The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[Darkstar]

yes, all matter is derived from mind.

So you admit to a lack of evidence?

no, i'm pointing out your lack of evidence.

For what, exactly? The falsity of a non-falsifiable hypothesis? Do you have any evidence other than "metaphysical possibility" that independent minds can exist?

At the very least, lack of evidence for independent sentiencies should not lead to the conclusion that they are likely to exist.

i never once said that. i said that means you can't rule it out.

According to your logic, nothing can ever be ruled out unless it is a logical contradiction. While this is technically true, if we see a balloon floating, do we immediately assume that gravity has been reversed? No, just in the same way that there is no reason to assume that the mind is magically seperate from the body.

[quote=Stanford]Φ is metaphysically possible if and only if Φ is true in some metaphysically possible world.
Example: It is metaphysically possible that some physical particle moves faster than the speed of light.
...
Φ is physically possible with respect to physical laws L if and only if Φ is logically consistent with L.
Example: Given the actual laws of physics, it is physically possible for a train to travel at 150 mph.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/modali...stemology/

But if it is physically impossible for a particle to move faster than the speed of light, then would not things that are metaphysically possible not necessarily be actually possible?

Energy is not matter, agreed.

mind can't be broken down to energy either.

Electrical impulses? At least we can prove those exist.

Is dualism falsifiable? If not, then there is no point in discussing it.

if you mean substance dualism, then yes actually. 2 substances can only interact if they share a property. for mind and matter to interact, either mind must have a physical property with matter or matter must have a mental property with mind. substance dualism states both mind and matter are fundamental. but if both are fundamental, they can't share a property and therefore they can't interact. this falsifies substance dualism. and this goes a little into the introspective argument.

I mean whatever dualism you are talking about. While substance dualism at least sounds vaguely possible, a "non-substance dualism" sounds like it would have to be straight up magic.

Laws of nature and laws of logic, only.

first, you are making an arbitrary limitation. if those laws can be necessary, then why can't anything else be necessary?

The cosmic cheeseburger is necessary, your argument is invalid. Or...would that make it valid?

second, laws of nature are not necessary, or at least not metaphysically necessary. we can easily imagine a world where nature is different. what if relativity wasn't true? what if friction didn't produce heat but instead some other energy? what if energy can be created and destroyed? such things are physically impossible in our world, but they are not metaphysically impossible.

Which is why I called them axiomatic, rather than necessary truths.

So, if I define the wonderful cosmic cheeseburger as "a non-physical entity that projects the illusion of a cheeseburger into people's minds, whose existence is not contingent on anything, but is otherwise limited in power", does it now exist?

Déjà vu. we've been through this before and you've forgotten everything. a cheeseburger only has physical properties. an immaterial cheese burger would have no properties. so all you're doing is saying "what if this thing, which is nothing, had omnipotence?"

Actually, I said it only causes hallucinations to make you think you see a cheeseburger. Additionally, it is not omnipotent, merely non-contingent.

Surely true omnipotence would require infinite power

no, it only requires total power over everything. if everything is not infinite, neither is omnipotence.

I presume this means that god cannot make an infinite number of things, then? Would that qualify as metaphysically impossible?

I again direct you to objection one.

the argument deduces that conclusion, not arbitrarily adds it. unless omnipotence is impossible, it is metaphysically necessary. thus an omnipotent being is either impossible or necessary.

I would go with impossible, unless you contend that the cosmic "cheeseburger" also exists. If I define the cosmic cheeseburger as non-contingent, and then give it a list of non-contradictory properties, I could define it into existence via this argument. I cannot think of any reason why it would be metaphysically impossible for a non-omnipotent being to be non-contingent.

except it does feed a single piece of data from the real world. this is in P1. that premise is a statement about the real world, because modal properties can still be real world properties. for example, it is impossible for rocks to condensate. this is a real world property that is modal in nature.

But what about your metaphysically possible particle exceeding light speed? As I said before (in this post, actually) not all things that aren't self-contradictory are actually possible. You can say that they technically might be, for all we know, but with that level of uncertainty, you might as well be arguing for Solipsism.