Rational AKD Wrote:if the existence of A is contingent upon B, then A's existence is dependent upon B's. this means if you get rid of B, you get rid of A. i did give the example of "what if God were made of matter" did i not? if he were made of matter, we could break him down. if we can break him down, he's not very omnipotent now is he? now, if God were necessary then you wouldn't have this problem. this is why P3 is true, because contingency creates a weak point which is contrary to being omnipotent.
And as I thought, you really didn't have an answer. If God, say, popped into existence ex nihilo his existence would be contingent, yet that has nothing to do with diminishing omnipotence in the slightest. If you got rid of that event, then you'd get rid of God, sure. But then it becomes a "so what?" moment. God is still capable of doing anything logically possible (for the most part) regardless. Now, you can add to the concept of omnipotence that it must include non-contingence, but you are trying to disguise what you're doing.
And again, if God were contingent, why would that mean he was made of matter?
Quote:you obviously don't know what you're talking about and you contradict yourself later.
Great response, by which I mean you had none.
Quote:sure... did you?
Indeed. Especially where, in the article and on the first example regarding epistemic possibility, it limits it to the things one knows.
Quote:in other words, it hasn't been demonstrated... yet it can only be metaphysically possible if it is demonstrated... so is it metaphysically possible or not?
How can I know that when all I have is epistemic possibility?
Quote:you've got to be kidding... tacyons were introduced with the intention of being capable of faster than light speed travel but they haven't even worked out the mathematics yet, yet alone detected any.
Er, hence "theoretical" in my post. But hey, ignoring words is your game so by all means continue.
Quote:so as far as you know, because motion is not contradictory, faster than light motion is also not contradictory. it hasn't been demonstrated so how do you know? what if light is necessarily the fastest thing in all metaphysically possible worlds? that would throw off your whole guess work. but we don't know that it is, but then again we don't know that it isn't. the point is you're simply making inferences based on your current knowledge to say it is metaphysically possible. that's exactly what i was doing involving God. but on top of that, the modal perfection argument provides a sound argument for God's metaphysical possibility.
In a real sense, all I have is epistemic possibility that it's possible. After all, it hasn't been demonstrated, and is as far as we know physically impossible in this world. So sure, within the language-game of an epistemic-metaphysical distinction, I only have epistemic possibility, and so do you, about certain things. Of course, whichever stance you take on this distinction, accept or reject, basically defeats your argument because on the former the argument is inert and on the latter it is stalemated, hence why I say it's useless for this sort of thing.
Are you referring to Madoyle's argument? Both of tye versions of his argument run into the same problem as Plantinga's argument. How does Maydoyle know that "great-making" properties are better to have than to lack? How does Maydoyle know that certain "great-making" properties are even compatible when held by the same object? Again, confusing epistemology with metaphysics.
Quote:I
you obviously don't know what valid means. valid doesn't mean free of fallacy, it means the conclusion is true if the premises are true.
..WHAT? No. To be logically valid is to say the argument's conclusion follows from the premises, i.e free from logical fallacies. SOUNDNESS deals in the actual truth of the premises themselves.
Quote:[Your question about God and my argument]
Here's how it works, and it answers the last part you addressed to me as well:
If there is even a SINGLE possible world in which metaphysical naturalism is true, then God cannot exist, period. Why? Just think about your own argument and take into account what Alex K has been trying to tell you. God is defined as a necessary being. A being who, if and ONLY IF he exists, he exists in all possible states of affairs. But if there is even ONE possible world that is a Metaphysically natural one, God does not exist there. But if God does not exist in any possible world, he exists in none of them because God only exists if he exists in all possible worlds by your own argument.
Hence, the only way to to defeat this is to say that metaphysical naturalism is incoherent, and thus not true in any possible world. Regardless, this is the stalemate. If we accept ontological arguments as such to be valid, then contradictory , yet equally valid arguments, result.
