Justification for Foundational Belief

[Angrboda]

I'm not sure what you are referring to here. We are aware of physiological reactions through qualitative experiences which we call emotion. (Or by scientific measurement.) I don't know what you mean by "equating physiological reactions with emotions". I did no such thing. An example here is the notion of referred pain. We may feel a pain in a certain part of our body, but the pain is caused by a physiological state occurring elsewhere in our body. We don't experience physiological reactions, we experience emotional states caused by physiological events or conditions. To speak of equating physiological reactions with emotions is nonsensical. Physiological reactions are physical phenomena. Emotions are mental phenomena. A physical phenomena can't be identical with a mental phenomenon, unless one is perhaps referring to brain states.

I'm referring to your calling physical sensations such as hunger and sleepiness emotional phenomenon. Just because something is experiential in nature does not make it an emotion.

You earlier argued thusly:

Our emotions and feelings are not tools of cognition. They do not provide us knowledge. Any beliefs gained by pursuing emotional goals would, by their nature, be unreliable...

I don't care whether you call them feelings or emotions, the question I was addressing was whether or not feelings or other non-rational cognitions can be foundational or not. Which is why I brought up Dr. Burton and Capgras delusion and the like. You're making an argument for a difference that makes no difference. Moreover, you're arbitrarily distinguishing one form of qualitative experience from another purely qualitative experience is purely arbitrary. Because the biology of emotions doesn't support such distinctions as qualitatively justifiable. You're making an arbitrary distinction, not supported biologically, to do what exactly?

How does your foundationalism require us to make a distinction between typically labeled emotions such as anger or desire, from other non-rational states such as hunger or thirst? Does it become more acceptable as a premise if I just limit the states to those traditionally labeled as emotions? Fine. Then I'm expanding the argument to say that emotions and other non-rational experiential states can be foundational. Is that acceptable to you, or do you reject non-rational subjective states or phenomena as being potentially foundational?

If the statement that there are foundational truths has no determinate value, then the theory that is foundationalism is of indeterminate validity. You seem to be eagerly biting your nose off to spite your face. If foundationalism isn't asserting that there are foundational truths, or that it is true that there are foundational truths, then what is it asserting? Is it asserting that "there might be foundational truths but it's indeterminate whether there are or not" ? I don't think you have thought through the implications of proposition P being of indeterminate truth value. If proposition P has no determinate truth value, then foundationalism is dead.

I'm simply pointing out the risk of generalizing that statement. Whether or not that statement has determinate truth value (or any statement for that matter) would depend upon the type of foundationalism chosen, i.e. which axioms one chooses to begin with.

No, what you're doing is making pointless and irrelevant objections. The point of an objection is either to advance your argument or to defuse a counter-argument. Adding "your objection" doesn't change the logical conclusion of my argument that foundationalism is invalid. The only possible effect that this "objection" would have is to strengthen my counter-argument. And while I would appreciate your charity — if indeed it were charity — I don't think it was intentional. I think you were just confused, or more likely, grasping at straws.

For example, one of the axioms of a foundational theory might be "the truth of any statement depends upon the derivibility from foundational axioms", a definition which automatically makes those axioms as neither true, nor false, while at the same time not invalidating the theory as a whole.

Again, this doesn't help you, as this was the core of the counter-argument. There are two cases here. Even given this definition of 'a' foundationalism, if proposition P is derivable from foundational axioms, then it is true by definition. If it is itself a foundational axiom then it is also true by definition. (Unless you've included false axioms in your foundational axioms, which is absurd and makes your axiom of derivability demonstrably false.)

Again, you're trying to assert differences that make no difference, which leads me to the inescapable conclusion that you don't know what you are doing, nor how to demonstrate the validity of foundationalism.

