Pleasure and Joy

[genkaus]

When you infer a black hole, it's because you know there's something affecting the path of objects or light moving through space. You are observing properties, and inferring the existence of an object which explains them. The black hole is a necessary addition, because there's no other good way to explain some apparent oddities of things observed in space.

In the case of all the behaviors you mentioned, we already have a sufficient explanation-- the mechanism of the brain. It is not necessary to posit the existence of fairies in order to explain all the behaviors-- unless you think the brain itself is NOT sufficient to explain the behaviors. So the idea that actual awareness is inferred from the brain or its behaviors is baloney. The fact is that you already "know" that people experience awareness, and you follow your conclusion back to the criteria that would arrive at that "knowledge."

The sufficient explanation you refer to is experience. The brain mechanism is not an explanation for the behavior, it is an explanation for experience.

To use your own analogy, when I observe light moving in an odd manner I posit the existence of something that I cannot perceive and I call it a black-hole. Then I go on to examine the nature of the back-hole and, upon investigation, find that it is made of superdense matter. Even if my investigation had instead revealed that the black-hole is made of fairy-dust, the fact of black-hole's existence would not have changed. Either way, I wouldn't be assuming anything.

Similarly, I see specific human behavior being caused by something and I call that thing 'experience'. The added advantage here is that I have knowledge of its existence due to my own capacity to experience. And upon investigation of what this experience is, I find it to be a specific brain-mechanism. If I had instead found a soul, I'd have said, soul is the explanation for experience. But instead, I find that brain-mechanism is the explanation.

We've both agreed that we are willing to believe that other humans actually experience, based on behavioral and physical similarities. The difference is that I accept that position as intrinsically agnostic, while you have to convince yourself that it's based on a careful consideration of physical facts, and therefore worthy of the word "knowing." You are wrong to do so. When you know what you want to believe, and conflate confirmation bias with an actual scientific process, you are not pitting science against philosophy. You are pitting your personal truthiness against BOTH science AND philosophy.

If conclusions drawn from careful consideration of physical facts cannot be regarded as knowledge, then there can be no such thing as scientific knowledge. So, by your standard, we all are necessarily agnostic about all of reality. We don't know that Earth is round -we believe it is. We don't know that dinosaurs existed - we believe they did. We don't know that law of gravity works - we believe it does. And by the same standard, we don't know that we don't know - we believe that we don't know. Is this your position? Because it is self-refuting.

[bennyboy]

The sufficient explanation you refer to is experience. The brain mechanism is not an explanation for the behavior, it is an explanation for experience.

You've said that experience IS brain function, and now you say that brain function explains experience. So you can say that brain function explains itself, or that experience explains itself.

To use your own analogy, when I observe light moving in an odd manner I posit the existence of something that I cannot perceive and I call it a black-hole. Then I go on to examine the nature of the back-hole and, upon investigation, find that it is made of superdense matter. Even if my investigation had instead revealed that the black-hole is made of fairy-dust, the fact of black-hole's existence would not have changed. Either way, I wouldn't be assuming anything.

You would be if you posited properties to the black hole which nobody can observe, and which are not required to explain the observations which cause you to infer its existence in the first place.

Similarly, I see specific human behavior being caused by something and I call that thing 'experience'. The added advantage here is that I have knowledge of its existence due to my own capacity to experience. And upon investigation of what this experience is, I find it to be a specific brain-mechanism. If I had instead found a soul, I'd have said, soul is the explanation for experience. But instead, I find that brain-mechanism is the explanation.

lol even you have to put quotes around it. I look forward to seeing the brain scans which you did of yourself, which you've also found in other humans. Frankly, I did not know you had access to any of that kid of equipment.

If conclusions drawn from careful consideration of physical facts cannot be regarded as knowledge, then there can be no such thing as scientific knowledge.

I'm saying that your conclusions are NOT drawn from careful consideration of physical facts. You did NOT infer the existence of awareness, in yourself or anyone else, based on behavior or brain function. You already believe that others actually experience.

The problem is that all those physical facts upon which you claim to draw work fine without positing any kind of actual experience. You are inferring properties that aren't required, only because you might as well since you feel you "know" the truth already.

So, by your standard, we all are necessarily agnostic about all of reality. We don't know that Earth is round -we believe it is. We don't know that dinosaurs existed - we believe they did. We don't know that law of gravity works - we believe it does. And by the same standard, we don't know that we don't know - we believe that we don't know. Is this your position? Because it is self-refuting.

You can claim gnosticism about idea which share the same context, which is determined by perspective and the set of assumptions one makes.

