(September 2, 2013 at 6:16 am)bennyboy Wrote: The problem is that I have actual experience, and you are defining something other than that as experience. You can play semantic games all you want, but the fact is that I am known (at least by me) to have a rich subjective awareness, and the Cyberboy 2000 can be known only to behave as though it does. You can conflate your definition with mine as much as you want, but that doesn't change the philosophical reality of what I am, and what the Cyberboy (as far as we are able to know) is not.

No, the problem is that you are not only working with with limited facts, you are also unwilling to consider any additional facts available.

This is not a semantic game. Your direct access to your own subjective awareness tells you nothing about the fundamental nature of experience itself. The only thing that you can know from just that direct access is that you have subject awareness. That you are capable of experience. Just from that single fact, you cannot determine the existence/non-existence of soul, you cannot determine if someone or something else is also subjectively aware and you cannot determine whether brain function is relevant to the experience. Once again, because it bears repetition, you cannot conclude anything on any of those issues simply based on the fact of your own experience.

But fortunately, our repository of facts is not limited to that. And this is why it is not a semantic game. What you refer to as "your rich subjective awareness" or your "actual experience" is, in fact, a specific form of data-processing. The philosophical reality of who you are is that you are a complex information processing system within which one specific form of information-processing is labelled "experience". That you think this makes you less special is irrelevant. That you think this does not jive with your belief of what experience is, is likewise irrelevant. Certain aspects of your behavior are the product of this form of data-processing and if Cyberboy displays the similar behavior, then that is prima-facie evidence that it too has that data-processing in its system. Which means what you call "subjective awareness" or "experience", the Cyberboy has that as well. The absence of direct access to Cyberboy's experience is not sufficient reason to dismiss all the other lines of evidence suggesting its existence.

(September 2, 2013 at 6:16 am)bennyboy Wrote: Whether it does or does not actually experience is not known, or knowable. I know I experience, because I wake up in the morning and do just that. I'm willing to assume that other humans do that, because they seem similar enough to me in other regards that it's worth making that assumption.

You are making the same mistake over and over again. That other humans are capable of experience is not only knowable, it is known. It is known because direct access to experience is not required to establish the knowledge of its existence. It is known because all the lines of evidence - physiological, neurological and behavioral - point to its existence.

(September 2, 2013 at 6:16 am)bennyboy Wrote: If I've made a positive assertion about the existence/lack of Cyberboy's ability to actually experience, then I happily retract it. I don't, and can't know-- and neither can anyone else. But there is enough dissimilarity that I'm not willing to assume it just because it behaves like a human.

Your ignorance is not a justification for universal ignorance. Your inability to know it does not place a limitation on anyone else's ability to know. Others would know that Cyberboy has the ability to actually experience because they know that certain behaviors are the result of subjective awareness and evidence of that behavior is prima-facie evidence of existence of experience. Your rejection of this knowledge is a positive assertion and bears the burden of proof.

(September 2, 2013 at 6:16 am)bennyboy Wrote: Nope. You're just taking good old-fashioned, imagination-less mechanism, and applying a mind-existent term to it as though its lack of actual experience means nothing.

Nope, I'm taking a mechanism and discovering that the way it works is precisely how the mind-existent concept of imagination works and thus concluding that the mechanism has imagination.

(September 2, 2013 at 6:16 am)bennyboy Wrote: No I don't. All I have to do is show that the mind attempting to comprehend its own nature is a circle. And to say the obvious: circles are bad.

Actually, if you are positing the possibility of matrix, then you do have to do more than show circular argument. Unfortunately, you haven't even shown that mind attempting to comprehend its own nature is circular.

(September 2, 2013 at 6:16 am)bennyboy Wrote: Right. In the context in which physics is done-- looking at things, experimenting on them, and manipulating them to our benefit-- the bridge and the science that allow it to stand are perfectly real. Whether that reality is in the Matrix, or a BIJ, or the Mind of God, is irrelevant, so long as the bridge stands. So you've proven nothing about the ultimate nature of things-- whether they are purely physical, purely mental, a mix, or something different entirely. All you've proven is that in our reality (whatever it is) some things are consistent enough to make categorizing those consistencies useful.

Unfortunately for you, this argument fails on two levels.

The philosophical and scientific concepts of proof, evidence, knowledge etc. rely on the axiomatic principle that you perceive reality. The hypotheticals presented here constitute a denial of that axiom, undercutting the very concept of proof and knowledge. Which is why, these scenarios are self-refuting. Which is why it is up to you, positing the possibility, to provide justification and bear the burden of proof. I do not have to disprove anything.

