Moral Oughts

[Acrobat]

This is an interesting argument. I've never thought of this before. 

Would it be right for me to say here that Wittgenstein isn't talking about morality as being part of metaphysics or something intrinsic in the world. But rather that language reveals how people actually think about morals. And if we know how people really think about morals, then we know what morals people have. 

So he's saying there are two kinds of good: good for a particular goal, and good because it's good. 

And a good which is only aimed at a particular goal may be accepted or discarded if the goal changes. So if your goal is to let the other guy win, then playing "badly" is good. Or if your goal is to delay your passenger from arriving at his destination because you know he's planning a crime, then taking the "wrong" road is the right thing. 

But the other kind -- good because it's good -- is a case where the variability of the goal will be denied. So if you're a bus driver and you're driving your passengers recklessly along the edge of a cliff, it wouldn't be acceptable to say, "well, it was my goal to drive recklessly today." People would, very rightly, say, "it is bad of you to choose this goal. Whether you happen to desire this end or not, it's bad." 

I wonder if this is revealing about a difference between Wittgenstein and modern Americans. I would say that Wittgenstein here is closer to my own moral views, but I have found that many people posting here disagree with me about such things. It may well be that the dominant view of morality in America is a strictly outcome-based, practical view. "If I might get punished it's bad. But if I'll be OK it's OK." With no absolute component to it. Others have thought that America was a land of expediency.

For the most part this is accurate. Wittegenstien here is primarly exploring the meaing of moral language, what we mean by good and bad, as distinct from other domains. Primarily that in moral language we appear to be making statements of absolute value, unlike when we speak in other areas, where we are speaking in relative terms.

He isn't doing so for the sake of deriving what morals people hold. He isn't attempting to develop any moral philosophy. Just investigating the sort of language game that takes place.

I should say, while I made a distinction between the sort of moral language Wittgenstien is speaking of, and the sort Gae and Grandizer appear to be using, Wittgenstien makes no such distinctions. It's the language of theists and unbelievers alike, at least the philosophers, and others he's acquinted with.

And I'm not sure if you're referring exclusively to American atheists, or just Americans in general, because pretty much everyone including fundies, speak about morality in the language described, except perhaps atheists like Gae and Grandizer, and those like them.

I think American atheists, tend to have a hostile attitude towards not just religious views, but views that even have a whiff of religiousness to them, like beliefs in absolute values, views that negate any sort of materialistic account of the world. It's why atheists like Daniel Dennet, Jerry Coyne, come out very harshly against unbelievers like Thomas Nagel, for expressing such sympathies.