Euthyphro dilemma asked for evolution.

[The Grand Nudger]

If we are creating it then we'd have to add provisions to the whole "objective" bit wouldn't we? Not that I would mind that, or disagree with it, just as an exercise in intellectual rigor. It would be pleasant if we could all find a useful and well reasoned set of moral concepts to agree on, hell, even just a few. But they would never be universal or objective in the way that Mystic is using the term. I personally use the term "discovery" as a concilliatory gesture to those who believe that such a thing as eternal morality floats around making things right or wrong and has it's own existence without reference to human beings might possibly exist....but I'd like to see them demonstrate that..lol.

[Anomalocaris]

For you means You form the opinion that it is wrong.

OK, can you elaborate on what you stated earlier?

Yes. Morality is an emergent property of interplay between perception, evolutionary conditioning and social expedience. One perceive certain modes of behavior as obnormally right, and thus perhaps absolutely moral, because it fits in some complex way with certain notion ingrained by evolution as an expedient course to promote a certain type of survival enhancing social perception, such as fairness, reciprocity, etc. A complex survival enhancing social behavior is only survival enhancing in the context of biology and particular genetically driven sociology of the animal. Take for example an predatory animal with social structure similar to lions. Here male probably enjoy no benefit from reciprocity to other males and would not not have it ingrained as a basic determinate of rightness of behavior. In its context it would probably be natural that a new male invading a herem to attempt to assert his genetic dominance by killing the children of his predecessors, possibly buy using them in some lethal sport. So in this case torture of children would not necessarily have perceived as immoral.

[Angrboda]

The part of your family would explain why you wouldn't like to do it, but does it explain why you feel it is wrong?

Nature doesn't have to use the same method to support all ends. Different behaviors may be reinforced by different emotional or cognitive behaviors. When my body needs rest, I feel sleepy. When my body needs nourishment, I feel hungry. That I don't feel sleepy when I'm hungry is no indication that sleepiness or hunger indicate universal, objective truths, it simply shows that different mechanisms are employed. That I have moral feelings when I think about behaviors having a moral dimension is no different from having aesthetic feelings about aesthetic experiences, or hunger feelings leading to eating behaviors. Different in content, but not in kind.

You keep coming back to the same flawed argument. You "feel" morality is different from these other things, so you suggest we need to explain your feeling. I "feel" that AC/DC is the greatest rock and roll band ever. Does that obligate you to explain in what way they are in fact the greatest?

[genkaus]

If we are creating it then we'd have to add provisions to the whole "objective" bit wouldn't we? Not that I would mind that, or disagree with it, just as an exercise in intellectual rigor. It would be pleasant if we could all find a useful and well reasoned set of moral concepts to agree on, hell, even just a few. But they would never be universal or objective in the way that Mystic is using the term. I personally use the term "discovery" as a concilliatory gesture to those who believe that such a thing as eternal morality floats around making things right or wrong and has it's own existence without reference to human beings might possibly exist....but I'd like to see them demonstrate that..lol.

Firstly, it would not be universal at all. The application of its concepts would change according to the time and place it is being applied. Secondly, the objective part would remain, i.e. it would not change according to a person's opinions or wishes.

Let's ask ourselves what morality is at its most basic - it is a code of conduct. It is a guide as to how a person should act, what he should do and what he should not do. Actions which are in accordance with that code are "good" and those against are "bad".

Now, an objective and well-reasoned morality would also need to be logical and rational, i.e. it cannot have some parts of it contradicting others. Based on these facts, we can figure out some parts of that objective moral code.

First of all, a person cannot act unless he is alive and free to act. These are the preconditions for morality and since it would not be logically consistent unless it complemented its own preconditions, objective morality must support both life and liberty. Every morality in existence requires these two preconditions, but if its tenets are contradictory to it, then it is illogical. Which is why I consider these two concepts of morality (and their corollaries: murder is wrong and slavery is wrong) to be objectively established.

One thing to be noted is that these are still not universal. They are applicable only as long as the moral agent acts consistently with the premises. Once he forgoes the premises (such as in case of a murderer or a slaver), these conditions no longer apply and therefore that person can be executed or imprisoned. I think we have more or less figured out these parts but have never applied them fully or consistently - given the prominence of death-penalty in some countries even in non-murder cases or the legality of slavery until the 19th century or imprisonment for crimes without any victims.

