RE: Ed Feser's Aristotelian Proof of the Existence of God
October 16, 2014 at 2:22 pm
(This post was last modified: October 16, 2014 at 4:20 pm by HopOnPop.)
(October 16, 2014 at 9:29 am)bennyboy Wrote:HopOnPop Wrote:Let's focus on this point alone, because to address everything point by point will make this exchange way too frustrating to read (and to write. I know I tried for several hours):
Turn around this idea for a moment. Lets just say some non-empirical effect is inundating our reality right now, bathing us all in some undetectible energy. If it is not emprically detectible in any way how would this "fact" matter in anyway to anyone or anything?
Another way to make this same point is to ask: what's the difference between a completely fictional idea and "a particular philosophical questions where we not only don't have the means to make empirical observations, but have no reason to think we ever will"?
By eliminating empiricism as a possible methodology, one has de facto eliminated any potential consequence, effect, benefit, harm...anything...for that said philosophical notion too, have they not?
Okay, let's take cosmogony-- the fact of existence, rather than non-existence, of the universe and everything in it. Now let's take psychogony (afaik I'm coining it but I think it works okay); I would argue, for example, that the capacity of the universe to include at least some subjective experience must be ingrained in whatever quantity "X" allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever. I think that's a fairly reasonable argument, since we generally consider that like creates like.
That may be a possibility, but the question still remains, what practical purpose (beyond one's love for entertainment value) does making that kind of distinction -- if we can never ever remotely know it -- mean to us? In your example, we agree that we can only have the subjective experience itself, regardless of what there may or may not be connected to it "outside" our empirical view that defines our reality. So to rework my question to address your concern:
How can we then distinguish between simple subjective experience from "some subjective experience...ingrained in whatever quantity "X" [that] allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever"?
We are still stuck with the same problem here. You are merely proposing that something here has components 'elsewhere' beyond any ability for us to ever detect, so what is the purpose of making this kind of distinction?
btw, in your response to Rhythm, I noted you said this: "Now, if I'm making a positive assertion about the nature of the universe, and I want you to believe me, then I'll have to meet whatever criteria you have for changing your beliefs..."
Forgive me for perhaps not making my original point clearer, but my own comment that initially urged you to initially comment in this thread (I believe my original point was regarding the difference between a merely sound argument (which is only speculative -- as in the case of the Cosmological argument)), and the idea of a sound AND valid argument (which requires an empirical demonstration to make it valid)) was essentially making this very point you just stated. I certainly never meant to imply that any idea one wants to simply entertain requires empiricism. That wouldn't make any sense -- I mean to believe that would be to demand a fiction writer entertain empiricism, and that would be absurd, and also miss the entire reason people read fiction). My point was, rather, that if one wants their idea to bridge the gap from "what is possible" to "what is true" (i.e. as you say: make "a positive assertion about the nature of the universe"), then you have to provide an empirical reason to justify why anyone would also accept that positive assertion. A merely logically valid arguement, though, is nothing more than a mere speculation, and thus remains indisinguishable from an equally logically valid complete fiction -- which is entertaining, but means that one who simply resorts to logical arguments (as so many philosophers of religion do), without the empirical demonstration too, the discussion doesn't amount to anything useful or informative (outside of the entertainment value), do you not agree?
I think we are essentially in agreement here, in any regard to the need or role of re: empiricism, are we not?