So I can know for sure that there's milk in my fridge. I don't need to worry that maybe I'm in the Matrix, and the milk isn't real, because I'm not making assertions about the existential reality of the milk-- only that if I open the fridge, there it is to be experienced visually.

In a video game, I can know for sure that if I get too close to a certain monster, it will kill me. If someone else asks "Are you sure?" I'll say I know for sure. In the context of that video game, it's a fact that that monster will kill me 100% of the time. Anyone who talks to me is operating in the same context that I am: no sensible person will say, "La la la I'm not really dead I'm in my Mom's basement eating Doritos." This fails, because he's abandoning the context.

Similarly, if someone gets knocked out, I can snap my fingers in front of his face until he blinks and say, "He's finally conscious again, because he's experiencing my finger snaps." Since I'm operating in a context defined by accepting the ideas both of the reality of the physical universe and of experience in other humans, then the only criterion of experience is his behavior. He's as conscious as anyone else is, and since I'm already assuming (even implicitly) that other humans can be conscious, there's no conflict there.

This is where you are. You've chosen your set of assumptions, and are fully immersed in the gnostic reality of the context which is defined by them. The problem is that you don't accept that they are assumptions-- you think they are based on evidence of a context external to assumptions. But they aren't.

[Neo-Scholastic]

They are, in fact, not separate.

The better analogy is a brick. Its shape and mass matter for building. Its color does not. You say that subjective experience matters, but then turn around and say everything is explicable as third-party observable physical processes. If that is so then, subjective experience is redundant. You cannot supply a reason why, in your theory, brain-states with observable properties need the additional property of subjective experience. Sorry genkaus, but you need to get your story straight. You are not being consistent.

[genkaus]

You've said that experience IS brain function, and now you say that brain function explains experience. So you can say that brain function explains itself, or that experience explains itself.

Are you willfully misunderstanding my statement? Let's see if you get it through analogy:

Black-hole is a superdense matter. Simultaneously, superdense matter explains a black-hole.

Electric current is a flow of electrons. The flow of electrons explains electric current.

Clouds are suspended water-particles. Suspended water particles explain clouds.

Similarly, experience is brain-function. Brain-function explains experience.

Do you get it or do you need further explanation?

You would be if you posited properties to the black hole which nobody can observe, and which are not required to explain the observations which cause you to infer its existence in the first place.

Unfortunately for you, the super-dense matter of the black hole is not observable - given that the black-hole itself is not observable. As for it being 'required' to explain anything - that's debatable. Fairy-dust would explain the existence of black-hole equally well, the same way soul would explain the existence of experience.

lol even you have to put quotes around it. I look forward to seeing the brain scans which you did of yourself, which you've also found in other humans. Frankly, I did not know you had access to any of that kid of equipment.

You want me to reveal all the personal aspects of my identity over the internet - sorry, not gonna happen.

I'm saying that your conclusions are NOT drawn from careful consideration of physical facts. You did NOT infer the existence of awareness, in yourself or anyone else, based on behavior or brain function. You already believe that others actually experience.

And you are sure of this because....?

I did carefully consider physical facts. I do know of the existence of my own awareness. The physical facts I considered were separating behaviors which are necessarily the result of experience and which aren't. Other physical facts are my physiological reactions. Yet others are the same behaviors and reactions in other. Which is why I know that others actually experience.

The problem is that all those physical facts upon which you claim to draw work fine without positing any kind of actual experience. You are inferring properties that aren't required, only because you might as well since you feel you "know" the truth already.

Sorry, they don't. You cannot display behavior like subjective preferences, learning, conditioning etc. without actual experience.

You can claim gnosticism about idea which share the same context, which is determined by perspective and the set of assumptions one makes.

First, you have to establish gnosticism as a coherent concept within that context.

So I can know for sure that there's milk in my fridge. I don't need to worry that maybe I'm in the Matrix, and the milk isn't real, because I'm not making assertions about the existential reality of the milk-- only that if I open the fridge, there it is to be experienced visually.

Sorry, but unless you make the assertion about the existential reality of the milk - no, you cannot know.

In a video game, I can know for sure that if I get too close to a certain monster, it will kill me. If someone else asks "Are you sure?" I'll say I know for sure. In the context of that video game, it's a fact that that monster will kill me 100% of the time. Anyone who talks to me is operating in the same context that I am: no sensible person will say, "La la la I'm not really dead I'm in my Mom's basement eating Doritos." This fails, because he's abandoning the context.

Bad example. It fails because the death here refers not to you but to the digital program you happen to be controlling.