Further, within the context of this discussion, the scientific method still ends up being valid within this context and therefore remains the suitable means to examine consciousness and subjective experience, which themselves are a part of this context.

(September 2, 2013 at 6:16 am)bennyboy Wrote: As I said, you can apply any words you want to your model, in whatever capacity you want. However, the fact is that I wake up and begin a rich subjective experience, and you cannot prove that the Cyberboy 2000 does. Therefore, I'm not willing to engage in a conversation where it is demanded that Cyberboy's data processing is conflated with my actual experience as a thinking, feeling human.

And as I said before, there is no 'conflation' and no semantic tricks. Your 'actual experience as a thinking, feeling human' is a specific form of data-processing. That is its fundamental nature. Which is why if the Cyberboy has the same system of data-processing, it possesses actual experience. And we can prove that it does by showing that the results of your data-processing match the results of Cyberboy's data-processing.

Quote:No, the problem is that you are not only working with with limited facts, you are also unwilling to consider any additional facts available.

This is not a semantic game. Your direct access to your own subjective awareness tells you nothing about the fundamental nature of experience itself. The only thing that you can know from just that direct access is that you have subject awareness. That you are capable of experience. Just from that single fact, you cannot determine the existence/non-existence of soul, you cannot determine if someone or something else is also subjectively aware and you cannot determine whether brain function is relevant to the experience. Once again, because it bears repetition, you cannot conclude anything on any of those issues simply based on the fact of your own experience.

Have I stated otherwise? I fully agree, since I've said that you cannot use experience to validate ideas about the ultimate nature of experience.

Quote:But fortunately, our repository of facts is not limited to that. And this is why it is not a semantic game. What you refer to as "your rich subjective awareness" or your "actual experience" is, in fact, a specific form of data-processing.

Only in the way that Casablanca is a reel of celluloid with light shining through it, and nothing more.

Quote:The philosophical reality of who you are is that you are a complex information processing system within which one specific form of information-processing is labelled "experience". That you think this makes you less special is irrelevant.

Your appeal to emotion on my behalf is noted and discarded. I'm not arguing that Cyberboy's experience belittles my own. I'm arguing that since I know that at least one human (me) actually experiences, and since I do not have access to Cyberboy's experience (or lack thereof), I'm willing to assume that other humans actually experience, but not that Cyberboy does, regardless of how it behaves.

Quote:You are making the same mistake over and over again. That other humans are capable of experience is not only knowable, it is known. It is known because direct access to experience is not required to establish the knowledge of its existence. It is known because all the lines of evidence - physiological, neurological and behavioral - point to its existence.

And you are ignoring the same refutation over and over again: that you are conflating subjective (i.e. actual) experience with physicals markers that SEEM to indicate experience, but can never be proven to do so.

Quote:Your ignorance is not a justification for universal ignorance. Your inability to know it does not place a limitation on anyone else's ability to know. Others would know that Cyberboy has the ability to actually experience because they know that certain behaviors are the result of subjective awareness and evidence of that behavior is prima-facie evidence of existence of experience. Your rejection of this knowledge is a positive assertion and bears the burden of proof.

That's goofy. That's like saying that the rejection of someone's "knowledge" of God is a positive assertion and bears the burden of proof. You are making assertions about the nature of experience, and I'm saying you haven't proven those assertions to be more than either assumptions or meaning-changing conflations-- just as you would do if a Christian tried to say, "Everything that exists is the Body of God, therefore I CAN show you God in the lab." You'd say that's a goofy definition of God, and refuse to accept his "evidence" as valid. And that's exactly what I'm saying to you.

Quote:Nope, I'm taking a mechanism and discovering that the way it works is precisely how the mind-existent concept of imagination works and thus concluding that the mechanism has imagination.

Except that "processing data" is itself another mind-existent word: really, what you have is a bunch of particles interchanging energy. The solar system does this-- so by your definition, the solar system has imagination. As does the sun. As does the hair on my chinny chin chin. OR you are going to say, "No. I'm talking about super-duper SPECIAL data processing, not the infinite (and super-complex) exchanges of energy happening all throughout the universe.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: Have I stated otherwise? I fully agree, since I've said that you cannot use experience to validate ideas about the ultimate nature of experience.

You have stated otherwise. Read my argument again and you'll see that we are not in agreement.

I'm saying that you can use experience to validate ideas about the ultimate nature of experience.

