Determinism

[Purple Rabbit]

@ rabbit:

If reality (no matter whether it's the natural or the alleged supernatural component of it) is such that it does not allow contracausal free will, there is no room for a soul natural or supernatural that is uncaused.

Bold added

Yeah, that looks okay. The bolded bit is important- I don't think it was in your original (admittedly brief) argument. Dualism (and therefore soul/ other supernatural stuff) doesn't require libertarian free will, but libertarian free will does require the supernatural junk.

Well, I used the term "contracausal freewill" in the original sentence instead of "uncaused soul". The two are not completely the same but IMO they are very close as I understand contracausal freewill as a necessary part of an uncaused or contracausal soul.

What religions claim independent souls, but aren't metaphysically dualistic (or idealistic)? You have me stumped there. Surely independent agency of souls requires dualism of some sort. I also don't follow your point about the problems of contracausal free will and libertarian free will being the same. Perhaps it would help if you said exactly what you mean by contracausal free will. I've been assuming that the term included indeterminate will, i.e. the actions that you will ultimately supervening on a stochastic microphysics, but its quite possible that you don't mean that at all.

Well, I don't know if there are any monistic religions, but I can't rule 'm out. Probably Parmenides could have been endorsing a monistic religion, for he is often named as the initiator of eleatic monism while at the same time in his stories gods or godesses appear.

With contra-causal free will I mean a will that is not part of any (natural or other) causal chain and yet is able to generate preferences. IMO opinion this coincides with libertarian free will, the view that choices and preferences are generated free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from the predetermination by god(s) as endorsed by free will theists. Regarding "indeterminate will" as defined by you it seems you're describing it more as a mechanism or being dependent on particular views on physics. For me, contra-causal free will is a concept that posits something on the origin and dependencies of free will, not on the mechanism (be it physical or otherwise) underlying it.

I'd go somewhat further than you re. the problem of supernatural causation. As far as I'm concerned, the whole notion is incoherent. Theres a nice argument in one of Jaegwon Kim's books- 'Physicalism, or Something Near Enough'- that strongly indicates that this is the case. If you're interested, I'd be happy to run through it- its yet another strong philosophical argument against the theist position, so worth having in ones armoury.

I am interested indeed.