Similarly, if someone gets knocked out, I can snap my fingers in front of his face until he blinks and say, "He's finally conscious again, because he's experiencing my finger snaps." Since I'm operating in a context defined by accepting the ideas both of the reality of the physical universe and of experience in other humans, then the only criterion of experience is his behavior. He's as conscious as anyone else is, and since I'm already assuming (even implicitly) that other humans can be conscious, there's no conflict there.

You are assuming - not me.

This is where you are. You've chosen your set of assumptions, and are fully immersed in the gnostic reality of the context which is defined by them. The problem is that you don't accept that they are assumptions-- you think they are based on evidence of a context external to assumptions. But they aren't.

Here's where you go wrong - I've already laid out my assumptions. I've also laid out why my assumptions are axiomatic and how any denial of those assumptions results in self-refutation. I've also shown why gnosticism is valid only within the context of those assumptions. And here's the kicker - assuming that others are capable of experience is not and has never been one of my assumptions. That knowledge is based on evidence. Which is precisely why your accusation of circular reasoning fails.

---

They are, in fact, not separate.

The better analogy is a brick. Its shape and mass matter for building. Its color does not. You say that subjective experience matters, but then turn around and say everything is explicable as third-party observable physical processes. If that is so then, subjective experience is redundant. You cannot supply a reason why, in your theory, brain-states with observable properties need the additional property of subjective experience. Sorry genkaus, but you need to get your story straight. You are not being consistent.

Do you intentionally ignore the rest of my post that already contains the answer to your question or do you simply not read it?

Here's where I first gave the explanation for this specific issue:

Yes, it is causally relevant. The causal chain can be viewed at different levels - we can view it at particulate level exchanging energy all the way up to the level of planetary motion. The level at which human consciousness exists and intuitively perceives the reality - i.e. as singular entities rather than collection of particles - the existence of subjective experience within those entities becomes relevant.

The second explanation through analogy is here:

For example, suppose I send a document to the printer, resulting in the action of it being printed. Now you say that there are two possibilities. The existence of document is a necessary property, there being a set of electronic signals is incidental. Or the existence of signals is necessary and there being a document is incidental. And I must choose which is the case. However, the fact is, without that document, there wouldn't be
those electronic signals and without those electronic signals there wouldn't be a document - they are one and the same thing. That we can conceptually regard them as separate entities does not change the fact.

And what both of them say is that subjective experience is not an additional or redundant property - it is the necessary consequence of the way the brain works. Viewing the same phenomenon atomically you see the causal chain as stimulus -> series of brain states -> behavior. Viewing it holisitically, you see is as stimulus -> experience -> behavior.

[bennyboy]

Are you willfully misunderstanding my statement? Let's see if you get it through analogy:

---

Black-hole is a superdense matter. Simultaneously, superdense matter explains a black-hole.

Electric current is a flow of electrons. The flow of electrons explains electric current.

Clouds are suspended water-particles. Suspended water particles explain clouds.

Similarly, experience is brain-function. Brain-function explains experience.

---

Do you get it or do you need further explanation?

. . . because increased condescension = better truth?

The problem with all your examples is that each inferred explanation starts with an observable property and a question about what caused it. That's how it works-- you see something, and you explain it. Sometimes, you can't see what causes a property-- then you must infer (or downright guess) what causes it. But in none of these cases do you start with an observable and sufficient cause of observable property X, and start guessing how it's the cause of unobservable property Y.

Get it yet?

Unfortunately for you, the super-dense matter of the black hole is not observable - given that the black-hole itself is not observable. As for it being 'required' to explain anything - that's debatable. Fairy-dust would explain the existence of black-hole equally well, the same way soul would explain the existence of experience.

The black-hole isn't the property. It's the explanation required to explain properties.

And you are sure of this because....?

I did carefully consider physical facts. I do know of the existence of my own awareness. The physical facts I considered were separating behaviors which are necessarily the result of experience and which aren't. Other physical facts are my physiological reactions. Yet others are the same behaviors and reactions in other. Which is why I know that others actually experience.

Which did you know first-- that you were actually experiencing, or that the brain was the source of your experiences?

Sorry, they don't. You cannot display behavior like subjective preferences, learning, conditioning etc. without actual experience

Just like a computer can't win a game of chess without actual imagination?

Sorry, but unless you make the assertion about the existential reality of the milk - no, you cannot know.

Sure I do. I open the fridge and voila! there's my milk. Why are you arguing against that, anyway? When you open your fridge, do you say, "Voila! There's a contained collection of x^n wave functions vibrating in space!" ? No, because the underlying reality isn't important-- if milk were made of Matrix code or the Mind of God, it would still just be milk. In the context of puttering around my house, my knowledge is based on direct experience, not on ideas about the underlying nature of things which get replaced every hundred years. Now, if I want to start making assertions about the absolute source of my milky experiences, then I'm going to be in big trouble.

