Moral standards

[Esquilax]

Thank you for the explanation and I see more clearly what you are saying. Correct me if I'm wrong: Humans evolved socially and that evolution leaned upon the development of morals in order to further facilitate the success of the evolutionary process.

This is close?

Basically. I don't believe morals to be these airy, objective things divorced from human experience; quite the contrary, the two feed into one another. It's not a perfect system; our social groups contain a lot more artificially constructed concepts and premises now than our evolutionary history could possibly have accounted for, but we're intelligent enough to be able to observe how we respond to certain stimuli and frame our morals accordingly. It's this two-tier process of looking at who we are as biological organisms and how our bodies and minds respond to outside stimuli, and then using those facts as a basis to derive moral conclusions that are fairest to the group at large, blind to individual biases and allegiances.

And I know that you are not equating air with morals, but this is an important point because humans do not require morals to lives they do air. This would make the occasional adherence to morals acceptable, as you say below, the "minimum of trust" and would excuse ignoring any given moral at any given time granted it did not obstruct the survival of the species. Doesn't this negate the idea of a standard? For example, rape is to be considered ok as long as it is your sex slave and not your wife. Or maybe only with the natives but not the proper ethnic majority.

You got the analogy backwards, but I see why, I didn't phrase it terribly well. You require air because without it you're not around. Morality requires thinking agents because without them, same deal.

But I can answer your question anyway: the short version is that a consistently applied moral standard doesn't allow for sex slaves or differing treatment for different races in any way. It's a blind process, not centered around the majority, or individual groups, but conscious agents as a whole. If a person wanted to make it so that it was morally acceptable to treat, say, a small ethnic group as slaves, they would need to provide argument and evidence that demonstrates why this would be a better path to take, that explains specifically why it should be that group in particular treated differently, without also encompassing his own. Otherwise his claim falls prey to special pleading and is logically invalid. Given that humans are relatively similar outside of cultural differences, making an argument like that would be extremely difficult, in my opinion.

I'm with you. But basing your morals strictly on evolutionary results means that your system of morals is solely based on species survival. This would mean that if indeed the Nazis had one and maintaing the aryan race was the social norm, it would be considered moral to kill the Jews as long as they were not needed for propagation of the species in any way.

The nazi understanding of "races" was extremely flawed, from an evolutionary perspective. We're all humans, and individual race demarcations are largely social constructs, not biological ones. Speaking strictly from biology, the jews are no different from anyone else. In fact, given that Judaism itself is a cultural identifier and not a genetic one, this whole argument isn't applicable at all.

Even if it was, by the way, evolution doesn't hinge on the elimination of everyone that isn't helping the propagation of the species. In fact, that may even be more harmful, as any one of us might give rise to the first human in the next generation with a new mutation that is actually highly advantageous. Diversity of life is always a positive. Mind you, "helping the propagation of the species," is also pretty specious; helping who, to do what? Evolution produces constant change, and the environment isn't always static either; you'd need predictive power beyond the scope of any individual human to be able to tell what should be saved in order to propagate the species, and what should be cut out.

I disagree. New circumstances, the technology boom being the best and most recent example, present themselves all the time and while I would agree with you (on what I am assuming you might say, that humans seem to have to bat these new ideas around before they come to a consensus on how to best proceed, I would say that the answer is already existent and the "batting around" is really just a combination of dealing with those things we have not come to fully understand and struggling with a flawed nature we have not come to fully accept.

Okay, I can see that. For any potential course of action there is a moral pinnacle, once all the variables are taken into account. Of course, for that hypothetical to be executed on and actually mean something in real terms, it requires beings to do so, but I see what you mean.

I do not consider exceptions a weakness. What is a weakness is an unjustified exception that does not uphold the inherent value of the standard it seems to deviate from.

And in cases where there are multiple values at play that may come into conflict?

