Necessary Truths Exist

[Rational AKD]

If we're talking about semantics, then you should realize that your very definition of necessary truth indicates a contingency - "true in all possible worlds" - as opposed to impossible worlds, meaning, where modal logic is applicable.

by the very nature of an impossible world, nothing is true or exists in an impossible world. you claim it a contingency yet the only alternative you give is an incoherent one.

Further, you are equivocation between a necessary truth and existential necessity. The definition "true in all possible worlds" applies to propositions, not things themselves.

and as I've stated before, the existence of all things can be expressed in propositions. the two are as equivocal as a word and its definition.

Ofcourse, facts aren't necessarily true - did you miss the part where I'm using them to argue against the existence of necessary truths?

if facts aren't necessarily true, then they are contingently true. the argument still applies, they can't be contingently true based on an infinite chain of contingent truths; but there must be a necessary truth(s) that they are all ultimately contingent upon.

The sequence of events being conceivably different doesn't mean that we need any necessary truths. The problem of "why is anything true at all?" is easily answered by truth being a relation of a proposition to reality

that doesn't explain anything of the truth of reality itself, why some things are true of reality and some things aren't. if the facts of reality are contingent, then it can still be fit into the argument.

it is in the nature of a proposition to be true or false and without there being a mind to conceive of those propositions, nothing had to be true or false.

really? does the sun exist without us? no? is it there by the necessity of it's own nature? no? then it is contingently there, and that's probably because of another contingent factor. but those contingent factors need to end somewhere, they can't go on forever.

Asked and answered.

as I've told you, that's a change in reference due to your own ignorance of the reference. if you read a book written in 1985 claiming that the current president of the US is Reagan, would you claim the author wrong? no, because you know the reference. people don't say general things to make statements that change. they do so to be brief but still convey the message. if I tell you who the current president is, you know exactly what time i'm referring to. quit pretending there is no reference or context in those statements, you're just being dishonest.

Truth is not a body of facts

really, changing your mind again? you said in post #47 "your dictionary definition is correct" which was referring to the dictionary reference I made in post #46 "the body of real things, events, and facts" so are you really playing this inconsistency game with your words? perhaps your mind was forged imperfectly, which is why you constantly have to change it lol.

not even on truth as correspondence. Just what theory of truth are you mangling here?

I don't know, I gave you a definition and you agreed to it but seemed to have forgotten what it actually said. it's still there in post #46 if you want to take a look.

You revealed your own flaw several times. "Representatives of reality", in other words, correspondence. You are seriously confused about language if you don't see how this screws up what you're saying. Words refer to certain concepts, words are not the things themselves.

yet words are equated with what they represent to avoid confusion. when I talk about rocks, i'm not referring to a word, but the thing itself. likewise when i'm talking about truth, i'm not referring to the label but reality itself.

Truth is a correspondence between a proposition and a fact, not the fact itself. All truth would disappear if there were no minds, but not all facts would.

the correspondence would disappear, but reality would not. as I said to genkaus but a moment ago, the sun is there whether we are here to say it or not. it is not there by the necessity of its own nature, but by a contingent factor, thus there are contingent natures of reality which can still be applied to this argument.

Yes it was

nothing in that definition said it was correspondence, or was reflective of reality. it said 1. it is the state of being the case, which doesn't say anything about being correspondence of the case and 2. a body of real things, events, or facts; not body of statements that represent facts. you're putting your interpretation into the definition.

Clearly experience of reality is real (we already agreed that is incorrigible did we not?). Whether or not there is something 'behind' those experiences I take to be unanswerable, a la Kant

then that would make you an idealist or a solipsist. this argument would apply to those who believe our experiences are represented by what's actually there. if you think your experiences can't represent anything apart from your mind's projection, then obviously these truths would only be entailments of that mind... but then there's nothing else to claim "there is" apart from that.

Reality itself has no about, it just is. Only minds make abouts.

as I said, if that's the case then nothing we say or observe about reality can be real. you might as well claim solipsism.

Say for example you don't know when the sentence was written and have no way of finding out. If it says that Regan is the president, it is false. Why? Because the fact that statement refers to is no longer the case. In other words, facts change and thereby the truth of propositions do too.

I covered that at the end of the post, but it seems you're too self absorbed to see it.

the statement is only wrong if you remove its reference and context, which also removes its meaning forcing you to impose your own reference and context.

did you read that? it was certainly in the post from me that you quoted. do you know what that means? the statement itself is wrong not because the meaning changed, but because you falsely imposed your own meaning. in other words, you interpreted it incorrectly. as I've said, words represent meaning, so when you impose your own meaning you're not changing facts. learn the difference between a reference of a fact and a fact.

The underlined bits in particular are exactly what I've been saying.

the underlined parts aren't what I've disagreed with. what I have disagreed with is you stating the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system, wouldn't be true without minds to say so. that would only be true if everything is derived from mind. taking a realist point of view, Jupiter would remain the largest planet in the solar system regardless of whether we are here to say so or not. unless you disagree with realism, you can't disagree with that.

[MindForgedManacle]

really, changing your mind again? you said in post #47 "your dictionary definition is correct" which was referring to the dictionary reference I made in post #46 "the body of real things, events, and facts" so are you really playing this inconsistency game with your words? perhaps your mind was forged imperfectly, which is why you constantly have to change it lol.

I actually thought that definition was for 'fact', not truth (you didn't really specify. The reason I assumed it was the MW definition of fact is the first one, 'the state of being the case'. Regardless, even MW gives the definition I was using:

the body of true statements and propositions 3 a : the property (as of a statement) of being in accord with fact or reality

And what further tips the scales here is the fact that we're discussing philosophy. The MW definitions you posted were just examples of ordinary language, which in this case is imprecise. In philosophy, facts are the state of affairs themselves, while truth is reference to that (on correspondence theory). So truth isn't a body of facts, it's a proposition accurately reflecting them.

I don't know, I gave you a definition and you agreed to it but seemed to have forgotten what it actually said. it's still there in post #46 if you want to take a look.

There was a slight misunderstanding, but even then further Merriam Webster entries align with what I've been saying, i.e truth refers to facts.

[quote
yet words are equated with what they represent to avoid confusion. when I talk about rocks, i'm not referring to a word, but the thing itself. likewise when i'm talking about truth, i'm not referring to the label but reality itself.[/quote]

You're USING the words to communicate about that which ISN'T the word. Again, you're demonstrating your misunderstandings of language. When talking about truth, you're talking about propositions which accurately refer to reality.

the correspondence would disappear, but reality would not. as I said to genkaus but a moment ago, the sun is there whether we are here to say it or not. it is not there by the necessity of its own nature, but by a contingent factor, thus there are contingent natures of reality which can still be applied to this argument.

