(August 3, 2012 at 1:03 am)FallentoReason Wrote: That's right Clive! Time to pull through with your attempt at making some sort of point--which you never intended to made clear. I felt mentally raped/abused and it wasn't nice!
This is
ad hominem; you're accusing me of having bad intentions. I hope the debate isn't characterized by these kinds of fallacies--or any kind of fallacy, actually.
If you see me committing any kind of error or fallacy, I'd appreciate being called out on it.
Quote:If in your opinion evidentialism simply fails, then by your own reasoning how could you have come to the conclusion that Jesus is Lord? Evidence or..?
First, let's define what I mean when I say "evidentialism", to make sure that we're all talking about the same thing.
Evidentialism is a theory of justification. That is, evidentialism tells you exactly how and why you should come to hold certain beliefs--that is, what standards a claim/proposition must meet in order for you to believe that claim/proposition.
Specifically, Evidentialism says something like this (some people might phrase it differently, but it all basically amounts to the same thing):
(E) Belief in
p is justified <=> there exists sufficient *evidence that
p is true.
Here, *evidence includes things like (but not limited to): sensory data, expert consensus, logical/mathematical proof, etc.
Notation: B(X,p) means "X believes p"; B(p) will be used if the identity of the believer is clear. E(p) means "There exists sufficient *evidence that p is true."
Suppose that X thinks E ("Belief in P is justified <=> there exists sufficient *evidence that P is true") makes a lot of sense, and so X decides he's going to be an Evidentialist.
Ideally, for X, it would be true that B(p) <=> E(p). That is, if E(p), then B(p), and if ~E(p) (i.e., there isn't sufficient *evidence that p is true), then ~B(p) (that is, X doesn't believe p).
Unfortunately for X, he is a human, and is therefore fallible. For suppose that X comes to believe that E(p), but his belief is wrong. X might think that there is expert consensus, when in fact there is not; or X might think that a measurement has confirmed a hypothesis when in fact the measurement was made in error, and so forth.
So it seems that X does not form beliefs based on whether or not E(p) is true, but rather on
whether X believes E(p) is true.
I'll stop here just to make sure everyone's on the same page. Any objections thus far?