The Problem of Evil, Christians, and Inconsistency

[Mudhammam]

Thank you Pickup. That is obviously the classical Epicurian position. There seem, to me, to be three problems there (but that is not to say you must find them problems).

The first is that when applied to society I think, though correct me if I am wrong, that it must lead to utilitarianism. That is whatever produces a net increase in happiness is best: that is how Richard Dawkins recently argued for abortion of Down's Syndrome children, perhaps forgetting, to the consternation of many Down's families, that they are frequently very happy people. RD, putting aside his misunderstanding that Down's Syndrome children and families frequently aren't unhappy, is probably being consistent with an Epicurean view. But equally consistent is harvesting organs from live people against their will. One person can save multiple other people (if good matches are assured in advance), potentially producing a net increase in happiness. utilitarianism can led to a tyranny of the majority; but it appears hard to argue against using its own logic.

When I first read about Dawkins' tweet, I thought it was douchey, mainly because it was inarticulate and appeared somewhat callous to exactly those families you mention. After his clarifications, however, I see his point, and don't actually think there's any problem with his opinion. In fact, from a consequentialist's point of view, it does indeed make a lot of sense. Dawkins was stating what he would advise in that situation, and apparently, a lot of people (as evidenced by their decision to abort fetuses with the extra chromosome) agree. There's a big difference between weighing the moral consequences and choosing whatever you feel is best for your family (and the future, potential child), and mandating that everyone else adhere to your decision as well. Dawkins was in no way advocating for the state to intervene and force women pregnant with a Downs fetus to have an abortion, and from the consequentialist perspective (at least mine anyway), such a form of eugenics would have horrific ramifications for everyone. Hence, really what we have here is 1) a recommendation that each individual who is responsible for bringing a person into the world make a decision that considers the morality of seeing a deformed fetus to full term, and 2) the freedom to make that decision for themselves. This is what the current situation, as mandated by the law in the U.S., is, and I'm okay with it.

As to your hypothetical about harvesting the organs of a live person to save multiple others, I think we can both see why such a policy would have terrible consequences for society, and would outweigh any alleged benefits. Since we're talking about individuals, and not simply numbers, I think Kant's categorical imperative that human beings be viewed as an ends rather than a means probably works in favor of the ideals that each of us strive for, including fair play, the freedom to pursue happiness, etc. Life isn't inherently fair, but our policies should strive to be so, and picking a healthy person's name out of a lottery to sacrifice their body parts wouldn't seem fair to not only that person and most of us, but probably the sick in need of those organs as well.

Mike, I'll grant that there are more hypotheticals you can think of that offer no easy solution, but consequentialism doesn't promise the answers to all moral questions; it simply serves as a guide that, I think, is most rational and humanistic.

Another more classic problem with Epicureanism is a problem in formulating a justice system, because there is no inherent 'rightness' in penal justice. Imprisonment is a poor deterrent for crimes committed in the heat of the moment. Does that mean we should forgo any punishment, especially if no-one else is made happy by penal justice?

The third problem is on the foundation of the premise that it is good to reduce pain and increase pleasure. When we look at nature, red in tooth and claw, pain is warp and weft through the forces that drive nature. On what foundation is pain necessarily bad? Why should it become the primary of goal of humans to eliminate something that appears to be so 'natural'. Why not, for example, say that what is most important is the survival (or perhaps even improvement) of the human species, accepting any pain that might entail.

As to your question about the penal system, I'm not for retributive justice. Punishment ought to be conducive to either: 1) the rehabilitation process, if possible, or 2) serve as a deterrent to others, and 3) should always be in proportion to the crime committed. Not to take a cheap shot or deviate from the current subject matter, but I might add that the Christian conception of final judgment and punishment fails on all three accounts, and for that reason, is rightly seen as excessive, inhumane, and almost sado-masochistic.

Why is pain necessarily bad? Well, clearly, it's not in every instance, but as a human being with feelings and sensations, it's not difficult to distinguish between states of misery, tragedy, affliction, horror, etc., and states of happiness, bliss, joy, etc. As human beings, who are guaranteed only this one life to live, this experience that is only as good as the present moment, what more could possibly matter other than moving towards the latter states of being and doing what's in our power to avoid the former? Again, considering our place in a society where interests conflict, a morality that takes these various qualities of experience seriously must strive to be internally consistent, allowing that new situations require renewed attention to the rationale and potential effects (and the effects of those--and those--and so on) that result.

May I recommend a book? Check out the The Moral Landscape by Sam Harris. I think that is a good outline of the rationale behind the arguments I'm making in brief here (not that you're unfamiliar with them, but his formulation is far more eloquent than mine).