No no no, and this is what Gen (I presume) and I have been trying to get through to you. Firstly, in the underlined bit you AGAIN confuse things. Truth IS the correspondence. If all minds are gone, and thus the correspondence, all truth is gone. However, as you note reality is still there (assuming solipsism is false). But that's IRRELEVANT. Truth accurately refers to reality. If there are no more minds, truth is GONE. In other words, truth is itself contingent in some real sense on reality, facts that is.

nothing in that definition said it was correspondence, or was reflective of reality. it said 1. it is the state of being the case, which doesn't say anything about being correspondence of the case and 2. a body of real things, events, or facts; not body of statements that represent facts. you're putting your interpretation into the definition.

Well, not exactly. There is no theory of truth in philosophy that defines truth as such. Again, you're trying to hide behind the vagueries of ordinary language when we're discussing the philosophical aspect. And as I noted earlier in this post, even MW has the philosophical definitions of correspondence.

then that would make you an idealist or a solipsist. this argument would apply to those who believe our experiences are represented by what's actually there. if you think your experiences can't represent anything apart from your mind's projection, then obviously these truths would only be entailments of that mind... but then there's nothing else to claim "there is" apart from that.

Eh, no. The Kantian distinction between the perceived and the real is essentially acknowledged as undefeated by all philosophers, much to their chagrin. Nor am I a solipsist or any other kind of idealist.

Truth is an entailment of 'mind' to begin with, so that's just a non sequitur.

as I said, if that's the case then nothing we say or observe about reality can be real. you might as well claim solipsism.

Even if everything was just an illusion in my mind and solipsism were true, are you saying that the illusion doesn't exist? And you might want to read up on Kant, because otherwise you're just going to keep misunderstanding his place in this topic.

I covered that at the end of the post, but it seems you're too self absorbed to see it.

the statement is only wrong if you remove its reference and context, which also removes its meaning forcing you to impose your own reference and context.

did you read that? it was certainly in the post from me that you quoted. do you know what that means? the statement itself is wrong not because the meaning changed, but because you falsely imposed your own meaning. in other words, you interpreted it incorrectly. as I've said, words represent meaning, so when you impose your own meaning you're not changing facts. learn the difference between a reference of a fact and a fact.

And here we go again. Is it a fact that Reagan is the president of the USA? NO. It WAS a fact, but it no longer is, because what is no true no longer refers to THAT fact.

the underlined parts aren't what I've disagreed with. what I have disagreed with is you stating the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system, wouldn't be true without minds to say so. that would only be true if everything is derived from mind. taking a realist point of view, Jupiter would remain the largest planet in the solar system regardless of whether we are here to say so or not. unless you disagree with realism, you can't disagree with that.

You said this:

the correspondence would disappear, but reality would not

Which means you DID disagree with that (and thus me), even if you did so inadvertently.
And now you're misunderstanding realism and idealism. Assuming solipsism is false, the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet would remain, but the PROPOSITION would not be true, and it would not be false. There would be NO MORE truth, because such is a property of propositions issuing from minds. So again, please realize you are disagreeing with the distinction between truth and fact, even when you affirm you are not.

To say, as you admitted, that the correspondence would disappear if all minds were gone is an admittance that truth is a property of propositions formed by minds. You cannot hold that position while simultaneously not understanding that without minds, "Jupiter is the largest planet" would not be true in a possible world without minds. Those are entirely contradictory.

[genkaus]

by the very nature of an impossible world, nothing is true or exists in an impossible world. you claim it a contingency yet the only alternative you give is an incoherent one.

I thought my meaning was clear - the contingency here is what you regard as a possible world, i.e. a world where modal logic is applicable.

Regardless, the incoherency of the alternative does not negate the contingency of your statement.

and as I've stated before, the existence of all things can be expressed in propositions. the two are as equivocal as a word and its definition.

But not all propositions are expressions of existence. Which is why the two are not equivocal.

if facts aren't necessarily true, then they are contingently true. the argument still applies, they can't be contingently true based on an infinite chain of contingent truths; but there must be a necessary truth(s) that they are all ultimately contingent upon.

False dichotomy - the measure of true or false can be applied to propositions, for which facts do not qualify. As such, facts are neither necessarily true, nor contingently true, they just are.

that doesn't explain anything of the truth of reality itself, why some things are true of reality and some things aren't. if the facts of reality are contingent, then it can still be fit into the argument.

Once again, those "things" which are true or not happen to be propositions about reality. And their truth is determined by their correspondence to reality.

really? does the sun exist without us? no? is it there by the necessity of it's own nature? no? then it is contingently there, and that's probably because of another contingent factor. but those contingent factors need to end somewhere, they can't go on forever.

Again - false dichotomy. Sun's existence itself is not a proposition, therefore the concept of necessity or contingency does not apply here.

as I've told you, that's a change in reference due to your own ignorance of the reference. if you read a book written in 1985 claiming that the current president of the US is Reagan, would you claim the author wrong? no, because you know the reference. people don't say general things to make statements that change. they do so to be brief but still convey the message. if I tell you who the current president is, you know exactly what time i'm referring to. quit pretending there is no reference or context in those statements, you're just being dishonest.

Given that the reference is not an inherent aspect of the fact, any fact stated without such a reference in subject to change.

[Rational AKD]

I actually thought that definition was for 'fact', not truth (you didn't really specify. The reason I assumed it was the MW definition of fact is the first one, 'the state of being the case'. Regardless, even MW gives the definition I was using:

oh, I suppose that is my mistake for not clarifying. sorry.

There was a slight misunderstanding, but even then further Merriam Webster entries align with what I've been saying, i.e truth refers to facts.

yes, words have several definitions. that's why I posted applicable ones.

You're USING the words to communicate about that which ISN'T the word.

that's exactly my point. we don't use rocks to tell each other about rocks (at least not typically) but instead devise words we assign definitions so we can talk about something without using the thing itself. likewise, truth is a reference to reality itself assuming a realist perspective of reality (that reality exists independent of our perceptions of it).

No no no, and this is what Gen (I presume) and I have been trying to get through to you. Firstly, in the underlined bit you AGAIN confuse things. Truth IS the correspondence. If all minds are gone, and thus the correspondence, all truth is gone. However, as you note reality is still there (assuming solipsism is false). But that's IRRELEVANT. Truth accurately refers to reality. If there are no more minds, truth is GONE. In other words, truth is itself contingent in some real sense on reality, facts that is.

