The Objective Moral Values Argument AGAINST The Existence Of God

[Edwardo Piet]

It's neither true because of a parsimony or true because of a basic law of probability.  It's not true at all.  The distribution of possible states for the two propositions is 50/50 with respect to their own and each others existence. 

Er... you're misinterpreting what I'm actually saying once again.

I'm saying that X crazy thing + Y crazy thing is less likely to be true than X or Y taken separately.

Even within the distribution of states in which moral realism is true..it's still 50/50 on the issue of god. 

Er, we're talking about my argument and you're taking it out of context. One of the premises of my argument is that there is no other rational reason to believe in God besides objective moral values. So, since objective moral values without belief in God is more parsimonious than objective moral values with belief in God, then it's more rational to believe in objective moral values without belief in God.

Parsimony tells us not to multiply entities beyond necessity.

Yes. Because all other things being equal it is more probable that an explanation that postulates less entities is true.

  It tells us that there is no need to refer to a god in the case of moral realism being true, but it tells us nothing about the probability of there being a god -from- moral realism being true. 

Again, you're taking my argument out of context.

 Put simply, moral realism doesn't have anything to do with god at all.

Again, you're taking my argument out of context. Yes, it has nothing to do with God at all, like I said, I don't even believe in the existence of objective moral values with or without God. That is not the point of the argument. The point of the argument is that if objective moral values exist they're more likely to exist without God. (Surely you can accept that simply due to the fact that in all likelihood this universe wasn't made by God?).

Ask yourself this..if moral realism being true lacks the required relationship with the divine in order to demonstrate or suggest the likelihood of the divine in the positive..why would you imagine it had the same ability in the reverse?

I think you need to rephrase this question as it's not clear to me.

Allow me to paraphrase it however to try and show you how I make sense of it:

I take it that you are asking... if moral realism being true says nothing about the fact that God is likely to exist then why should moral realism being true say anything about the fact that God is unlikely to exist?

I think I perhaps got it right, but I'm just checking, as your question seems a bit confusing, the way you phrased it, to me.

Okay anyways, to answer that question: It's not objective morality itself that demonstrates it. I don't have to demonstrate it. One of the actual premises of my argument is that there can be no other rational reason to believe God exists besides the belief that objective moral values exist. I don't think that the existence of objective moral values are an indication of God existing or not existing. I don't think it says anything either way. You keep misrepresenting me as saying that. I am playing devil's advocate, as I have already said, and starting with the premise, that I myself don't accept, that there can be no other reason to rationally believe in God besides the existence of objective moral values. I don't accept that. I don't think there is any reason at all to rationally believe in God. My point is if objective moral values are the only rational reason to believe in God, it's still more rational to not believe in God because of the principle of parsimony.

Did you actually read my argument? You seem to have trouble grasping the fact that I'm only saying my conclusion follows if all the premises are accepted.