The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[Rational AKD]

The slippery part about your argument is that none of the language is precise enough to really nail down what is stated where, so you can shift back and forth the point where you switch from necessary properties of God to actual properties of God. This becomes more clear if one puts the argument in one sentence, where it is harder to do stealth shifts in meanings of words.

all properties of God are necessary properties. the only part that becomes actual is his existence when it is shown he is is necessary in C3.

You cannot conclude that God's existence is not dependent on an external factor from saying that the concept of God includes this necessity. Since you have before only said things about the concept of God, it only allows you to conclude statements about God's existence if he exists: something that does not exists does not have to fulfil the requirements laid out in its concept. This is confusing in this case because you put existence as a requirement into the concept.

i think you misunderstand. the argument pretty much starts by stating the coherence of the concept of God. this coherence means it is metaphysically possible. then it goes into hypothetical "what if God exists?" if God existed he could either exist contingently or necessarily. but if he existed contingently, that would contradict his omnipotence. therefore, if God were to exist, he could only exist necessarily. so if he exists he exists necessarily, if he doesn't exists then he must necessarily not exist. that's the point of the argument. since the only way it could be impossible for God to exist is if he was incoherent, then if P1 is true God exists. thus P1 is the only controversial premise.

I actually did read it, but the second part was complete hand-waving. Again I'll repeat what you dodged: What does being contingent have to do, AT ALL, with being able to be overcome? You asserted that with no defense whatsoever. Nor would God being contingent mean he was made of matter.

if the existence of A is contingent upon B, then A's existence is dependent upon B's. this means if you get rid of B, you get rid of A. i did give the example of "what if God were made of matter" did i not? if he were made of matter, we could break him down. if we can break him down, he's not very omnipotent now is he? now, if God were necessary then you wouldn't have this problem. this is why P3 is true, because contingency creates a weak point which is contrary to being omnipotent.

This is why I said you need to read up some more. I wasn't insulting, I meant it because you have no idea what you're talking about. There is ONLY one way to demonstrate actual metaphysical possibility and that's by being shown to exist. The reason why is because simply being unable to find the incoherency in a concept doesn't actually mean it's coherent. Without a demonstration of existence, you ONLY have epistemic possibility because you only have your own limited set of knowledge.

you obviously don't know what you're talking about and you contradict yourself later.

Hah! Do you even READ what you quote?

sure... did you?

For one, faster-than-light particles are ALREADY theoretically possible...

in other words, it hasn't been demonstrated... yet it can only be metaphysically possible if it is demonstrated... so is it metaphysically possible or not?

such as Tacyons, so inasmuch as one accepts that science talks about the world as it is, FTL particles is possible.

you've got to be kidding... tacyons were introduced with the intention of being capable of faster than light speed travel but they haven't even worked out the mathematics yet, yet alone detected any.

We already know that motion is possible, so motion at any particular rate implies not contradiction or impossibility given a different kind of universe.

so as far as you know, because motion is not contradictory, faster than light motion is also not contradictory. it hasn't been demonstrated so how do you know? what if light is necessarily the fastest thing in all metaphysically possible worlds? that would throw off your whole guess work. but we don't know that it is, but then again we don't know that it isn't. the point is you're simply making inferences based on your current knowledge to say it is metaphysically possible. that's exactly what i was doing involving God. but on top of that, the modal perfection argument provides a sound argument for God's metaphysical possibility.

I'm using "valid" in the sense of logic. In other words, my argument has NO fallacies, ergo valid. It's soundness can be disputed, but only by disputing one of the premises, namely the 2nd one.

you obviously don't know what valid means. valid doesn't mean free of fallacy, it means the conclusion is true if the premises are true. however, the thing that seems to be confusing is your use of can't and cannot. when you say those, are you saying he can't exist in any possible world or just that one? i can easily grant you that if naturalism is true in a possible world God can't exist in that possible world, but i don't see how you could say that therefore he can't exist in any possible world. that would only be true if the MOA is valid since it shows God can't be contingent.

Now, what you've clearly missed is that this argument stalemates your argument and the MOA because both (or at least Plantinga's is) are valid, but they stalemate.

i hardly see your argument as a stalemate. either your first premise is a claim of necessity or a claim of possibility. if it is a claim of possibility then your conclusion must also be that of possibility or it is invalid. if it is a claim of necessity, then you have that burden to prove that God necessarily can't exist if naturalism is possible or true a possible world.

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Um no.

Sound and colour are the result of our very physical brains processing input from our senses having detecting physical things photons, movements in the air etc. they are in no way immaterial.

i notice that you say sound and color are "the result of..." and then you describe the physical process. i can actually agree with that; however, you're telling me that sound and color have a correlation to this physical process but they are not equivalent. so you haven't reduced sound and color to a physical substance or process. you've only pointed out sound and color correlate to that physical process.