RE: The Problem of Evil, Christians, and Inconsistency
August 30, 2014 at 2:34 am
(This post was last modified: August 30, 2014 at 2:39 am by Michael.)
Thank you Pickup. That is obviously the classical Epicurian position. There seem, to me, to be three problems there (but that is not to say you must find them problems).
The first is that when applied to society I think, though correct me if I am wrong, that it must lead to utilitarianism. That is whatever produces a net increase in happiness is best: that is how Richard Dawkins recently argued for abortion of Down's Syndrome children, perhaps forgetting, to the consternation of many Down's families, that they are frequently very happy people. RD, putting aside his misunderstanding that Down's Syndrome children and families frequently aren't unhappy, is probably being consistent with an Epicurean view. But equally consistent is harvesting organs from live people against their will. One person can save multiple other people (if good matches are assured in advance), potentially producing a net increase in happiness. utilitarianism can led to a tyranny of the majority; but it appears hard to argue against using its own logic.
Another more classic problem with Epicureanism is a problem in formulating a justice system, because there is no inherent 'rightness' in penal justice. Imprisonment is a poor deterrent for crimes committed in the heat of the moment. Does that mean we should forgo any punishment, especially if no-one else is made happy by penal justice?
The third problem is on the foundation of the premise that it is good to reduce pain and increase pleasure. When we look at nature, red in tooth and claw, pain is warp and weft through the forces that drive nature. On what foundation is pain necessarily bad? Why should it become the primary of goal of humans to eliminate something that appears to be so 'natural'. Why not, for example, say that what is most important is the survival (or perhaps even improvement) of the human species, accepting any pain that might entail.
The first is that when applied to society I think, though correct me if I am wrong, that it must lead to utilitarianism. That is whatever produces a net increase in happiness is best: that is how Richard Dawkins recently argued for abortion of Down's Syndrome children, perhaps forgetting, to the consternation of many Down's families, that they are frequently very happy people. RD, putting aside his misunderstanding that Down's Syndrome children and families frequently aren't unhappy, is probably being consistent with an Epicurean view. But equally consistent is harvesting organs from live people against their will. One person can save multiple other people (if good matches are assured in advance), potentially producing a net increase in happiness. utilitarianism can led to a tyranny of the majority; but it appears hard to argue against using its own logic.
Another more classic problem with Epicureanism is a problem in formulating a justice system, because there is no inherent 'rightness' in penal justice. Imprisonment is a poor deterrent for crimes committed in the heat of the moment. Does that mean we should forgo any punishment, especially if no-one else is made happy by penal justice?
The third problem is on the foundation of the premise that it is good to reduce pain and increase pleasure. When we look at nature, red in tooth and claw, pain is warp and weft through the forces that drive nature. On what foundation is pain necessarily bad? Why should it become the primary of goal of humans to eliminate something that appears to be so 'natural'. Why not, for example, say that what is most important is the survival (or perhaps even improvement) of the human species, accepting any pain that might entail.
