The Will to Believe
Here, William James attampts to argue that it is okay to believe in something without having evidence for it.
He says
Already, one can see error in his saying that deciding we do not yet know is 'a passionate decision'.
He argues that non-christians are closed minded:
He can be seen here utilizing the unequal comparison between the amount of evidence required to believe simple things to the evidence rquired for god. He seems to show the same 'well if you gave god a chance' reasoning as many theists, despite the fact that most atheists are ex-theists.
Refuting of refutations of criticism: ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Will_to...#Criticism )
1. One does not need to assume a hypothesis true, or act as though it were true to test it. Doing so would be clearly biased.
2. I'm not sure I understand what they are asking with this one. He does say, however, that if there is any doubt in a belief, you can will yourself not to believe it, or if there is any evidence you can will yourself to believe it.
3. This opens up something entirely different:
Then there is this:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872...83160.html
In which, it is argued basically that religion makes you feel good, and therefore you should follow it, even if god isn't real. This is the pragmatist theory of truth from The Will to Believe. Said theory also ties in with self-fulfilling beliefs (assuming they are positive), which James mentions. However, James had argued that this theory wasn't necessary for the belief in god.
The problem here is that there exists a hole shaped god, not a god shaped hole. He claims that if we assume god, and then compare what the world would be like with him to what it is now, and it fits, this proves god. However, there are two problems with this. The studies showing the ineffectiveness of prayer had not been conducted yet when this was written, but there is another assumption he made. By assuming god, he removes the possibility that people explained already existing things with god. God doesn't answer anything, whereas science can be used to determine what will happen in the future. Also, god is so vaguely and broadly defined that this is hardly viable, not to mention we could use the sane argument to support the Flying Spaghetti Monster. The last sentence appears to relate to redefining god to escape falsification. Unfortunately, this resource doesn't fail in the minds of its users.
Herein lies the main problem: you cannot believe without first having blind faith. Then, when you see a 'sign' of god, your belief is strengthened. People who are willing to suspend all disbelief are also most likely to be the ones to interpret things as signs from god. The final sentence from that quote is undeniably true; I'm not sure if he understood the implications of that, but that idea supports atheim pretty strongly.
Okay, enough from me; any thoughts? (Or did I already say too much and accidentally slay this thread in its infancy?)
Here, William James attampts to argue that it is okay to believe in something without having evidence for it.
He says
William James Wrote:"Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds; for to say under such circumstances, "Do not decide, but leave the question open," is itself a passional decision,—just like deciding yes or not,—and is attended with the same risk of losing truth."
Already, one can see error in his saying that deciding we do not yet know is 'a passionate decision'.
He argues that non-christians are closed minded:
William James Wrote:For them the evidence is absolutely sufficient, only it makes the other way. They believe so completely in an anti-Christian order of the universe that there is no living option: Christianity is a dead hypothesis from the start.
wikipedia Wrote:James then goes on to argue that, like the examples he gave in section IX, religious belief is also the sort of belief that depends on our personal action and therefore can also justifiably be believed through a faith based on desire:
"We feel, too, as if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will, as if evidence might be forever withheld from us unless we met the hypothesis half-way. To take a trivial illustration: just as a man who in a company of gentlemen made no advances, asked a warrant for every concession, and believed no one's word without proof, would cut himself off by such churlishness from all the social rewards that a more trusting spirit would earn,—so here, one who should shut himself up in snarling logicality and try to make the gods extort his recognition willy-nilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off forever from his only opportunity of making the gods' acquaintance. This feeling, forced on us we know not whence, that by obstinately believing that there are gods (although not to do so would be so easy both for our logic and our life) we are doing the universe the deepest service we can, seems part of the living essence of the religious hypothesis. If the hypothesis were true in all its parts, including this one, then pure intellectualism, with its veto on our making willing advances, would be an absurdity; and some participation of our sympathetic nature would be logically required. I, therefore, for one, cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, or wilfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game. I cannot do so for this plain reason, that a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule. That for me is the long and short of the formal logic of the situation, no matter what the kinds of truth might materially be."