What you cannot do is use the simple fact of having experience to validate ideas about the ultimate nature of experience.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: Only in the way that Casablanca is a reel of celluloid with light shining through it, and nothing more.

Quite the opposite. Reel of celluloid with light shining through would be the level of data-processing of your eyes receiving optical data. Its identity as a movie and your experience of vision require an additional level of data-processing.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: Your appeal to emotion on my behalf is noted and discarded. I'm not arguing that Cyberboy's experience belittles my own.

Actually, you did make that argument.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: I'm arguing that since I know that at least one human (me) actually experiences, and since I do not have access to Cyberboy's experience (or lack thereof), I'm willing to assume that other humans actually experience, but not that Cyberboy does, regardless of how it behaves.

And I'm saying that the limitation of your knowledge does not make that knowledge impossible. Unlike you, we do not assume that other humans have experience - we know. We know not because of physical similarities, but because neurological, physiological, verbal and behavioral indicators of experience are present in them. Which is why if cyberboy satisfies one or more of that criteria, the reasonable conclusion is that it has experience. Your insistence on denying that is counter-factual.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: And you are ignoring the same refutation over and over again: that you are conflating subjective (i.e. actual) experience with physicals markers that SEEM to indicate experience, but can never be proven to do so.

On the contrary, I've made the distinction very clear and thus refuted your refutation over and over again.

The behavioral indicators (how you act and what you say) are consequences of experience occurring. Certain physiological indicators (increased heart-beat, rush of adrenaline) are consequences of experience occurring. This I know because I perceive these consequences occurring within myself. Which is why I know that they don't simply seem to indicate experience - they do indicate experience. Which is why when I see them in others, I conclude that they too are capable of experience.

The neurological indicators are experience. The same way that electronic signals are software. There is no conflation - we are just examining the same phenomenon at different levels. And it can be proven quite simply. Alterations in the electronic signals produce consistent changes in the software and changes in the software result in changes in those signals. Similarly, changes in your neurological make-up alter your experience and changes in your experience result in neurological alterations.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: That's goofy. That's like saying that the rejection of someone's "knowledge" of God is a positive assertion and bears the burden of proof.

If that person has provided rational, testable and falsifiable justification for that knowledge, then yes, it's rejection would be a positive assertion and bear the burden of proof.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: You are making assertions about the nature of experience, and I'm saying you haven't proven those assertions to be more than either assumptions or meaning-changing conflations-- just as you would do if a Christian tried to say, "Everything that exists is the Body of God, therefore I CAN show you God in the lab." You'd say that's a goofy definition of God, and refuse to accept his "evidence" as valid. And that's exactly what I'm saying to you.

Except for the little fact that I have proven my assertion to be more than assumptions or meaning-changing conflations. My explanation of experience is compatible with its standard definition. And that would be the criteria for judging conflation - not your vague, inexplicable redefinition. And my assertions have been supported by evidence - evidence that complies with the accepted scientific standard. Unlike this hypothetical Christian, I'm not redefining, conflating or starting with assumptions. Which is why your counter-argument is invalid.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:28 am)bennyboy Wrote: Except that "processing data" is itself another mind-existent word: really, what you have is a bunch of particles interchanging energy. The solar system does this-- so by your definition, the solar system has imagination. As does the sun. As does the hair on my chinny chin chin. OR you are going to say, "No. I'm talking about super-duper SPECIAL data processing, not the infinite (and super-complex) exchanges of energy happening all throughout the universe.

Must you keep repeating the same fallacies over and over again? Yes, I am referring to imagination as a specific form of data-processing. And no, I do not refer to any and every "particles interchanging energy" as data-processing. Which is why all the other events mentioned here do not qualify for data-processing, much less imagination.

(September 1, 2013 at 12:18 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: A couple advantages of dualism are as follows:

Dualism does not conflate neuroscience with materialism. One is a science, the other is a philosophy.

Physical phenomena, in themselves, have no inherent meaning. Dualism provides a place, absent in materialism, for irreducible qualities like qualia and intentionality.

Unlike materialism, dualism affirms that the subjective contents of mental states have explanatory relevance while avoiding both epiphenomenalism and over-determination. This allows natural selection to reward rationality.

However, there is absolutely no scientific evidence of dualism, and all of the research in neuroscience points to mind being entirely brain-based.

Dualism is an outmoded idea; the only reason for it to persist is to support woo-woo ideas.

A question for those of you who take the materialist position: is subjective experience causally relevant? If so, why? If not, then why must they exist?