I think you confuse my entire post there. in that particular segment, I was making an "even if you're right" point by not talking about truth, but the nature of reality. did you notice how I never once used the word truth in that quote? that was intentional so you couldn't worm your way out with the whole "you're mis-defining truth" gag. instead, I referenced the nature of reality itself without the use of the word truth.
so, to recap I think we can agree the sun exists regardless of whether we are there to say whether it is true or not. I think we can also agree that the sun does not exist by the necessity of its own nature. but that must mean that it exists due to a contingent factor. it's logical and inescapable. 1. it exists. 2. it is possible for it not to exist. 3. there must be something that made it exist or brought it into being. this is proper application of the logic used in the argument. you'll notice it's a similar format as the Kalam, except instead of applying it to the universe it's applied to truth, not referencing the label itself, but what truth represents... reality... the way things actually are. and as I said before, I can speak of truth in a matter to where i'm talking about what it represents rather than exactly what truth is. not the word that represents, but the representation itself.

Well, not exactly. There is no theory of truth in philosophy that defines truth as such. Again, you're trying to hide behind the vagueries of ordinary language when we're discussing the philosophical aspect. And as I noted earlier in this post, even MW has the philosophical definitions of correspondence.

it again all comes down to what you're talking about in terms of truth. are you talking about truth, the representative of reality, or truth, what's actually being represented. just like how you can use words as what's actually being represented as opposed to referencing them as representations, you can use truth in the same manor.

Eh, no. The Kantian distinction between the perceived and the real is essentially acknowledged as undefeated by all philosophers, much to their chagrin. Nor am I a solipsist or any other kind of idealist.

that's not something I disputed. I already know there's a difference between perception of reality. what I was responding to was this:

Whether or not there is something 'behind' those experiences I take to be unanswerable

so if you were to believe there is nothing "behind" our experiences and everything we experience is not because of an independent reality, then you would be taking a solipsist or idealist view. a realist view is one that says there is something behind our experiences. that our experiences are our mind's recognition of actual reality through our senses.

Truth is an entailment of 'mind' to begin with, so that's just a non sequitur.

that's why I said, throughout that entire quote, that it is a representation of reality. if you're going to dispute that, then you would be taking up an idealist view.

Even if everything was just an illusion in my mind and solipsism were true, are you saying that the illusion doesn't exist?

no, I would be saying it doesn't have an independent existence. it would exist, but only in your mind. it would not exist if your mind doesn't exist. realists don't have this view of reality.

And here we go again. Is it a fact that Reagan is the president of the USA?

no, because you're using is to mean the present. your reference is different.

NO. It WAS a fact

now you're using was to represent the past, an entirely different reference than is. as I said, the facts don't change, references do. is was and will be are all words the represent tense. if you use tense to incorrectly refer to a fact in time, your use of tense or time reference is wrong. it's like me saying "Tokyo is here" when we're actually in NY. i'm not changing the fact by changing my position, i'm changing the place of reference in the sentence since the word "here" refers to where I currently am, just like how "is" refers to the present time. how ridiculous would it sound if you said "I can change reality, because when I say 'Tokyo is here' I can be right or wrong depending on whether i'm there or not"? the reality is, you're not changing the reality of the position of Tokyo by going there or not, and you're not changing the time of an event by saying a sentence at a different time. you should get a basic knowledge of the use of tenses in language.

Which means you DID disagree with that (and thus me), even if you did so inadvertently.

you said this whole time that truth is correspondence and wouldn't exist without minds, so how does saying "the correspondence would disappear, but reality would not" disagree with that? as I recall, you agreed with that particular sentence I said.

And now you're misunderstanding realism and idealism. Assuming solipsism is false, the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet would remain, but the PROPOSITION would not be true, and it would not be false.

did I say that? or are you putting words in my mouth... again? I said it would remain the largest planet... I said nothing about whether the proposition would remain true, since the proposition obviously wouldn't exist without someone to propose it. instead, i'm making references to reality without using words like "truth" or "proposition" since you obviously have a problem with me using them in this manor... as representations not representatives. the description of the word, not the nature of the word.

There would be NO MORE truth, because such is a property of propositions issuing from minds. So again, please realize you are disagreeing with the distinction between truth and fact, even when you affirm you are not.

again, no i'm not. you want me to still be disagreeing so you're interjecting words i'm not using. again, i'm making an "even if you're right" argument, that even if the words are as you say they are, there are actual facts of nature that are contingent. since that's the case, you can replace all the words "proposition" with "fact" and all the words "truth" with "real" and the argument will still be sound. if you still don't get what i'm saying, i'll recreate the argument to satisfy your objections.
Argument:
P1: in order for a fact to be real, it must be real because it is contingent upon a factor or it’s necessarily real.
P2: there must exist fundamental facts that can’t be real by a contingent factor (there can’t be an infinite amount of facts all contingent upon the former).
C1: therefore there are fundamental facts that can only be real because they are necessarily real (P1, P2)
P3: if a fact is necessarily real, then it is not contingent upon other facts of reality
C2: therefore there are necessary facts that transcend other facts of reality (C1, P3)
Conclusion: necessary transcendent facts exist.
notice none of this changes the nature of the argument, just the wording.

To say, as you admitted, that the correspondence would disappear if all minds were gone is an admittance that truth is a property of propositions formed by minds.

but you said by saying that, I was disagreeing with you... right? man, you're really inconsistent with your arguments.

You cannot hold that position while simultaneously not understanding that without minds, "Jupiter is the largest planet" would not be true in a possible world without minds. Those are entirely contradictory.

which is why I didn't say that... man you need to catch up.

---

I thought my meaning was clear - the contingency here is what you regard as a possible world, i.e. a world where modal logic is applicable.

Regardless, the incoherency of the alternative does not negate the contingency of your statement.

you obviously still don't get it. the statement "necessarily exists" contains the word "exists" which would mean it is a necessary part of every possible world. likewise, the statement "necessarily true" means the same. the possible world was implied in the word truth since something can't be true if it's not possible. a "necessary truth" is not contingent upon a possible world... it is an entailment of one. meaning you can't have a possible world without such necessary truths, and vice versa. but since possible worlds are also necessary (since the existence of truth itself implies it) neither are contingent. this is the case because if you have something A, which is necessary which entails B, then both A and B are necessary (since the existence of B is necessary for A and the existence of A is necessary itself that means there is no possible world where neither A or B exist).

But not all propositions are expressions of existence. Which is why the two are not equivocal.

the ones that are expressions of existence are equivocal, however. when I say "it is true that the sun exists" it can easily be taken as "the sun is real."

False dichotomy - the measure of true or false can be applied to propositions, for which facts do not qualify. As such, facts are neither necessarily true, nor contingently true, they just are.

then the statement "why does the sun exist" should be incoherent... but it's not. we know there is a reason that the sun exists, and those reasons can either be because it can't not exist (it's necessary) or there is something that brought it into existence (it's contingent). those are the only 2 explanations for existence, and if you think i'm wrong I challenge you to find another. and no, neither won't suffice. you actually have to present an option, not just disagree with what I say.

