Ed Feser's Aristotelian Proof of the Existence of God

[bennyboy]

1.)Why would a logical extension mean anything in territory where empiricism does not?

Because even when empirical observation is impossible, we still like to form ideas about things.

And while you spend 20,000 years developing the technology-- maybe-- to do that, I will sit here and enjoy the process of wondering about things.

Wonder and imagine all you like. I do it to. I'd just prefer that we don't pretend that we're being reasonable when we do those things. If you'd like to state that something is in the category of unknown and probably unknowable - is there a problem with leaving it as an unknown? If so, why put it in that box in the absence of that knowledge in the first place?

Because it is by a combination of logical speculation and empirical observation that we learn what things in life ARE mysteries, and identify ideas which we should consider more deeply.

[quote]
"I would argue, for example, that the capacity of the universe to include at least some subjective experience must be ingrained in whatever quantity "X" allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever. I think that's a fairly reasonable argument, since we generally consider that like creates like."

You're extending logic into an area where the rules may not apply. Invoking an empirical claim in the process, as I've mentioned (and that's ignoring what one might call the empirical nature of logic).

Yes, I'm doing that, and I specifically claimed I was doing that. I'm extending ideas about what is knowable into a context in which things are not knowable.

Bolded bits are the operatives. "Here's this gap, Imma fill it with speculation and then claim that I don't need evidence to come up with something reasonable (though I'll appeal to it anyway), and that it would be silly to ask me for it."

You've repeatedly said that I'm doing this, and I've repeatedly pointed out the difference between forming speculative ideas based on what is currently known/believed, and making a positive assertion for which I must carry the burden of proof. No ideas about cosmogony, for example, can meet the burdern of empirical proof. How would you collect observations about a time when there was no time? You can't-- you have to speculate. Now, that doesn't mean all speculation is bullshit, or that those with better empirical observations in this context can't come up with better/more interesting speculations. I'd take Stephen Hawking's logically-extended speculations with much more interest than a Catholic taxi driver's, for example.

I'm trying to help you realize that you're not being reasonable...and that you -are- appealing to empiricism....not that there wasn't some creative mind.

Making a logical extension of what we know through observation is not itself an empirical process. For example, I've observed that at least 1 mind exists (my own). I extend this idea into other people, and arrive at the philosophical position that other minds also exist. Now, I cannot empirically observe what it's like to be you, or prove there is such a thing as "being like you," but the idea of non-solipsism anyway turns out to be highly useful and interesting to me.

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How can we then distinguish between simple subjective experience from "some subjective experience...ingrained in whatever quantity "X" [that] allows for the existence of the universe, or created it, or whatever"?

I think we are at different points of a diversion in this thread, here.

The latter idea I'm giving as an idea of logical extension-- that a framework that includes mind might originate with/in/from a creative quantity which also includes mind. But I didn't mean to imply that this mind (I guess it's a Deity) could be part of one's own personal experience. I also (just to be crystal clear) didn't mean to imply that this particular logical extension represents a truthful statement about the universe and its origins-- only that it conforms to a sensible way of generating ideas, even though it is not empirically provable/disprovable.

My point was, rather, that if one wants their idea to bridge the gap from "what is possible" to "what is true" (i.e. as you say: make "a positive assertion about the nature of the universe"), then you have to provide an empirical reason to justify why anyone would also accept that positive assertion. A merely logically valid arguement, though, is nothing more than a mere speculation, and thus remains indisinguishable from an equally logically valid complete fiction -- which is entertaining, but means that one who simply resorts to logical arguments (as so many philosophers of religion do), without the empirical demonstration too, the discussion doesn't amount to anything useful or informative (outside of the entertainment value), do you not agree?

This all sounds on point to me.