Indeed I do, which is why I noted it wasn't a completed refutation. However, it is not clear to me that P is a foundational truth. So at minimum, you and I differ as to it being a foundational truth. I'd say that, prima facie, it's a bad sign for any hypothetically foundational concept or truth that two reasonably intelligent people are diametrically opposed as to whether it is a foundational truth. Since you're the one asserting that it is foundational, the onus is upon you to demonstrate why it, proposition P, or any basic concept / foundational truth is identifiably a foundational truth, as opposed to another proposition, say Q, which is not. What properties and characteristics must a proposition possess in order to be considered a foundational truth. What procedure do we use to partition the set of all beliefs, propositions, or concepts into basic and not basic? (And, "because Genkaus thinks it is" is not a satisfactory argument. Also note that this is why I brought up the trilemma: if you have to justify proposition P on the basis of other propositions or concepts, you've made foundationalism circular and thus vacuous. How do we identify basic concepts / truths?)

The measure I choose is whether or not its negative can be asserted without a contradiction.

Well, first of all, Russell's teapot seems to satisfy. On the other hand, it's not clear that classical logic can be asserted without contradiction. And we know that, given things like Godel's incompleteness theorem, for certain mathematics, there are truths and falsehoods for which it may not be possible to determine whether they yield a contradiction or not within that system. It's actually here where your earlier objection regarding indeterminacy comes back to bite you. At minimum, it has to be a basic, foundational truth that, in the language or system in which our propositions are defined, all axioms or propositions that yield a contradiction can be determined to yield a contradiction. If not, none, some, or all axioms may not be identifiable as axioms. Anyway, it's your foundationalism, you fill in this blank for me.

However, that's not really my main concern. My concerns are twofold. First, why does this yield axioms which are a) foundational, and b) true. Unless your criterion satisfies both goals, it's not a complete description of the generative principles of your foundationalism.

What is it about non-contradiction that makes something foundational? (I had something else, but it keeps slipping away. And rereading, I need to look into the classical reason for this criterion; it resembles something Kantian, but I'd have to research it, and I don't intend to do so immediately.)

You're confusing the criteria by which we distinguish basic from non-basic concepts (or percepts) from the concepts or percepts themselves. It's a question of identifying a common property or properties which basic concepts share, regardless of the specifics of the concept / percept itself. If you can't determine how to separate the basic concept from a non-basic concept, foundationalism is, again, dead in the water. I find it rather interesting you would define foundational concepts in term of percepts. Firstly, that seems to lead down the hole of naive empiricism of the Humean sort, for which we know there are significant difficulties. Second, veridical and non-veridical percepts are not reliably distinguishable, so that would leave us with a purely phenomenological perspective, which is a rather barren landscape. But the most problematic is that percepts don't have truth values, nor do they explain many abstractions; so just like Perhaps, you would be bankrupting the explanatory and logical power that we require of foundationalism, at the expense of defensibility. A foundationalism that doesn't give rise to, at minimum, a logic, doesn't lead to many interesting places. Percepts as basic truths doesn't lead to anywhere useful. (Ignoring that phenomenological perspectives like Heidegger's and Sartre's do lead somewhere, just not the places we, in general, want to go with a foundationalist theory.) (On top of which, there are many important basic concepts, or potential basic concepts which aren't perceptual; the concept of a group of things and the transfinite being just two off the top of my head.)

The point I'm trying to make is the error of classifying all forms of foundationalism under one umbrella. There can be many different criterion for separating the basic and derivative concepts and the self-evident percepts being the basic ones is only one of them. One may also consider the common concepts derivable form all percepts as a basic concept as well or use irrefutability as a criteria.

I included the possibility of multiple criterion. Regardless, what might be a possible foundationalism is of no interest to me. You have asserted that proposition P has the characteristics of a foundational concept / whatever. I'm not interested in what "might be" — I want you to demonstrate the foundationalism which you claimed knowledge of by asserting that proposition P appeared foundational. Any number of things "might be true," such empty speculation does not serve the ends of this discussion, unless, something that "might be true" makes my argument invalid or a premise unsound. Empty possibilities have no relevance unless the possibility undermines my demonstration. The "possibilities" you have mentioned do not. Moreover, I think it's reasonable to expect the refutation of my very real premises and argument will only be demonstrated to be invalid with real, specific objections which change the conclusion of my argument, and preferably, an actual foundationalism. I tire of arguing about what shade of pink the Invisible Pink Unicorn might be.