Once again, those "things" which are true or not happen to be propositions about reality. And their truth is determined by their correspondence to reality.

and as I've stated before, reality does not necessarily have to be as it is. there are things in reality that can be different. since that is the case, there must be a reason why things in reality are as they are. the reasons can't resemble an infinite chain but must end somewhere. therefore there are things in reality that are as they are because they are necessary. that's how the argument is applied.

Again - false dichotomy. Sun's existence itself is not a proposition, therefore the concept of necessity or contingency does not apply here.

are you saying it is impossible for the sun not to exist? if it is possible for the sun not to exist, then necessity and contingency also apply (since they're both degrees of possibility).

Given that the reference is not an inherent aspect of the fact, any fact stated without such a reference in subject to change.

given that the word "is" is a reference to the present time, any sentence that uses the word "is" does have an inherent aspect of referencing a point in time.

[MindForgedManacle]

yes, words have several definitions. that's why I posted applicable ones.

What you posted were ordinary applications of the word, which are vague and equivocate, which is a mistake given we're discussing the philosophical views on it.

that's exactly my point. we don't use rocks to tell each other about rocks (at least not typically) but instead devise words we assign definitions so we can talk about something without using the thing itself. likewise, truth is a reference to reality itself assuming a realist perspective of reality (that reality exists independent of our perceptions of it).

Truth doesn't necessarily assume a realist position, maybe correspondence does but even then it doesn't presume to know such is the case, it makes an assumption that it is (because it can't avoid it...thanks to Kant).

I think you confuse my entire post there. in that particular segment, I was making an "even if you're right" point by not talking about truth, but the nature of reality. did you notice how I never once used the word truth in that quote? that was intentional so you couldn't worm your way out with the whole "you're mis-defining truth" gag. instead, I referenced the nature of reality itself without the use of the word truth.

the correspondence would disappear, but reality would not. as I said to genkaus but a moment ago, the sun is there whether we are here to say it or not. it is not there by the necessity of its own nature, but by a contingent factor, thus there are contingent natures of reality which can still be applied to this argument.

Here, you agree with the difference between truth and fact, while here:

he underlined parts aren't what I've disagreed with. what I have disagreed with is you stating the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system, wouldn't be true without minds to say so. that would only be true if everything is derived from mind. taking a realist point of view, Jupiter would remain the largest planet in the solar system regardless of whether we are here to say so or not. unless you disagree with realism, you can't disagree with that.

So you have in fact repeatedly made this mistake, and even talking about reality is itself, as I mentioned, irrelevant to the fact that truth is entirely dependent on minds existing, which make propositions. So talking about the nature of reality itself is a red herring here, as truth is that which refers to that reality via language.

so, to recap I think we can agree the sun exists regardless of whether we are there to say whether it is true or not. I think we can also agree that the sun does not exist by the necessity of its own nature. but that must mean that it exists due to a contingent factor. it's logical and inescapable. 1. it exists. 2. it is possible for it not to exist. 3. there must be something that made it exist or brought it into being. this is proper application of the logic used in the argument. you'll notice it's a similar format as the Kalam, except instead of applying it to the universe it's applied to truth, not referencing the label itself, but what truth represents... reality... the way things actually are. and as I said before, I can speak of truth in a matter to where i'm talking about what it represents rather than exactly what truth is. not the word that represents, but the representation itself.

And you make the same mistake. To say that the proposition "the Sun exists" in a world without minds is incoherent, and tries to impose mind on a mindless world in order to make a creation of the mind apply in that world. This is another part where reading some Kant will help, as talking about a possible world without minds and subjective experience is meaningless.
I mean, in a possible world without minds, the law of identity isn't true (or false). After all, "A is A" is just a statement in the English language. However, the fact that law refers to would remain (that something is itself)

it again all comes down to what you're talking about in terms of truth. are you talking about truth, the representative of reality, or truth, what's actually being represented. just like how you can use words as what's actually being represented as opposed to referencing them as representations, you can use truth in the same manor.

For all the times you say you're not disagreeing with me on truth and fact, you make the same error every time. Truth is not what's being represented, facts are. What you said is circular: Truth is what is being represented by truth. Truth encapsulates facts, it's not the facts it encapsulates, which is why we have the correspondence theory of truth, not a theory of reality itself being true. Using truth in that manner in philosophy is sloppy and is the sort of thing that leads to equivocations, which is why no one in epistemology would actually do that.

that's not something I disputed. I already know there's a difference between perception of reality. what I was responding to was this:

Whether or not there is something 'behind' those experiences I take to be unanswerable

so if you were to believe there is nothing "behind" our experiences and everything we experience is not because of an independent reality, then you would be taking a solipsist or idealist view. a realist view is one that says there is something behind our experiences. that our experiences are our mind's recognition of actual reality through our senses.

Okay, so now you're straw manning. Where did I say that there was nothing behind the experiences? Answer (underlined): I didn't. I said ascertaining the truth of what, if anything, is 'behind' those experiences is unknowable, I did not say there was nothing behind them. Again, that's what the Kantian distinction IS. It's not an affirmation or rejection of either realism or idealism, it's a recognition that such is ultimately unaswerable by necessity and is amenable only to an assumption.

that's why I said, throughout that entire quote, that it is a representation of reality. if you're going to dispute that, then you would be taking up an idealist view.

I didn't dispute that (I've repeatedly corrected your errors on it). You made statements like this:

he underlined parts aren't what I've disagreed with. what I have disagreed with is you stating the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system, wouldn't be true without minds to say so. that would only be true if everything is derived from mind. taking a realist point of view, Jupiter would remain the largest planet in the solar system regardless of whether we are here to say so or not. unless you disagree with realism, you can't disagree with that.

See the underlined? That's a confusion between truth and fact, and tries to impose mind on a scenario where none exists. Jupiter being the largest planet would be a fact in that state of affairs, but it would not be true as there are no propositions in that state of affairs.

no, I would be saying it doesn't have an independent existence. it would exist, but only in your mind. it would not exist if your mind doesn't exist. realists don't have this view of reality.

I didn't take the position that the would-be illusion was substantial.

no, because you're using is to mean the present. your reference is different.

