Why ontological arguments are illogical

[genkaus]

Can you give an example? Simply stating that you can imagine it doesn't mean that it's logically possible; I could state, "I can imagine a square circle." That doesn't prove that square circles are logically possible.

I can imagine a perfect woman with whom every man and lesbian in the world would immediately fall in love with, but I can also see that its "better" if she doesn't exist - given the amount of conflict her existence would create.

No, I don't think immoral perfection constitutes a "perfection" in the sense that the ontological arguments offer--at least, not Leibnizian ones.

But I might be wrong. Can you show that, under some definition of 'perfection' given by some noteworthy ontological argument (i.e., not one you just made up), God would have to possess "immoral perfection"?

So, the ontological arguments use words in a different "sense" now? "Sense" which is not explained but must somehow be realized?

Regarding your point: "Gottfried Leibniz saw a problem with Descartes' ontological argument: that Descartes had not asserted the coherence of a "supremely perfect" being. He proposed that, unless the coherence of a supremely perfect being could be demonstrated, the ontological argument fails. Leibniz saw perfection as impossible to analyse; therefore, it would be impossible to demonstrate that all perfections are incompatible. He reasoned that all perfections can exist together in a single entity, and that Descartes' argument is still valid."

Clearly, he saw the incompatibility of all perfections and made the excuse.

In Leibnizian terminology, no perfection is ever mutually exclusive with or contradictory to another perfection. Thus the conjunction of every such "perfection" is trivially logically possible.

And once you offer an argument supporting this notion, I'll counter it. Otherwise, its a cheap cop-out.