(September 2, 2013 at 10:49 am)ChadWooters Wrote: A question for those of you who take the materialist position: is subjective experience causally relevant? If so, why? If not, then why must they exist?

Yes, it is causally relevant. The causal chain can be viewed at different levels - we can view it at particulate level exchanging energy all the way up to the level of planetary motion. The level at which human consciousness exists and intuitively perceives the reality - i.e. as singular entities rather than collection of particles - the existence of subjective experience within those entities becomes relevant.

genkaus Wrote:I'm saying that you can use experience to validate ideas about the ultimate nature of experience.

Then you don't know what a circle is.

Quote:And I'm saying that the limitation of your knowledge does not make that knowledge impossible. Unlike you, we do not assume that other humans have experience - we know.

Just as Christians "know" that God exists but that doesn't make it proven, provable, or true. Truthiness is not truth.

Quote:The behavioral indicators (how you act and what you say) are consequences of experience occurring. Certain physiological indicators (increased heart-beat, rush of adrenaline) are consequences of experience occurring. This I know because I perceive these consequences occurring within myself. Which is why I know that they don't simply seem to indicate experience - they do indicate experience. Which is why when I see them in others, I conclude that they too are capable of experience.

That's exactly what I said, except you are replacing the words "willing to assume" with "know."

Quote:The neurological indicators are experience. The same way that electronic signals are software. There is no conflation - we are just examining the same phenomenon at different levels.

Sure, there's a conflation. There's a person's brain function, which we can see, and their subjective experience, which we cannot. Conflating what can be seen with what cannot is an act of summoning fairies. EVEN IF there is a perfect 1:1 correlation between the properties of NT flow, electrical flow, etc. with a person's actual experience, they are at best different properties of those functions-- and the simple fact is that we don't have objective access to the property of subjective experience.

Quote:[re theistic claims] If that person has provided rational, testable and falsifiable justification for that knowledge, then yes, it's [sic] rejection would be a positive assertion and bear the burden of proof.

Yeah no. If a Christian wants to make an existential claim, he has to prove that God actually exists, rather than seeming to him to exist. At no point in this process does anyone else have to prove anything.

Quote:Except for the little fact that I have proven my assertion to be more than assumptions or meaning-changing conflations. My explanation of experience is compatible with its standard definition. And that would be the criteria for judging conflation - not your vague, inexplicable redefinition. And my assertions have been supported by evidence - evidence that complies with the accepted scientific standard. Unlike this hypothetical Christian, I'm not redefining, conflating or starting with assumptions. Which is why your counter-argument is invalid.

A Christian takes something nobody can see or interact with (God), maps it to other properties (like feelings or circumstantial events), conflates them, and feels confident in claiming that God is real. You take something nobody can see or interact with (someone else's actual experience), map it to other properties (behaviors / organ function), conflate them, and feel confident in claiming that actual experience is real.

And that is my definition of conflation with regard to this thread: synonymizing that which can be directly observed which that which cannot.

(September 2, 2013 at 11:35 am)genkaus Wrote: Yes, it is causally relevant.

Thank you for answering the question. Your answer helps me address your theory more directly. In order to be causally relevant the subjective experience must fall within the causal chain as follows:

brain-state ---> feeling ---> behaviour.

But that is not what you propose, which is this:

brain-state/feeling ---> behaviour

For any given instance of consciousness, you have a third-party observable property, a brain-state for example, causing another third-party observable behaviour. But you also have a second property, the first-person subjective feelings associated with the brain-state also causing the observable behaviour. Your theory makes two causes, one subjective and one objective, responsible for one effect.

You have one thing, an instance of consciousness. It has two properties. The first is a physical brain-state. The second property is feeling. Which property is necessary and which is accidental? You must choose.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Then you don't know what a circle is.

I do know - and this isn't one.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Just as Christians "know" that God exists but that doesn't make it proven, provable, or true. Truthiness is not truth.

Except you ignored the very next sentence where show exactly what makes it provable, proven and true.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: That's exactly what I said, except you are replacing the words "willing to assume" with "know."

A substitution which makes all the difference in the world and a substitution which is justified, given the existence of evidence.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Sure, there's a conflation. There's a person's brain function, which we can see, and their subjective experience, which we cannot. Conflating what can be seen with what cannot is an act of summoning fairies. EVEN IF there is a perfect 1:1 correlation between the properties of NT flow, electrical flow, etc. with a person's actual experience, they are at best different properties of those functions-- and the simple fact is that we don't have objective access to the property of subjective experience.