So in other words (as I've said) the facts a proposition refers to changes, no? I've been trying to figure out why you thought there was a disagreement here.

now you're using was to represent the past, an entirely different reference than is. as I said, the facts don't change, references do. is was and will be are all words the represent tense. if you use tense to incorrectly refer to a fact in time, your use of tense or time reference is wrong. it's like me saying "Tokyo is here" when we're actually in NY. i'm not changing the fact by changing my position, i'm changing the place of reference in the sentence since the word "here" refers to where I currently am, just like how "is" refers to the present time. how ridiculous would it sound if you said "I can change reality, because when I say 'Tokyo is here' I can be right or wrong depending on whether i'm there or not"? the reality is, you're not changing the reality of the position of Tokyo by going there or not, and you're not changing the time of an event by saying a sentence at a different time. you should get a basic knowledge of the use of tenses in language.

Now you're contradicting yourself. By saying facts don't change, you're saying a fact is always the case which, unless you're speaking in the context of a particular philosophy of time, is self-evidently absurd and contrary to speaking contingent facts as you have.
The proposition regarding Reagan being president is false because the fact regarding who is the president is no longer the case. That seems to be what you said at one point (but not consistently), so I'm still confused where the problem is.

you said this whole time that truth is correspondence and wouldn't exist without minds, so how does saying "the correspondence would disappear, but reality would not" disagree with that? as I recall, you agreed with that particular sentence I said.

Because you also said this:

what I have disagreed with is you stating the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system, wouldn't be true without minds to say so

which seems to equate truth and fact. Either that, or it tries to impose mind onto a possible state of affairs where there emphatically isn't one. Which becomes even more worrisome when you bring up Kant's distinction between the perceived (all you have) the the real itself.

did I say that? or are you putting words in my mouth... again? I said it would remain the largest planet... I said nothing about whether the proposition would remain true, since the proposition obviously wouldn't exist without someone to propose it. instead, i'm making references to reality without using words like "truth" or "proposition" since you obviously have a problem with me using them in this manor... as representations not representatives. the description of the word, not the nature of the word.

Here (again):

what I have disagreed with is you stating the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system, wouldn't be true without minds to say so

It wouldn't be true without minds, but it would be a fact (assuming realism).

if you still don't get what i'm saying, i'll recreate the argument to satisfy your objections.
Argument:
P1: in order for a fact to be real, it must be real because it is contingent upon a factor or it’s necessarily real.
P2: there must exist fundamental facts that can’t be real by a contingent factor (there can’t be an infinite amount of facts all contingent upon the former).
C1: therefore there are fundamental facts that can only be real because they are necessarily real (P1, P2)
P3: if a fact is necessarily real, then it is not contingent upon other facts of reality
C2: therefore there are necessary facts that transcend other facts of reality (C1, P3)
Conclusion: necessary transcendent facts exist.
notice none of this changes the nature of the argument, just the wording.

Actually it does in a rather hilarious way: it doesn't even conclude as you wish it to now. These transcendent facts would merely be the necessary facts of reality, such as the fact of identity, the fact of non-contradiction and the fact of existence. None of these concluded necessary facts do anything for you, and certainly cannot establish a necessary being as your original argument sought to do (using a controversial and flawed philosophical principle, mind you).

Further, have you actually considered WHY those facts in particular are such? Because reality itself is such, reality is logical (in some sense). Of course, I must also mention that there are systems of logic that treat identity and non-contradiction as either contingent or true.

but you said by saying that, I was disagreeing with you... right? man, you're really inconsistent with your arguments.

Can you resist straw manning? I was pointing out YOUR inconsistency, i.e disagreeing with me, then agreeing with me on the same topic.

which is why I didn't say that... man you need to catch up.

Well, I guess this doesn't exist then:

what I have disagreed with is you stating the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system, wouldn't be true without minds to say so

Silly me.

[Rational AKD]

What you posted were ordinary applications of the word, which are vague and equivocate, which is a mistake given we're discussing the philosophical views on it.

I posted common uses of the word. if truth is contingent upon minds, then it is also controlled by minds. if it is controlled by minds, then it is not objective. most people would disagree if you told them truth is subjective.

Truth doesn't necessarily assume a realist position, maybe correspondence does but even then it doesn't presume to know such is the case, it makes an assumption that it is

that's why I said *assuming a realist position. truth is used as a word representing an objective reality assuming one exists.

Here, you agree with the difference between truth and fact, while here:

would you stay on task... i'm making an inside argument making an "even if you're right" point. stop bringing up old posts.

And you make the same mistake. To say that the proposition "the Sun exists" in a world without minds is incoherent

no... i'm not saying "the proposition 'the sun exists'..." i'm saying "the thing known as the sun exists..." learn the difference between a reference to things and a reference to sentences.

Truth is not what's being represented, facts are

the two are equivocal and often interchangeable as shown evident by the replacement of every word "truth" with the word "real" I did in the argument. I can say "i'm telling the truth" and "i'm speaking facts" and they both mean exactly the same thing. the only difference is semantics.

Truth encapsulates facts, it's not the facts it encapsulates, which is why we have the correspondence theory of truth, not a theory of reality itself being true. Using truth in that manner in philosophy is sloppy and is the sort of thing that leads to equivocations

as I said, the two words are most often equivocal. the theories of truth are to support post modernism philosophy, which is a step backwards in philosophy.

Okay, so now you're straw manning. Where did I say that there was nothing behind the experiences?

you took the skeptical position of "we can't know if anything is behind those experiences." this is what they would call a skeptical solipsist view, that it is plausible our experiences are mere illusion but equally plausible they aren't.

I didn't take the position that the would-be illusion was substantial.

do you even know what you're responding to? I was not saying you took that position but simply responded to this question you asked me:

Even if everything was just an illusion in my mind and solipsism were true, are you saying that the illusion doesn't exist?

So in other words (as I've said) the facts a proposition refers to changes, no? I've been trying to figure out why you thought there was a disagreement here

no, the facts of the proposition refer to a specific place and time, and the truth of the proposition only changes if the context of the sentence is removed forcing you to impose your own. to say at this point in time "Obama is the president" is equivalent to "in 2013 Obama is the president." the word "is" is referring to the president time and the truth of that sentence doesn't change over time because it has a specific context and reference.

Now you're contradicting yourself. By saying facts don't change, you're saying a fact is always the case which, unless you're speaking in the context of a particular philosophy of time, is self-evidently absurd and contrary to speaking contingent facts as you have.

maybe I should be a little more clear. facts change over time, but facts referenced by propositions don't change since the proposition always references the place and time either specifically or generally. if I say "Obama is the president" I am correct, and I am not incorrect because 10 years go by, because when I said "is" I was talking about this time in 2013. my reference doesn't change unless someone removes it.

