possible?

that's the only reason i need. something can only be metaphysically impossible if it has a self contradiction, for example a square circle. this is why P1 is worded the way it is, because the argument only fails if P1 is false. everything else follows logically and inescapably.

Or are you suggesting that literally nothing is impossible so long as it is not logically impossible?

logical impossibility has to do with coherence within a system. metaphysical possibility has to do with coherence in itself since we can imagine numerous systems for different metaphysically possible worlds and it only needs to be possibly true in one of those systems to be metaphysically possible.