For instance, with lies. Lies, as a general rule are considered to be immoral. But the inherent value in this rule is that people have a right to the truth, but not everyone has the same rights to the same truths. A homicidal maniac has no right to know that I am hiding the children in the crawlspace, and so I lie to him and tell him that I live here alone. Though it seems to deviate, the lie upholds the inherent value of the standard.

In this example, our value regarding truthfulness has come into conflict with our value for human safety, given that you have reasonable grounds to suspect that putting the former before the latter will lead to the death of the children. You- in part instinctively, and in part rationally- make a cost/benefit analysis and through your actions make a value judgment based on what you feel to be the most beneficial possible action. The exemption you made on the truthtelling value is entirely justified by the lives you saved.

In the euthanasia example, the value placed on human life conflicts with our value toward avoiding suffering and unnecessary pain. Now, it's a muddier issue, since we also have to consider our value of individual agency, but if that person's life comes to nothing but pain, with no chance of recovery, then there is only cost in keeping him alive, and certainly no benefit to the person in question. I would argue that it becomes cruel to keep that person lingering in pain they don't need to feel, and if they want to end their life then the decision becomes even easier, to me. It's nasty to think about, but I'd hardly say the exemption here is unjustified.

You keep assuming that I have a problem with exceptions and situations. I don't. What I am calling for is a system that can account for these exceptions without compromising its basic standards.

You put the first parameter of your system as being the preservation of life, and then made an exception for this base value on the grounds that it can be painful and hard to deal with sickness. This exception does not uphold your base value in that someone with a terminal illness is still able to consider morals (which you have defined as the expression of value within life).

Ah, you're thinking of it as a hierarchy. You shouldn't be; preservation of life may be the most broadly applicable and basic of the parameters, but it isn't some overarching super-principle that can't be violated by a conflict with some combination of the others. See, it sort of depends on how you're thinking of life; it's not just the functioning of the body's essential components, it's also determined by the individual's ability to experience and enjoy life, the potential that they have, and so on. A lot of things go into it, but the exception I make for sickness isn't just that pain is hard to deal with, but that at sufficient levels, pain and sickness can rob a person of the ability to experience their life such that the benefit they receive from doing so outweighs the pain they feel. A person bound to a hospital bed and in constant suffering may be alive, but I doubt they're doing much living.

The system you present would disregard its base value on the grounds that living with pain is not pleasing. Instead of upholding, this exception opens the door to a slew of circumstances that compromise the base value (homework is not pleasing, having to eat my vegetables and workout is not pleasing, consistent headaches or injuries that did not heal properly are not pleasing) But these, I believe we can both agree, are not reasons to end life.

True, which is why the determination isn't as simplistic as "not pleasing," as I've explained above.

I am not sure why atheists believe that Christians do not think. Dogmas are absolute, but that does not make their application simple. As for the rapidly evolving world, I believe I addressed that.

Their applications are rigid, however, and depending on the bluntness of the dogma, almost impossible to interpret your way around... though interpretation is another problematic part of christian theology, from an outside perspective. From where I'm standing it really does look like having cake and eating it too, where the morals you have are absolute and binding and perfect due to their divine source... but also filled with interpretation and so on that has definitely changed over time.

Whoa! Where are the bitter sarcasm and insults coming from? I thought we were having a good conversation?

My apologies. I just get frustrated having to deal with these moral questions, and I may have attributed a level of antagonism to your question that wasn't intended.

And in regards to my initial "asinine" question, it has gone unanswered. You have claimed a moral system based on evolution and survival of a social creature, but you are unable to present standards that would hold consistent in the midst of fundamental disagreements over the value of any given life.

Hopefully this post has helped with that. Disagreements are bound to occur, which is why it's helpful to think of these standards as general rules rather than absolutes; when they conflict, one or more of them may have to be suspended in that specific case (we have a value for human freedom, but not in the case of hardened criminals for a reason, after all) for the betterment of us all. We make mistakes, obviously, but that's exactly what you would expect from a system derived from an evolutionary basis, and not at all from a divinely inspired basis.