The proposition regarding Reagan being president is false because the fact regarding who is the president is no longer the case.

yes, but if that were stated when he was president, that person wouldn't be incorrect. nor would his sentence change from true to false simply with passage of time, because the person was referencing that point and time, not a future time.

which seems to equate truth and fact

Jupiter being larger than other planets is a fact. i'm sorry, but it seems that you have the impression that it is impossible to reference a fact. Jupiter's existence is a fact. Jupiter's size is a fact. Jupiter's size being larger than all planets in this solar system is a fact.

Either that, or it tries to impose mind onto a possible state of affairs where there emphatically isn't one.

so Jupiter is in fact not larger than the other planets of the solar system?

It wouldn't be true without minds, but it would be a fact (assuming realism).

again, quit bringing up the ancient past and respond to what I say now. I realize you have a problem with the semantics so I've shifted the focus of my argument to the fact that Jupiter is large, not the truth.

Actually it does in a rather hilarious way: it doesn't even conclude as you wish it to now. These transcendent facts would merely be the necessary facts of reality, such as the fact of identity, the fact of non-contradiction and the fact of existence.

haha, you think that's not what I was trying to argue from the start? lets take a trip back to post #4.

I can name you 3 necessary truths. the law if identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of exclusive middle

it's pretty much exactly what you said except I called them laws instead of facts.

None of these concluded necessary facts do anything for you, and certainly cannot establish a necessary being as your original argument sought to do

really? that's what you thought I was trying to do? no no no no no. lets take a trip back to post #1.

it is an argument of my own design, and rather than a religious argument it's purely philosophical.

Conclusion: necessary transcendent truths [not beings] exist.

Further, have you actually considered WHY those facts in particular are such? Because reality itself is such, reality is logical (in some sense). Of course, I must also mention that there are systems of logic that treat identity and non-contradiction as either contingent or true.

as I said from the beginning, this argument is only to debunk the philosophical position of logical fictionalism, the position that logic is something that is made up by us or derived from speech rather than necessarily part of reality.

Well, I guess this doesn't exist then:

oh, I see what you're complaining about now. sorry, I messed up the semantics. what I meant to say was: "what I have disagreed with is you stating the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system, wouldn't be real without minds to say so." there, all better?

[MindForgedManacle]

I posted common uses of the word. if truth is contingent upon minds, then it is also controlled by minds. if it is controlled by minds, then it is not objective. most people would disagree if you told them truth is subjective.

Okay? We're discussing the philosophical side of it, not the 'common' usage (which when probed leads to equivocations.

Some concept being contingent on something else doesn't mean it's controlled by it. Truth in the context of philosophy has very explicit meanings, and in this case you would have to be saying that we control what the facts are in order for your response to make sense.

that's why I said *assuming a realist position. truth is used as a word representing an objective reality assuming one exists.

In the part I was responding to, you seemed to say truth assumes a realist position, so my mistake.

would you stay on task... i'm making an inside argument making an "even if you're right" point. stop bringing up old posts.

Old posts, as in just 2 back? Wow, okay. You're 'even if you're right' argument doesn't work either, as I'll sho in a moment.

no... i'm not saying "the proposition 'the sun exists'..." i'm saying "the thing known as the sun exists..." learn the difference between a reference to things and a reference to sentences.

If you're not talking about propositions, you're not talking about truth in philosophy. Again, conflating truth and facts leads to nonsensical equivocations.

the two are equivocal and often interchangeable as shown evident by the replacement of every word "truth" with the word "real" I did in the argument. I can say "i'm telling the truth" and "i'm speaking facts" and they both mean exactly the same thing. the only difference is semantics.

They're not equivocal as you yourself have already admitted. And I demonstrated in my explanation involving circles that replacing all instances of 'real' with 'true' leads to antinomies. Things that exist are 'real'. Statements affirming that 'X exists' are true. Reversing that makes no sense, and doesn't even apply any philosophical notion of true correctly, as my earlier circle examples demonstrated.

Further, hand-waivingly saying that I'm just playing with semantics is not a valid criticism, especially since the distinction is important and what is making you run into errors.

as I said, the two words are most often equivocal. the theories of truth are to support post modernism philosophy, which is a step backwards in philosophy.

You're equivocating on them, but they are not equivocal, as my earlier unpacking (again, the circles example) demonstrated.

Post modernist philosophy, are you kidding me? This is the last-ditch attempt of your to save yourself the embarrassment of a bad argument. Contemporary philosophy is very advanced and developed, with epistemology being a real standout. The correspondence theory of truth alone is THOUSANDS of years old, going back at least to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.
The reason why there are theories of truth is because in Epistemology, knowledge is typically defined as a true belief, with some third element. But the question becomes, "what do you mean by 'true'?", so any accompanying unpacking of the concept of truth is required, just as the other aspects of knowledge have in epistemology.

you took the skeptical position of "we can't know if anything is behind those experiences." this is what they would call a skeptical solipsist view, that it is plausible our experiences are mere illusion but equally plausible they aren't.

It's a skeptical view, but it's not solipsistic. For example, indirect realists like me don't think we experience reality itself, but a mental reproduction of it via sense data, all the while not claiming to actually know that we do. After all, pretty much all positions here are just assumptions, thanks to the Kantian distinction, which can be summed up as "We only have access, necessarily, to our PERCEPTION of reality, not reality itself, so we can't our perceptions necessarily map to twhatever might be behind those perceptions".

do you even know what you're responding to? I was not saying you took that position but simply responded to this question you asked me:

Even if everything was just an illusion in my mind and solipsism were true, are you saying that the illusion doesn't exist?

Do YOU even know what you said? You said this to me in response:

no, I would be saying it doesn't have an independent existence. it would exist, but only in your mind. it would not exist if your mind doesn't exist. realists don't have this view of reality.

What you seemed to be impying (perhaps accidentally) at one point is that if solipsism were true, the illusion didn't exist. My only points on idealism and realism is that they are not provable, hence why I brought up Kant's distinction.

no, the facts of the proposition refer to a specific place and time, and the truth of the proposition only changes if the context of the sentence is removed forcing you to impose your own. to say at this point in time "Obama is the president" is equivalent to "in 2013 Obama is the president." the word "is" is referring to the president time and the truth of that sentence doesn't change over time because it has a specific context and reference.

You actually altered the statement to support your view. The proposition obviously has a context in the sense of when it's made, but whether or not something is actually true changes depending on what is factual.

maybe I should be a little more clear. facts change over time, but facts referenced by propositions don't change since the proposition always references the place and time either specifically or generally. if I say "Obama is the president" I am correct, and I am not incorrect because 10 years go by, because when I said "is" I was talking about this time in 2013. my reference doesn't change unless someone removes it.

And this doesn't work, because I can just as easily say 'Ted Cruz is the president' and clearly that is false NOW, but if it happens in 2016 (God help us if it does...), then that statement is then true. The fact to which that proposition referred changed, because reality changed.

yes, but if that were stated when he was president, that person wouldn't be incorrect. nor would his sentence change from true to false simply with passage of time, because the person was referencing that point and time, not a future time.