Here's where you go wrong - I've already laid out my assumptions. I've also laid out why my assumptions are axiomatic and how any denial of those assumptions results in self-refutation. I've also shown why gnosticism is valid only within the context of those assumptions. And here's the kicker - assuming that others are capable of experience is not and has never been one of my assumptions. That knowledge is based on evidence. Which is precisely why your accusation of circular reasoning fails.

What's wrong with self-refutation? Science does it all the time.

Anyway, you've already established that you base your knowledge of experience on (the experience of) evidence-- like the Cyberboy 2000's ability to modify it's face structure to seem like it expresses emotions. What you haven't established is that the evidence you accept is sufficient to make it WORTH taking a gnostic position.

I know that at least some things are not what they seem. Therefore, something seeming to be does necessarily make it so.

[genkaus]

. . . because increased condescension = better truth?

Nope, just more fun for me.

The problem with all your examples is that each inferred explanation starts with an observable property and a question about what caused it. That's how it works-- you see something, and you explain it. Sometimes, you can't see what causes a property-- then you must infer (or downright guess) what causes it. But in none of these cases do you start with an observable and sufficient cause of observable property X, and start guessing how it's the cause of unobservable property Y.

Get it yet?

That's where you are wrong. Look at the examples again - the inferred explanation starts with phenomena that are both observable and non-observable. You infer the phenomena based other observed properties (the phenomena itself need not be observable) and then you explain what caused it by further investigation.

The black-hole isn't the property. It's the explanation required to explain properties.

And the same applies to experience.

Which did you know first-- that you were actually experiencing, or that the brain was the source of your experiences?

The former.

Just like a computer can't win a game of chess without actual imagination?

Precisely.

Sure I do. I open the fridge and voila! there's my milk. Why are you arguing against that, anyway? When you open your fridge, do you say, "Voila! There's a contained collection of x^n wave functions vibrating in space!" ? No, because the underlying reality isn't important-- if milk were made of Matrix code or the Mind of God, it would still just be milk.

In making any statement like "milk is a collection of x^n wave functions" or "milk is a matrix code" or "milk exists in mind of god" - you are making the assumption of existential reality of milk. You are changing the nature of its existence, but that assumption is made all the same. And that assumption is necessary for existence of knowledge.

What's wrong with self-refutation? Science does it all the time.

That's falsifiability - not self-refutation.

Anyway, you've already established that you base your knowledge of experience on evidence-- like the Cyberboy 2000's ability to modify it's face structure to seem like it expresses emotions.

Not that evidence. Facial contortion is a physiological consequence, not a behavioral one. Given Cyberboy's different physiology, its behavior would be the standard evidence for experience.

What you haven't established is that the evidence you accept is sufficient to make it WORTH taking a gnostic position.

The knowledge that certain behaviors necessarily require experience to be reproduced.


I know that at least some things are not what they seem. Therefore, something seeming to be does necessarily make it so.
[/quote]

[Neo-Scholastic]

Genkaus, a gaggle has the same properties as seven geese. It rains, the river swells, and the levy breaks. Put them together and call it a flood. Nothing new appears when you make a set.

You said you thought subjective experiences were causally relevant, but what you really meant was something else. You meant that there are no actual subjective experiences, only objective phenomena under another label. In so doing you deny the reality of conscious awareness as commonly understood.

It's no wonder that bennyboy and you have been talking past each other. He accepts the reality of qualia while you're in zombieland.

[bennyboy]

The black-hole isn't the property. It's the explanation required to explain properties.

And the same applies to experience.

Actual subjective experience is not required to explain behavior. Brain function is sufficient.

Just like a computer can't win a game of chess without actual imagination?

Precisely.

I admire your full commitment to your world view. Not many people would claim a Radio Shack chess set has actual imagination.

I do not accept the way you define these words. You would presumably say that any device which can react to redness (for example, by stopping at a red light) is experiencing redness. And yet, when I talk about the interchange of photons, some of which represent redness, you do not accept that individual particles are actually experiencing. And when I talk about a galaxy, in which many parts' movement is affected by forces exerted on them by other objects, you do not accept that the galaxy is actually experiencing.

Water, for example, reacts to a loss of heat by changing its structure to ice. The loss of heat has caused a physical response in the water. Is the water experiencing that heat loss?

[genkaus]

Genkaus, a gaggle has the same properties as seven geese. It rains, the river swells, and the levy breaks. Put them together and call it a flood. Nothing new appears when you make a set.