He can be seen here utilizing the unequal comparison between the amount of evidence required to believe simple things to the evidence rquired for god. He seems to show the same 'well if you gave god a chance' reasoning as many theists, despite the fact that most atheists are ex-theists.
Refuting of refutations of criticism: ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Will_to...#Criticism )
1. One does not need to assume a hypothesis true, or act as though it were true to test it. Doing so would be clearly biased.
2. I'm not sure I understand what they are asking with this one. He does say, however, that if there is any doubt in a belief, you can will yourself not to believe it, or if there is any evidence you can will yourself to believe it.
3. This opens up something entirely different:
wikipedia page on William James Wrote:Therefore, this doctrine allows one to assume belief in God and prove His existence by what the belief brings to one's life.
Then there is this:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872...83160.html
In which, it is argued basically that religion makes you feel good, and therefore you should follow it, even if god isn't real. This is the pragmatist theory of truth from The Will to Believe. Said theory also ties in with self-fulfilling beliefs (assuming they are positive), which James mentions. However, James had argued that this theory wasn't necessary for the belief in god.
wikipedia Wrote:It cannot then be said that the question, "Is this a moral world?" is a meaningless and unverifiable question because it deals with something non-phenomenal. Any question is full of meaning to which, as here, contrary answers lead to contrary behavior. And it seems as if in answering such a question as this we might proceed exactly as does the physical philosopher in testing an hypothesis. [...] So here: the verification of the theory which you may hold as to the objectively moral character of the world can consist only in this,—that if you proceed to act upon your theory it will be reversed by nothing that later turns up as your action's fruits; it will harmonize so well with the entire drift of experience that the latter will, as it were, adopt it. [...] If this be an objectively moral universe, all acts that I make on that assumption, all expectations that I ground on it, will tend more and more completely to interdigitate with the phenomena already existing. [...] While if it be not such a moral universe, and I mistakenly assume that it is, the course of experience will throw ever new impediments in the way of my belief, and become more and more difficult to express in its language. Epicycle upon epicycle of subsidiary hypothesis will have to be invoked to give to the discrepant terms a temporary appearance of squaring with each other; but at last even this resource will fail. (—William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality")
The problem here is that there exists a hole shaped god, not a god shaped hole. He claims that if we assume god, and then compare what the world would be like with him to what it is now, and it fits, this proves god. However, there are two problems with this. The studies showing the ineffectiveness of prayer had not been conducted yet when this was written, but there is another assumption he made. By assuming god, he removes the possibility that people explained already existing things with god. God doesn't answer anything, whereas science can be used to determine what will happen in the future. Also, god is so vaguely and broadly defined that this is hardly viable, not to mention we could use the sane argument to support the Flying Spaghetti Monster. The last sentence appears to relate to redefining god to escape falsification. Unfortunately, this resource doesn't fail in the minds of its users.
wikipedia Wrote:Although James does not here explain the way in which the truth or evidence regarding religious belief depends upon our first having religious belief, he does argue that it is a part of the religious belief itself that its own truth or the evidence of its own truth depends upon our first believing it. In the preface to the published version of "The Will to Believe" James offers a different argument for the way in which the evidence for religion depends upon our belief. There he contends that it is through the failure or thriving of communities of religious believers that we come to have evidence of the truth of their religious beliefs. In this way, to acquire evidence for religious belief, we must first have believers who adopt such belief without sufficient evidence. Much later in life, in his "Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking" lectures, James also mentions the possibility that God's existence may actually depend upon our belief in his existence.
Herein lies the main problem: you cannot believe without first having blind faith. Then, when you see a 'sign' of god, your belief is strengthened. People who are willing to suspend all disbelief are also most likely to be the ones to interpret things as signs from god. The final sentence from that quote is undeniably true; I'm not sure if he understood the implications of that, but that idea supports atheim pretty strongly.
Okay, enough from me; any thoughts? (Or did I already say too much and accidentally slay this thread in its infancy?)
John Adams Wrote:The Government of the United States of America is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion.