I haven't mentioned or at least argued for an immaterial soul yet on this forum. Just the existence of conscious experiences distinct from brain activity and possessing causal power over behavior.
Your point about Aristotle being a materialist: He would not be a materialist in any sense in which we use the word today. Universals exist only in the mind it is true but they correspond to that within a physical object that makes it intelligible. The form of an object is ontologically distinct from it's matter. Further the form determines the behavior we see in physical things.
If someone wants to call him a materialist that's fine. It might also open a good discussion on what contemporary philosophy means by matter. The word is often used as if it's meaning is self-evident.
Your point about Aristotle being a materialist: He would not be a materialist in any sense in which we use the word today. Universals exist only in the mind it is true but they correspond to that within a physical object that makes it intelligible. The form of an object is ontologically distinct from it's matter. Further the form determines the behavior we see in physical things.
If someone wants to call him a materialist that's fine. It might also open a good discussion on what contemporary philosophy means by matter. The word is often used as if it's meaning is self-evident.