The gaggle is missing the property of seven. Calling it a flood indicates the level of damage. New concepts and information can be derived when things are considered as sets - that's why we make those sets.

You said you thought subjective experiences were causally relevant, but what you really meant was something else.

No, that was what I meant.

You meant that there are no actual subjective experiences, only objective phenomena under another label. In so doing you deny the reality of conscious awareness as commonly understood.

No, I'm saying that there are subjective experiences. That we may, some day, might be able to see them as objective phenomena would not change the fact that they are subjective experiences. However, I did deny the "reality of conscious awareness as commonly understood" because the way it is commonly understood is as existence of a soul.

It's no wonder that bennyboy and you have been talking past each other. He accepts the reality of qualia while you're in zombieland.

I think I have been pretty clear on this - I accept the reality of qualia and I explain it.

---

Actual subjective experience is not required to explain behavior. Brain function is sufficient.

Given that that brain function is subjective experience, it becomes included in the explanation automatically.

Here's how your analogy plays out w.r..t black-hole -

Black-hole is not required to explain motion of light. Super-dense matter is sufficient.

I admire your full commitment to your world view. Not many people would claim a Radio Shack chess set has actual imagination.

Most people work with the same erroneous assumptions as you do.

I do not accept the way you define these words. You would presumably say that any device which can react to redness (for example, by stopping at a red light) is experiencing redness. And yet, when I talk about the interchange of photons, some of which represent redness, you do not accept that individual particles are actually experiencing. And when I talk about a galaxy, in which many parts' movement is affected by forces exerted on them by other objects, you do not accept that the galaxy is actually experiencing.

I'm not the one defining these words. And no, I do not say that a device reacting to red light is necessarily sentient. I've been quite clear with regards to my view on the form and function of experience and why it is a reasonable conclusion at one point and not in another.

In case of the galaxy or individual particles, one single causal chain is going on. It receives input, processes it through preset system, gives specific output. Nothing that can be called 'experience' is present here.

In conscious or sentient beings two causal chains occur. The being receives input, processes it and gives output. And this causal chain itself serves as an input for a parallel one. The other system processes the reception and the processing in another manner and gives another set of output. This second causal chain is what we call 'experience'.

If the output given by the entity is not explicable by the existence of the first causal chain, it indicates the existence of a second one. So, if there is a pre-coded program present in the device that dictates reaction to presence of red light, then existence of the second causal chain is not required and inference of experience is invalid. However, if there isn't such a program present, then that indicates a parallel running program which analyzes process itself, i.e. experience.

Water, for example, reacts to a loss of heat by changing its structure to ice. The loss of heat has caused a physical response in the water. Is the water experiencing that heat loss?

No. For the reasons given above.

[bennyboy]

Given that that brain function is subjective experience, it becomes included in the explanation automatically.

In giving that, you are begging the question automatically.

I admire your full commitment to your world view. Not many people would claim a Radio Shack chess set has actual imagination.

Most people work with the same erroneous assumptions as you do.

That's what the Mormons keep telling me. But I don't believe them, either.

I do not accept the way you define these words. You would presumably say that any device which can react to redness (for example, by stopping at a red light) is experiencing redness. And yet, when I talk about the interchange of photons, some of which represent redness, you do not accept that individual particles are actually experiencing. And when I talk about a galaxy, in which many parts' movement is affected by forces exerted on them by other objects, you do not accept that the galaxy is actually experiencing.

---

I'm not the one defining these words. And no, I do not say that a device reacting to red light is necessarily sentient. I've been quite clear with regards to my view on the form and function of experience and why it is a reasonable conclusion at one point and not in another.

In case of the galaxy or individual particles, one single causal chain is going on. It receives input, processes it through preset system, gives specific output. Nothing that can be called 'experience' is present here.

In conscious or sentient beings two causal chains occur. The being receives input, processes it and gives output. And this causal chain itself serves as an input for a parallel one. The other system processes the reception and the processing in another manner and gives another set of output. This second causal chain is what we call 'experience'.

If the output given by the entity is not explicable by the existence of the first causal chain, it indicates the existence of a second one. So, if there is a pre-coded program present in the device that dictates reaction to presence of red light, then existence of the second causal chain is not required and inference of experience is invalid. However, if there isn't such a program present, then that indicates a parallel running program which analyzes process itself, i.e. experience.

---

Okay, so let's take the temperature in a room, which is heated by an element which turns on and off. This element has no means by which to achieve this turning on and off-- it relies on the thermostat, which monitors the temperature, and cuts or allows power to go to the element. You are saying the thermostat is experiencing both the room and the state of the element, since it is the "second causal chain."

You're funny!