Also, how exactly is "percepts as basic truths" bankrupting the explanatory power of that particular foundationalism?

Because without some form of logical deduction, no truths are derivable from the basic concepts, and the truth of forms of logical deduction is not a percept (unless you're broadening 'percept' to include anything that enters consciousness.)

Finally, your insistence on classifying all statements as true or false implies a prior acceptance of another epistemological theory.

Considering you started this thread naively asserting the correspondance theory of truth as the objective measure of truth, I find this objection a bit disingenuous. Regardless, I'm not asserting anything about falsity. The sole epistemological plank I need is that if something is not true, then it is not true. If you are discussing foundationalism in the context of an epistemology in which things can be true, then my minimum is satisfied, because all that I am arguing is that foundationalism is not true. If you can't demonstrate that within an epistemology that contains the concept of true, then I have no need of further argument. If you are attempting to drag us off into an epistemology without the concept of true, you've basically shot yourself in the foot, as you certainly cannot demonstrate foundationalism is true in an epistemology with no concept of truth.

Again, you're making objections that have no merit. Please try to be germane and relevant in your objections.

[genkaus]

You earlier argued thusly:

Our emotions and feelings are not tools of cognition. They do not provide us knowledge. Any beliefs gained by pursuing emotional goals would, by their nature, be unreliable...

I don't care whether you call them feelings or emotions, the question I was addressing was whether or not feelings or other non-rational cognitions can be foundational or not. Which is why I brought up Dr. Burton and Capgras delusion and the like. You're making an argument for a difference that makes no difference. Moreover, you're arbitrarily distinguishing one form of qualitative experience from another purely qualitative experience is purely arbitrary. Because the biology of emotions doesn't support such distinctions as qualitatively justifiable. You're making an arbitrary distinction, not supported biologically, to do what exactly?

How does your foundationalism require us to make a distinction between typically labeled emotions such as anger or desire, from other non-rational states such as hunger or thirst? Does it become more acceptable as a premise if I just limit the states to those traditionally labeled as emotions? Fine. Then I'm expanding the argument to say that emotions and other non-rational experiential states can be foundational. Is that acceptable to you, or do you reject non-rational subjective states or phenomena as being potentially foundational?

I thought the distinction between them was obvious and no, I do not consider physical sensations such as hunger and thirst to be non-rational experiential states any more than sight or sound. Basically, those sensations inform us of the state of reality outside our own consciousness. The same way our five senses inform us of reality outside our body, these sensations inform us of details inside our body but separate form our consciousness. Since I accept the percepts such as these to be both rational and potentially foundational, clearly ny argument does not address these.

No, what you're doing is making pointless and irrelevant objections. The point of an objection is either to advance your argument or to defuse a counter-argument. Adding "your objection" doesn't change the logical conclusion of my argument that foundationalism is invalid. The only possible effect that this "objection" would have is to strengthen my counter-argument. And while I would appreciate your charity — if indeed it were charity — I don't think it was intentional. I think you were just confused, or more likely, grasping at straws.

How is the argument that your starting point itself is invalid irrelevant? You said, "If foundationalism is true, the statement "there are foundational truth" has determinate truth value". This statement is not true and therefore, the following argument does not apply either.

Again, this doesn't help you, as this was the core of the counter-argument. There are two cases here. Even given this definition of 'a' foundationalism, if proposition P is derivable from foundational axioms, then it is true by definition. If it is itself a foundational axiom then it is also true by definition. (Unless you've included false axioms in your foundational axioms, which is absurd and makes your axiom of derivability demonstrably false.)

Again, you're trying to assert differences that make no difference, which leads me to the inescapable conclusion that you don't know what you are doing, nor how to demonstrate the validity of foundationalism.

I'm not trying to demonstrate the validity of foundationalism here - Ive made my arguments regarding it in the prior posts. I'm simply arguing against your arguments against foundationalism. And what you have wrong here is your statement "If P is a foundational axiom then it is true by definition", since that statement assumes that axioms can be classified as true or false.

Well, first of all, Russell's teapot seems to satisfy. On the other hand, it's not clear that classical logic can be asserted without contradiction. And we know that, given things like Godel's incompleteness theorem, for certain mathematics, there are truths and falsehoods for which it may not be possible to determine whether they yield a contradiction or not within that system. It's actually here where your earlier objection regarding indeterminacy comes back to bite you. At minimum, it has to be a basic, foundational truth that, in the language or system in which our propositions are defined, all axioms or propositions that yield a contradiction can be determined to yield a contradiction. If not, none, some, or all axioms may not be identifiable as axioms. Anyway, it's your foundationalism, you fill in this blank for me.

However, that's not really my main concern. My concerns are twofold. First, why does this yield axioms which are a) foundational, and b) true. Unless your criterion satisfies both goals, it's not a complete description of the generative principles of your foundationalism.

What is it about non-contradiction that makes something foundational? (I had something else, but it keeps slipping away. And rereading, I need to look into the classical reason for this criterion; it resembles something Kantian, but I'd have to research it, and I don't intend to do so immediately.)

For a proposition to qualify as axiomatic, it must remain true under all circumstances, i.e. no statement derived form them should contradict them. It'd be impossible to validate it in its entirety -but we can say that if its negations is always false, then the statement itself is always true. Thus, if the negation is self-refuting or always leads to a contradiction, then it is indicative that the statement would likely be always true.

I included the possibility of multiple criterion. Regardless, what might be a possible foundationalism is of no interest to me. You have asserted that proposition P has the characteristics of a foundational concept / whatever. I'm not interested in what "might be" — I want you to demonstrate the foundationalism which you claimed knowledge of by asserting that proposition P appeared foundational. Any number of things "might be true," such empty speculation does not serve the ends of this discussion, unless, something that "might be true" makes my argument invalid or a premise unsound. Empty possibilities have no relevance unless the possibility undermines my demonstration. The "possibilities" you have mentioned do not. Moreover, I think it's reasonable to expect the refutation of my very real premises and argument will only be demonstrated to be invalid with real, specific objections which change the conclusion of my argument, and preferably, an actual foundationalism. I tire of arguing about what shade of pink the Invisible Pink Unicorn might be.

How do the possibilities I've mentioned "do not"?

Because without some form of logical deduction, no truths are derivable from the basic concepts, and the truth of forms of logical deduction is not a percept (unless you're broadening 'percept' to include anything that enters consciousness.)

Isn't that included by definitions?

Considering you started this thread naively asserting the correspondance theory of truth as the objective measure of truth, I find this objection a bit disingenuous. Regardless, I'm not asserting anything about falsity. The sole epistemological plank I need is that if something is not true, then it is not true. If you are discussing foundationalism in the context of an epistemology in which things can be true, then my minimum is satisfied, because all that I am arguing is that foundationalism is not true. If you can't demonstrate that within an epistemology that contains the concept of true, then I have no need of further argument. If you are attempting to drag us off into an epistemology without the concept of true, you've basically shot yourself in the foot, as you certainly cannot demonstrate foundationalism is true in an epistemology with no concept of truth.

Again, you're making objections that have no merit. Please try to be germane and relevant in your objections.

Different theories of epistemology have different concepts regarding truth and as you point out, I subscribe to correspondence theory and you apparently do not. So, basically, we are talking about two different things when talking about "truth" and therefore, given the absence of common ground, your statement regarding "truth" of foundationalism is meaningless to me, since you do not mean the same thing as I do. Now if you were to tell me what you meant by the "truth" of foundationalism and what's your criteria for accepting that - in short, your accepted epistemological theory, then maybe we can converse on common ground.

[Angrboda]

First, the non-contradiction thing, I don't fully understand that, but am not at this point willing to investigate the matter further, so I'll just have to accept that I don't know whether or not proposition P is foundational or not, nor whether that criterion of foundationalism is valid or not. As noted in my OP, that's work I have yet to do.

However, you keep raising objections of the sort that say, "well here is another way in which proposition P may not be 'true'". Unless you can gerrymander the logical landscape to an almost unheard of extent, foundationalism entails proposition P under most any conceivable "epistemology" (any conceivable epistemology under which foundationalism can be asserted and demonstrated to be true; epistemologies in which it can't be thusly shown are irrelevant, as foundationalism is about what is true — any other result is the end of [that] foundationalism). If there exists a demonstrable foundational axiom, then proposition P is true under most any useful concept of entailment and membership conceivable. If the existence of a single axiom isn't demonstrably true, then foundationalism is not true, or at least not demonstrably true, which amounts to the same thing. Therefore finding yet another way proposition P may not be demonstrably true does not in any way criticize my argument; if anything, it strengthens it by adding more ways that foundationalism can fail. Moreover, if you're not defending foundationalism.... well I guess that does explains the lack of cogency and logical force of your objections. Anyway, I don't need any additional arguments for why proposition P may not true, and therefore foundationalism is not true. But hey, thanks anyway!

Anyway, this has wandered off into a situation in which a person who earlier confessed his ignorance of contemporary epistemology is making hand-waving arguments about what "alternative epistemologies" might show. I think you're simply wandering among the brambles in hopes of finding gold. Lotsa luck with that. I've given my twin argument, the only real gap remaining (besides the additional clauses you've provided which yield the same conclusion) is the rather foundational question of what makes a foundational axiom foundational and whether proposition P is foundational (or its equivalent). However that's one of the limbs of my counter-argument, that if you have to justify a foundational axiom, then that axiom isn't properly foundational; and despite all your talk about epistemology, you never once challenged that point.

Anyway, I'm leaving this discussion. Primarily to devote attention to more interesting matters, but whatever.

[Humesapprentice]

The issue of foundational belief has been a tough one for me, to say the least. Avoiding post modernism and radical skepticism isn't a simple chore, as the ticket to doing so for me is to justify the seemingly unjustifiable: foundational beliefs.

Beliefs of this nature are a priori issues and include self evident belief and axioms. Descartes established personal acknowledgement of reality with the cogito, but memory, induction (as dissected by Hume), sense-perception, and interpretation of the meaning of words ( I believe it was Wittgenstein who brought light to this) are all truths that humans intuitively assume and need in order to survive as a mentally and physically healthy individual.

The justification for many foundational beliefs is fairly simple, and I personally subscribe to it. The answer that has bubbled to the surface is, "You are either with me or against me in this world. Functioning in a world you don't believe to be real isn't healthy- some could say deadly or impossible. So I will assume these truths, all the while beings receptive to new information that contradicts these beliefs."

My issue with this is that I feel like I am shifting the burden of proof, waiting to be proven wrong. I had previously thought it to also be special pleading, however foundational belief is in another class from derived belief because it is an a priori issue that takes precedence over all other forms of belief.

That has been my very limited understanding of foundationalism and is what governs my evidentialist beliefs. My question to anyone and everyone is, am I justified?
Am I justified in making an assumption on the part of foundational beliefs?

On the issue of justifying foundational beliefs: if it has be justified, then it is not foundational. Beliefs which are foundational ought to exactly match the definition of what knowledge is without demonstration.

Once we specify what we really mean by the word "knowledge" seeing whether a belief fits this category ought to be like seeing that A equals A. I think what knowledge refers to is a belief that you have which matches reality. Since reality is experienced by sensations of various kinds, asking whether a belief is true (in other words, asking whether a belief counts as knowledge) means asking whether this belief matches the sensations which you have. The beliefs which are foundational are statements in which you can clearly see this without further proof: "I now feel tired" (if you feel tired when you think this) "I exist" "A equals A" and so on. Beliefs such as induction do indeed require justification (and can be justified) but that's another story.