[The Grand Nudger]

Why couldn't an objective morality be both irrational or illogical as well as objective? Wouldn't any currently existing morality be objective so long as we limited what group of individuals we are considering. Would beings from the planet Slitznarp also have to follow this morality, and in standing next to a being from the planet Slitnarp who does not follow this morality could it still then be called objective?

It's not that I can't see where you're coming from, but that the terms used to describe this morality do have a bit of jargon going for them in that their meanings are perhaps slightly altered by the concept which you wish to propose (not an issue so long as we're on-board with the idea that objective; as it pertains to morality and within the confines of this discussion merely means that all human beings agree. I only offer the hypothetical Slitznarpian above to show that there would be similarities with this agreed upon or objective morality with all moralities currently in existence in that they can very much appear to be objective 9so long as you define the set) until confronted with a dissenter.)

[genkaus]

Why couldn't an objective morality be both irrational or illogical as well as objective?

I think that's pretty obvious. If morality is objective, then it is not based on anyone's opinions or desires, it is based on facts. Being derived from facts, it would be rational (since its derivation would have to be reasoned) and logical (since logic pertains to how one truth follows from another).

Wouldn't any currently existing morality be objective so long as we limited what group of individuals we are considering.

Not if it is dependent upon the opinions or desires of members of that group. Objective doesn't mean independent of our opinions, it means independent of anyone's opinions.

Would beings from the planet Slitznarp also have to follow this morality, and in standing next to a being from the planet Slitnarp who does not follow this morality could it still then be called objective?

Not necessarily and not if facts which apply to us do not apply to them. For e.g. assume that beings from planet Slitnarp have a hive mind where no single being can act (and by that, I'm implying a physiological constraint), without the collective will sanctioning that action. In that case, their objective morality would take that into consideration and the concept of freedom would simply not apply to them. It would continue to apply to us even if we are standing beside them. And even in this case, both moralities would be objective.

It's not that I can't see where you're coming from, but that the terms used to describe this morality do have a bit of jargon going for them in that their meanings are perhaps slightly altered by the concept which you wish to propose (not an issue so long as we're on-board with the idea that objective; as it pertains to morality and within the confines of this discussion merely means that all human beings agree. I only offer the hypothetical Slitznarpian above to show that there would be similarities with this agreed upon or objective morality with all moralities currently in existence in that they can very much appear to be objective 9so long as you define the set) until confronted with a dissenter.)

I most definitely do not agree with the bolded part. Objective simply does not mean "based on agreement of all humans" - unless it can be shown that that agreement itself is based on facts. Any otherwise agreed upon morality would still be subjective. And even in case of a dissenter, if he can show that his argument is based on facts while the masses rely on their desires, then the masses are wrong and the dissenter is right.

[The Grand Nudger]

The trouble I think, is when you argue that "if" this objective morality can be shown to be based on facts- etc etc. Are we entirely certain that morality hinges on facts? What might qualify as a "moral fact"? Also, when you say that this objective morality would not be based on anyone's opinions, that isn't the only way that such a morality might be subjective. Is being based on logic an absolute requirement for objectivity in the case of morality in the first place? Lets suppose we all shared the same moral constructs, but no thought had ever been given to them, no opinions had ever been offered in support or criticism of them. I know, not likely, but this is a "what if" game, right? Would this morality not qualify as objective by the metrics you've offered -being that they are subject to no one's opinion-? In the case of the two hypothetically coexisting moralities of slitznarpians and humans each morality is subjective with regards to the species which it applies to, isn't it? Again, you've defined a set and then declared the morality in question to be objective, relative to the set.

I really don't have any problem with searching for this kind of morality btw, it's not something I'd argue against. But the terms used do seem to be influenced by the context of the argument. You seem to be defining objective to fit the morality you're proposing, rather than demonstrating that this hypothetical objective morality is, in fact, objective.

(and before it seems like we have a massive disagreement here, there is definitely something to the notion, at least to my mind, that the terms objective and subjective have fuzzy connotations, -as objective as can be reasonably expected- might fit better with human beings and their moral constructs.)

---

In a nutshell, I think my problem with this is that in the act of defining some objective morality the axioms at the base of the moral pyramid would seem to my mind to be entirely too easy to characterize as opinions of some sort.

We could try it out, propose some hypothetical axioms that would form the basis of this objective morality and run them through a meat grinder?

[genkaus]

The trouble I think, is when you argue that "if" this objective morality can be shown to be based on facts- etc etc. Are we entirely certain that morality hinges on facts?

That statement is tautologically true. If that morality is not based on facts, then it cannot be called objective morality.

What might qualify as a "moral fact"?

Since morality is a guide on how to act, the facts regarding human actions - such as our biological and rational capacities - would come under moral facts.

Also, when you say that this objective morality would not be based on anyone's opinions, that isn't the only way that such a morality might be subjective.

No, it may also be based on the subject's emotions or desires. Basically, if it derives from the subject's mind and/or thoughts about it, it is subjective.

Is being based on logic an absolute requirement for objectivity in the case of morality in the first place?

No, being based on reality is the requirement. Since reality cannot be but logical, being so is a reliable test for morality's objectivity.

Lets suppose we all shared the same moral constructs, but no thought had ever been given to them, no opinions had ever been offered in support or criticism of them. I know, not likely, but this is a "what if" game, right? Would this morality not qualify as objective by the metrics you've offered -being that they are subject to no one's opinion-?

The premise of your question is wrong. In the situation you outlined, the question of objective or subjective becomes moot, since it cannot be considered morality in the first place. The key difference between human and animal morality is that animals simply act according to instinct or conditioning. Human actions, on the other hand, have to be considered before they come under the purview of morality. Consider that we do not judge the parasites in our body according to human standards of good and evil. Further, when someone is shown to be incapable of understanding his actions - such as an infant or the mentally-challenged - we do not hold them responsible for their actions either.

In the case of the two hypothetically coexisting moralities of slitznarpians and humans each morality is subjective with regards to the species which it applies to, isn't it?

No, it would still be objective with regards to them since it would be wholly based on facts regarding those species and not anyone's thoughts about them. Things do not become objective to subjective even if they change from person to person. The pattern of your finger-prints, for example, is objective, even though it is unique to you.

Again, you've defined a set and then declared the morality in question to be objective, relative to the set.

Relative is not the same as subjective. Things can be relative and objective at the same time.

I really don't have any problem with searching for this kind of morality btw, it's not something I'd argue against. But the terms used do seem to be influenced by the context of the argument. You seem to be defining objective to fit the morality you're proposing, rather than demonstrating that this hypothetical objective morality is, in fact, objective.

On the contrary, I consistently use the same definition for objective, albeit with minor variations in expression:

Something is objective if it:
1. Depends on the object of inquiry rather than the subject.
or 2. Is independent of anyone's thoughts, opinions or desires regarding it.
or 3. Depends on facts of reality.

In a nutshell, I think my problem with this is that in the act of defining some objective morality the axioms at the base of the moral pyramid would seem to my mind to be entirely too easy to characterize as opinions of some sort.

We could try it out, propose some hypothetical axioms that would form the basis of this objective morality and run them through a meat grinder?

I've already proposed two of them, I'll now give all three.
1. Morality is a guide for a moral agent regarding how to act.
2. A moral agent needs to be both alive and free to be able to act according to the code.
3. Every action has a goal.

[The Grand Nudger]

That statement is tautologically true. If that morality is not based on facts, then it cannot be called objective morality.

I would agree, which is precisely the reason I'm always looking for one of those facts when these sorts of discussions begin. On the other hand, the morality we have doesn't seem to be based on facts (nor does it seem to need to be based on facts for it to be operable). What with this hit-or-miss morality being the only one we've ever seen, I'm the kind of person that requires a little more in the way of "hey maybe, if and if and if". But I know we're just brainstorming it here, and that you haven't claimed to have found any of these moral facts definitively. So no worries on that count.

Since morality is a guide on how to act, the facts regarding human actions - such as our biological and rational capacities - would come under moral facts.

Well now wait a minute, maybe I was wrong above. You do have an idea as to where we might look, is this as far as you have taken it, or have you isolated a moral fact?

No, it may also be based on the subject's emotions or desires. Basically, if it derives from the subject's mind and/or thoughts about it, it is subjective.

Agreed, a stickler might ask you if you have ever experienced a thought that did not arise from your mind, but we'd be splitting hairs at that point.

