One philosophical argument for existence of supernatural.

[MindForgedManacle]

1)In face of naturalism, our concept of ourselves and praise is not firmly grounded.
2) Without being firmly grounded, it takes a form of illusion as far as knowledge of ourselves and praise goes.
[what is meant by this premise, is that we don't know it being true, not that we know it's wrong]
3) However our knowledge of ourselves and praise is firmly grounded knowing it's not an illusion.
4) Therefore naturalism is not true.

This is a pretty silly argument, but I'll show why as you unpack the argument.

When it comes to our own existence, we have a concept of the self. To me this concept of the self needs to backed up by an actual soul. There is a reason to this. We aren't merely an experience. We attach ourselves actions. Actions in the past, relationships we have, habits we take, attributes we take on, they all form part of the concept of who we are.

Seems like merely assertions regarding your interpretations of your experience. Worse, you seem to think that mere direct expeeience of something gives you definite knowledge of its nature; that's bullshit. That's why Descartes cogito fails, because he assumes that there is a thing that thinks, when his argument only has access to the incorrigible proposition that 'there are thoughts'.
The fact that you apparently conceive of yourself as a ontologically separate, undivided whole doesn't actually tell you if you are. And I would tend to see psychology as being an excellent refutation of that belief.

If we were merely an experience produced by the biological brain, then the past no longer is a part of who we are, things we've done shouldn't impact our concept of our self other than they did so because evolution favoured us having such a concept of ourself.

Of course, on naturalism, the past is a part of who we are. It shaped our memories, beliefs and ingrained habits, which are the basis for how we act. This is a silly.

There is more to it, our sense of pride assumes praise and value exists.

Yes, they exist - on any worldview aside from a Platonic one - as ONLY things created by minds.

If naturalism was true, we can trace our sense of value when we first mind appeared and valued it's own existence to exist rather then to die. As for us, are roots would take a different form of praise with actions done in a community or tribe as we evolved.

I can't understand what's being said here.

At one point did subjective sense of praise turn into an objective sense of value and praise? Somewhere down the line in evolution, it wasn't perfectly objective for sure, from naturalism perspective, so how did it get to be an objective value? At one point in evolution did it go from having a sense of value to knowing there is an objective value or a sense of praise to knowing there is an objective praise value.

There was no such point. "Objective value" is a contradiction in terms. A value is something that only exists to the valuer. Hence, it is dependent on the valuer. Thus, it is no an actual feature of the world in itself. 'Objective' denotes an abstraction from agents. Therefore, 'objective value' is a contradiction.

The same is true of our sense of selves. We wouldn't have a way of really knowing who we are objectively, it's more of a sensation and experience that we would have gotten as we evolved.

Not sure what the point is here.

There would be nothing to back this oneness concept of ourselves we have, we simply have it, because evolution favoured us having it.

Same as above.

However, I believe we innately know objective praiseworthiness exists as well that our concept of our selves is built on some objective basis.

"I think" is not evidence for your claim here, and again draws on a contradictory concept.

Us knowing objective praiseworthiness doesn't mean there is a universal sense or that we know exactly what that it is. It just means when we have a sense of praise, we do so thinking there is an objective value to that praise, even if we aren't aware of that exact value. The same would not be true if all we had was our subjective experience.

Pointing out that we supposedly have a feeling there's such a thing is not an argument.

The same is true about knowing ourselves. That there is an objective existence to ourselves, outside our own very relative experience.

Again, our awareness of our existence tells us nothing non-trivial about the ontological status of it.