They wouldn't be correct anymore, so the proposition has to be retroactively appended to retain its truth value.

Jupiter being larger than other planets is a fact. i'm sorry, but it seems that you have the impression that it is impossible to reference a fact. Jupiter's existence is a fact. Jupiter's size is a fact. Jupiter's size being larger than all planets in this solar system is a fact.

I said that Jupiter being the largest planet is a fact. I didn't say it was impossible to reference a fact (there's that straw man again), I said in a possible world without minds and thus without propositions, "Jupiter is the largest planet" would neither be true nor false, because that proposition can't even be made in that scenario, and only propositions (not reality itself) have the properties of truthyness and falsity.
So, I have agreed that it's a fact (and never denied it was), but in a possible world without minds there is no truth and falsity in regards to this, because there aren't any propositions.

so Jupiter is in fact not larger than the other planets of the solar system?

I've constantly said it's a fact, but in a possible world without minds, there is no truth value related to it because there are no propositions.

again, quit bringing up the ancient past and respond to what I say now. I realize you have a problem with the semantics so I've shifted the focus of my argument to the fact that Jupiter is large, not the truth.

'Ancient past', as in like 2 or 3 posts ago where you made a ridiculous error? Regardless, I HAVE moved on and demonstrated that you're STILL trying to assume truth and fact are the same thing. So, more hand-waiving claims of semantics is irrelevant. I've already said it would be a fact, but without minds existing truth is an inapplicable concept here.

haha, you think that's not what I was trying to argue from the start? lets take a trip back to post #4.

I can name you 3 necessary truths. the law if identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of exclusive middle

it's pretty much exactly what you said except I called them laws instead of facts.

Sorry about that. As I said on page 2 or 3, there's a YT video called the 'Leibnizian Cosmplogical argument' that features a similar argument trying to establish God's existence as a necessary truth.

The reason I used 'fact' there is because those laws refer to facts, namely that things are themselves and aren't not themselves.

really? that's what you thought I was trying to do? no no no no no. lets take a trip back to post #1.

it is an argument of my own design, and rather than a religious argument it's purely philosophical.

Conclusion: necessary transcendent truths [not beings] exist.

Read the above.

However, I also noted a couple of posts back that even the Laws of identity and non-contradiction aren't above criticism of their applicability, even if I disagree. After all, paraconsistent logic is able to deny non-contradiction, and I think there is a logical system or two that treats even identity as contingent. So while there might be truths that are necessary, even philosophers can't exactly agree which ones are it.

as I said from the beginning, this argument is only to debunk the philosophical position of logical fictionalism, the position that logic is something that is made up by us or derived from speech rather than necessarily part of reality.

The problem is that to do that, you'd have to, among other things, void the paraconsistent logical framework.

oh, I see what you're complaining about now. sorry, I messed up the semantics. what I meant to say was: "what I have disagreed with is you stating the fact that Jupiter is the largest planet in the solar system, wouldn't be real without minds to say so." there, all better?

Another straw man; how surprising. Without minds, there arw no propositions. Truth and falsity are ONLY applicable to propositions. Hence, a possible world without minds has no truth or falsity in it. Facts would remain (Jupiter being the largest planet), but truth would not (the proposition "Jupiter is the largest planet" has no truth value in such a possible world.).

So again:

The circle is true (incoherent)

The circle is real (fact)

The statement "the circle is true" is real (incoherent)

The statement "the circle is real" is true (proposition corresponding to a fact)

[Rational AKD]

Okay? We're discussing the philosophical side of it, not the 'common' usage (which when probed leads to equivocations.

no, because in philosophy you can take any definition of a word for an argument, since the definitions would be part of the premises. so long as you remain consistent with your definitions, you can reach your philosophical conclusion using the rules of logic. it doesn't matter if I conform to a subjective philosophical definition of truth or not, so long as it is defined and used consistently in the argument.

Old posts, as in just 2 back? Wow, okay. You're 'even if you're right' argument doesn't work either, as I'll sho in a moment.

yes, I apologize; what I said 2 posts earlier was poorly worded.

If you're not talking about propositions, you're not talking about truth in philosophy. Again, conflating truth and facts leads to nonsensical equivocations.

that's why I switched my word usage from proposition to fact, from truth to real. what you're saying really isn't devastating to my argument, it's just complaining about semantics. and you accuse me of equivocation by equivocating truth and reality but the fact is i'm not making any logical conclusions different if I were to use those different words. i'm still being consistent with the definitions I assigned to the terms so i'm not committing that fallacy.

They're not equivocal as you yourself have already admitted. And I demonstrated in my explanation involving circles that replacing all instances of 'real' with 'true' leads to antinomies. Things that exist are 'real'. Statements affirming that 'X exists' are true. Reversing that makes no sense, and doesn't even apply any philosophical notion of true correctly, as my earlier circle examples demonstrated.

it only makes no sense if you ignore the fact that statements about "X exists" are also statements about what's "real" so saying the statement is about reality is accurate, just skipping an intermediate step.

Further, hand-waivingly saying that I'm just playing with semantics is not a valid criticism, especially since the distinction is important and what is making you run into errors.

the point I had you're playing semantics was shown valid by the adequate change I made to the argument and the fact that it had no change in the conclusions made.

You're equivocating on them, but they are not equivocal, as my earlier unpacking (again, the circles example) demonstrated.

i'm sorry, but did I say anywhere that they are not equivocal? I certainly the only one who said they are not equivocal (besides you) was genkaus to which I immediately responded rejecting that statement here:

the ones that are expressions of existence are equivocal, however. when I say "it is true that the sun exists" it can easily be taken as "the sun is real."

Post modernist philosophy, are you kidding me? This is the last-ditch attempt of your to save yourself the embarrassment of a bad argument.

Post modernist philosophy, are you kidding me? This is the last-ditch attempt of your to save yourself the embarrassment of a bad argument. Contemporary philosophy is very advanced and developed, with epistemology being a real standout. The correspondence theory of truth alone is THOUSANDS of years old, going back at least to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle.

so you're saying modern philosophy by giving an example of ancient philosophy... nice... anyways, i'm not saying modern philosophy is bad, i'm specifically targeting post modern philosophy saying it's taking steps backwards. if you knew anything about it, you would agree. it's saying we can't know what reality is which is pretty much nullifying physical sciences and studies.
http://www.postmodernpreaching.net/postm...sophy.html

The reason why there are theories of truth is because in Epistemology, knowledge is typically defined as a true belief, with some third element. But the question becomes, "what do you mean by 'true'?"