No, being based on reality is the requirement. Since reality cannot be but logical, being so is a reliable test for morality's objectivity.

A minor point of contention here, reality may not be able to be anything but logical, but this does not mean that what we currently perceive as logical is the end all be all, and our large collection of logical fallacies attests to our ability to get the whole logic bit wrong. Again, it would be a case of "so far as we know". I don't have a problem with this, but again, keep in mind that you and I aren't the only ones in this discussion and such a thing might fly completely unnoticed by Mystic, for example, who asserts a universal unchanging and absolute something or other of morality.

The premise of your question is wrong. In the situation you outlined, the question of objective or subjective becomes moot, since it cannot be considered morality in the first place. The key difference between human and animal morality is that animals simply act according to instinct or conditioning. Human actions, on the other hand, have to be considered before they come under the purview of morality. Consider that we do not judge the parasites in our body according to human standards of good and evil. Further, when someone is shown to be incapable of understanding his actions - such as an infant or the mentally-challenged - we do not hold them responsible for their actions either.

Whoa there, not because you say so Genk. We have every reason to believe that many of our "moral considerations" weren't the product of some well reasoned or well considered process. I concede that these things would not be a part of what constitutes morality to you, but this ad hoc morality does exist whilst yours is still only hypothetical. We don't judge them, but that doesn't necessarily mean that we shouldn't. That's classic is-ought, or am I mistaken? Not that our ad hoc morality isn't in the same boat, mind you.

No, it would still be objective with regards to them since it would be wholly based on facts regarding those species and not anyone's thoughts about them. Things do not become objective to subjective even if they change from person to person. The pattern of your finger-prints, for example, is objective, even though it is unique to you.

I'm not sure that the fingerprints analogy is a very good one, fingerprints are material, demonstrable, etc.... and we're talking perceptions of what does or does not constitute "morality".

Relative is not the same as subjective. Things can be relative and objective at the same time.

Absolutely true, bad choice of words on my part.

Something is objective if it:
1. Depends on the object of inquiry rather than the subject.
or 2. Is independent of anyone's thoughts, opinions or desires regarding it.
or 3. Depends on facts of reality.

I'm not doubting that you consistently use the word. I give you a little more credit than all that. Gimme a moment to find a better way to phrase this particular question, I thought I laid it out fairly simply, but I probably didn't.

I've already proposed two of them, I'll now give all three.
1. Morality is a guide for a moral agent regarding how to act.
2. A moral agent needs to be both alive and free to be able to act according to the code.
3. Every action has a goal.

This is the part I love. I like the first one, however, is morality a guide or is it merely the sum total of how we do act? Judging from existent moralities the lines seem blurry, and this is only my opinion. A moral agent could also be absolutely dead and avoid coming into conflict with this code as often as a living moral agent -that's just an amusing thing that comes to mind, not really any sort of criticism. Every action has a goal...well....perhaps, even if we can't determine what that goal is.

So, in the business of establishing these as moral facts aren't you going to be haunted by the same thing that haunted you the last time we invoked moral agents, and the conditions for being classified as a moral agent? Wouldn't those have to be definitively shown? We can't be ad hoc rationalizers, if this proclamation is to be all-encompassing, can we? I can't say that I find too much in the way of issues with where this is going, once we concede that there is possibly such a morality, that there are possibly moral agents, the third seems to come out of left field but the second would follow by definition. Thing is, and I think I've found a way to rephrase that question above, are we entirely certain that we aren't working backwards on this, we know what we want to assert, and so we propose a definition that would allow us to do so?

[Angrboda]

I've already proposed two of them, I'll now give all three.
1. Morality is a guide for a moral agent regarding how to act.
2. A moral agent needs to be both alive and free to be able to act according to the code.
3. Every action has a goal.

This is the part I love. I like the first one, however, is morality a guide or is it merely the sum total of how we do act?

I don't think these two are necessarily in conflict. While I would agree that moral codes like the golden rule and utilitarianism are developed to correlate with our non-rule based intuitions, I think it's reasonable to suspect that our minds are implementing some sort of heuristic, the goals of which and operation of which are not apprehensible to direct introspection, but whose behavior accords well with rule based attempts to the describe it. (In other words, the rule is an attempt to reverse-engineer the behavior.) In that case, the rule is not the source of the moral, but it may be a good guide to what our moral intuitions are likely to tell us.