Fine, I'll repeat the same argument once again - we don't need direct access to the property of subjective experience. Once again, we don't need direct access to the property of subjective experience. We do have an objective access to it - the observation of its consequences. Not 'seeing' subjective experience is not a roadblock to concluding its existence.

As for your accusation of fairies - if we observe a specific brain function going on, we observe that that brain function results in specific behavior and physiological results and and we know beforehand that those results are caused by experience - then the logical conclusion is that that brain function is experience. No fairies involved.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: Yeah no. If a Christian wants to make an existential claim, he has to prove that God actually exists, rather than seeming to him to exist. At no point in this process does anyone else have to prove anything.

Within this analogy - the Christian has given proof. He has given evidence to support the claim that his god actually exists rather than just seeming to exist. Now its up to you to disprove.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: A Christian takes something nobody can see or interact with (God), maps it to other properties (like feelings or circumstantial events), conflates them, and feels confident in claiming that God is real. You take something nobody can see or interact with (someone else's actual experience), map it to other properties (behaviors / organ function), conflate them, and feel confident in claiming that actual experience is real.

That's where you are wrong - by your own admission, there is always atleast one person who can see or interact with experience - the doing the experiencing. Any 'mapping' I do starts with observing my own experience and mapping it to my own behavior.

(September 2, 2013 at 8:59 pm)bennyboy Wrote: And that is my definition of conflation with regard to this thread: synonymizing that which can be directly observed which that which cannot.

On the contrary, I've made the distinction very clear. The behavioral and physiological indicators are consequences of experience occurring. Did you miss the part where I said it before?

---

(September 2, 2013 at 10:33 pm)ChadWooters Wrote: Thank you for answering the question. Your answer helps me address your theory more directly. In order to be causally relevant the subjective experience must fall within the causal chain as follows:

brain-state ---> feeling ---> behaviour.

But that is not what you propose, which is this:

brain-state/feeling ---> behaviour

For any given instance of consciousness, you have a third-party observable property, a brain-state for example, causing another third-party observable behaviour. But you also have a second property, the first-person subjective feelings associated with the brain-state also causing the observable behaviour. Your theory makes two causes, one subjective and one objective, responsible for one effect.

You have one thing, an instance of consciousness. It has two properties. The first is a physical brain-state. The second property is feeling. Which property is necessary and which is accidental? You must choose.

Here's where you go wrong - there is, in fact, just one cause. With reference to that instance of consciousness, both properties are necessary. The problem here is that you cannot intuitively see them as the same thing - which is why you insist on treating them as two separate objects. They are, in fact, not separate.

For example, suppose I send a document to the printer, resulting in the action of it being printed. Now you say that there are two possibilities. The existence of document is a necessary property, there being a set of electronic signals is incidental. Or the existence of signals is necessary and there being a document is incidental. And I must choose which is the case. However, the fact is, without that document, there wouldn't be
those electronic signals and without those electronic signals there wouldn't be a document - they are one and the same thing. That we can conceptually regard them as separate entities does not change the fact.

Similarly, here, the feeling is the brain-state. Which is why, both statements are simultaneously true, whereas any choice would require one of them to be false.

(September 2, 2013 at 11:33 pm)genkaus Wrote: Fine, I'll repeat the same argument once again - we don't need direct access to the property of subjective experience. Once again, we don't need direct access to the property of subjective experience. We do have an objective access to it - the observation of its consequences. Not 'seeing' subjective experience is not a roadblock to concluding its existence.

When you infer a black hole, it's because you know there's something affecting the path of objects or light moving through space. You are observing properties, and inferring the existence of an object which explains them. The black hole is a necessary addition, because there's no other good way to explain some apparent oddities of things observed in space.

In the case of all the behaviors you mentioned, we already have a sufficient explanation-- the mechanism of the brain. It is not necessary to posit the existence of fairies in order to explain all the behaviors-- unless you think the brain itself is NOT sufficient to explain the behaviors. So the idea that actual awareness is inferred from the brain or its behaviors is baloney. The fact is that you already "know" that people experience awareness, and you follow your conclusion back to the criteria that would arrive at that "knowledge."

We've both agreed that we are willing to believe that other humans actually experience, based on behavioral and physical similarities. The difference is that I accept that position as intrinsically agnostic, while you have to convince yourself that it's based on a careful consideration of physical facts, and therefore worthy of the word "knowing." You are wrong to do so. When you know what you want to believe, and conflate confirmation bias with an actual scientific process, you are not pitting science against philosophy. You are pitting your personal truthiness against BOTH science AND philosophy.