I gave a clear definition, it is what's actually real. you claim there's a problem with equivocation with this, I claim the two are equivocal. a proposition about a statement about reality is still ultimately a proposition about reality. how do we know it's true? many times we don't, and we must accept things we thought were true really aren't. but if there is a proof, then we can accept it undeniably, such as the statement "I think therefore I am."

It's a skeptical view, but it's not solipsistic.

it's still solipsist, just not extreme solipsist. there are different kinds of solipsism, and you're taking a more skeptical version. i'll let wiki show you:

Solipsism is the philosophical idea that only one's own mind is sure to exist... Epistemological solipsism is the variety of idealism according to which only the directly accessible mental contents of the solipsistic philosopher can be known. The existence of an external world is regarded as an unresolvable question rather than actually false.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solipsism

you would be taking the epistemological idealism rather than the metaphysical idealism as wiki describes.

For example, indirect realists like me don't think we experience reality itself, but a mental reproduction of it via sense data, all the while not claiming to actually know that we do.

many solipsists use the "brain in a vat" possibility to justify their view, so you'll have to do better than that to call yourself a realist. a realist would believe everything we experience would exist even if we weren't here to experience it. if you don't believe me, ask wiki again:

Contemporary philosophical realism is the belief that our reality, or some aspect of it, is ontologically independent of our conceptual schemes, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etchttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

After all, pretty much all positions here are just assumptions, thanks to the Kantian distinction, which can be summed up as "We only have access, necessarily, to our PERCEPTION of reality, not reality itself, so we can't our perceptions necessarily map to twhatever might be behind those perceptions".

no, we can't necessarily map our perceptions to reality, but truth is not our perception of reality but rather what is actually part of reality. whether that reality exists or not is a different topic, the only reality we have direct access to is the reality of our own thought. this is undeniable, because you can't observe something if you're not conscious. but truth can still refer to an independent reality, assuming one exists.

What you seemed to be impying (perhaps accidentally) at one point is that if solipsism were true, the illusion didn't exist.

no, what I've been saying this entire time is the illusion would exist in your mind, but wouldn't have its own independent existence, just as the rest of your thoughts don't. I agree thoughts exist but not outside the mind, and if solipsism was true, the world would exist but not independent of your mind (the believer's mind).

My only points on idealism and realism is that they are not provable, hence why I brought up Kant's distinction.

that's not what I disputed and i'm not disputing it now.

You actually altered the statement to support your view. The proposition obviously has a context in the sense of when it's made, but whether or not something is actually true changes depending on what is factual.

first, I didn't alter the statement, "Obama is the president" is exactly the statement that we've been discussing. you're stating that it's true now but now always, i'm stating the statement represents now and thus doesn't become wrong over time. second, yes, facts change, but whether something is true or not depends on which fact it represents. in a book written 1985 stating "Regan is the president" it has a reference to the current date, 1985, thus does not become wrong simply because the facts have changed. it only becomes wrong when it represents the wrong fact, time in this case. it becomes wrong when it references the wrong date.

And this doesn't work, because I can just as easily say 'Ted Cruz is the president' and clearly that is false NOW, but if it happens in 2016 (God help us if it does...), then that statement is then true. The fact to which that proposition referred changed, because reality changed.

I think we're talking about two different scenarios. in mine, I state the current president and it's looked back upon and analyzed. in that case, the statement is still true since it still makes the reference to that time. in your scenario, you would make the statement at one time, and it's right, but restate it later and it's wrong. in that case, one would be wrong because it's making a different reference. there's a difference made in a tense statement made now and the exact same statement made later, since it's obviously time based hence the use of tense. but a statement made then still doesn't change to wrong now since it still represents then.

They wouldn't be correct anymore, so the proposition has to be retroactively appended to retain its truth value.

the appending is only necessary to retain the same reference of time in the statement, but it doesn't make any change to the statement's meaning by appending the use of tense over time. and i'm talking about truth in meaning, not semantics, so you can't say "even if they don't change meaning, they still change it." if there's no change in the meaning of the statement, there's no change in the truth of it, only the semantics.

I said that Jupiter being the largest planet is a fact. I didn't say it was impossible to reference a fact (there's that straw man again)

I wasn't strawmanning, because if you pay attention I said it seems to me that you have the impression. I didn't say you actually are saying or implying that.

I said in a possible world without minds and thus without propositions, "Jupiter is the largest planet" would neither be true nor false, because that proposition can't even be made in that scenario, and only propositions (not reality itself) have the properties of truthyness and falsity.

ok fine, i'm moving beyond that scope to talk about its actual existence rather than the truth of its existence. that's why I reworded the argument.

Sorry about that. As I said on page 2 or 3, there's a YT video called the 'Leibnizian Cosmplogical argument' that features a similar argument trying to establish God's existence as a necessary truth.

that would be a step beyond this argument, but I don't quite know how to get there from this conclusion. so I've started it off as a philosophical argument leaving the option to expand it into a religious one if I find out how to do it.

The reason I used 'fact' there is because those laws refer to facts, namely that things are themselves and aren't not themselves.

i'm not criticizing your use of the word fact. it's merely the only difference between what I said and what you said.

However, I also noted a couple of posts back that even the Laws of identity and non-contradiction aren't above criticism of their applicability, even if I disagree. After all, paraconsistent logic is able to deny non-contradiction, and I think there is a logical system or two that treats even identity as contingent. So while there might be truths that are necessary, even philosophers can't exactly agree which ones are it.

paraconsistent logic doesn't invalidate non-contradiction, and I don't know of any logical system that does. i'll let Stanford handle this one:

Nevertheless, as we will see below, many paraconsistent logics validate the Law of Non-Contradiciton (LNC) (⊨ ¬(A ∧ ¬A)) even though they invalidate ECQ [ex contradictione quodlibet].
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/

The problem is that to do that, you'd have to, among other things, void the paraconsistent logical framework.

paraconsistant logic doesn't invalidate non-contradiction, only ex contradictione quodlibet (in English 'from a contradiction anything follows').

Another straw man; how surprising.

straw man? are you serious? all I did was try and correct myself to appease you. I didn't even say anything about what you said, merely corrected my mistake and my correction is somehow a straw man?

Without minds, there arw no propositions. Truth and falsity are ONLY applicable to propositions. Hence, a possible world without minds has no truth or falsity in it.

that's why I corrected the statement I made to confirm this. man, what does it take for you to understand i'm talking about me not you.

Facts would remain (Jupiter being the largest planet), but truth would not (the proposition "Jupiter is the largest planet" has no truth value in such a possible world.).

good, i'm glad you agree with the amended statement I made. finally we can move on (maybe).