The Category Error of Scientism

[pineapplebunnybounce]

What? Is this just nitpicking about the language science uses? A bit of a ridiculous exercise considering most people understand that thermostats do not have intentions and a lot of science books are written to the general public and try not to be too technical but to get the concept across. If you want to read the dry stuff, get your hands on a journal.

And I disagree that science cannot inform moral decisions. It's just a mechanism to understand reality, if you don't know anything about reality, how can you possibly make moral judgements that will actually achieve what you want to achieve? Prime example is the religious, especially those who tell dying people that they have to convert or go to hell. In their heads they think they're doing good, but they're not. Cos they don't know that hell is just something someone made up and that this person's consciousness is going to end at death. They don't know, so instead of doing "the right thing", they are just making someone distressed about hell.

Not that I actually want to discuss science with someone who thinks fossils are the claim.

[EgoRaptor]

That made about as much sense as post-modernism.

[Neo-Scholastic]

That made about as much sense as post-modernism.

Then you do not understand post-modernism.

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What? Is this just nitpicking about the language science uses?

Not at all. Just because everyday language is convenient does not mean it reflects the underlying reality of what we describe. The problem is that some AF members seem incapable or unwilling to distinguish between the two distinct categories of being: mental and physical.

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More proof that you don't know your ass from a hole in the ground!

Changing your user name doesn't make you any less of a cunt.

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....Nor can scientific findings, like evolutionary processes, be used to support any moral philosophy.

...scientific findings definitely will be used in support of moral philosophy. But that said, no amount of scientific information, or moral philosophy derived thereof, can make such a philosophy desirable for you...

I agree. Science can, and should, inform our decisions. I used the word 'support' in the sense that it cannot serve as the foundation for a moral system.

[EgoRaptor]

That made about as much sense as post-modernism.

Then you do not understand post-modernism.

No one understands postmodernism.

[Neo-Scholastic]

...in a purely physical monist view, i.e. a physical determinism, I think intentional language about PEOPLE is flawed, in that it ascribes a quasi-magical intentionality to a physical system.

100% spot on. Congrats, you understand the inescapable dilemma for proponents of ontological nihilism (oops, I meant naturalism.)

[pineapplebunnybounce]

What? Is this just nitpicking about the language science uses?

Not at all. Just because everyday language is convenient does not mean it reflects the underlying reality of what we describe. The problem is that some AF members seem incapable or unwilling to distinguish between the two distinct categories of being: mental and physical.

What do you mean by that? I'd need an example to really understand what you mean. What do you mean categories of being? First you'd have to define "being". And then state what your criteria is for categorizing things. What properties are you looking at?

[MindForgedManacle]

It is easy to make the mistake of placing mental properties and physical processes in the same category of being. You will find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, referring to the natural world only quantitatively. When you use qualitative terms to describe physical reality you must do so with a certain understanding: that these terms serve as convenient linguistic conventions.

And you must also realize that convenient linguistic conventions are often misleading and/or error ridden when explored. For example, when I hear presuppositional apologists talk about "absolute truth" or "absolute certainty" I realize that such a qualifier is worthless.

Most advocates of atheistic approaches to both morality and philosophy of mind make the same category error: they project mental properties onto physical processes or, alternatively, describe physical processes in terms of mental properties. Both ontological and methodological naturalism exclude qualitative assessments of physical reality. These assessments include the mental properties of meaning, qualitative value, and teleology.

Very few metaphysical naturalists philosophers I know of would say that their worldview prohibits qualitative assessments. The Alex Rosenburg's of the philosophical world
are rare among naturalists.

And really, very few moral philosophers or philosophers of mind are 1) theists or 2) make use of theism in their philosophical literature on ethics and mind, so you're effectively talking about the entirety of those fields.

Without access to qualitative terms naturalism has nothing to say about morality or mind. Both subjects concern qualitative concepts. Discussing moral questions requires making comparative value judgments. Discussions about mental properties refer to the significance and purpose of things.

Same problems as above.

Consider the difference between these two descriptions: 1) “Old growth trees are important to forest eco-systems” vs. 2) “Old growth trees are essential for the survival of forest eco-systems”. Statement 1 makes the category error by attributing a mental property, desire, to forest eco-systems, similar to saying that economic security is important to me.

And 1) shows you misunderstanding your own example, first off. "Importance" in this context can clearly be seen to mean "in the best interests of enabling, promoting and/or preserving its continued existence". Bam, non-teleological, not ascribing a mental property improperly. In fact, biologists have even tried preventing this in recent decades by more clearly stating such things in ways not amenable to such readings.

Now consider the difference between another two statements: 1) “The thermostat wants to reach 72 degrees” vs.2) “The bi-metal strip in a thermostat expands or contracts in response to ambient air-temperature.” Statement 1 attributes intentionality, to the thermostat.


Or yet another: 1) “One function of the liver is to purify the blood” vs. “The liver filters blood.” Physical objects do not have purposes; they just are and do what they do.

And finally: 1) “The smoke indicates a fire” vs. 2) “Smoke rises out of fire.” In statement 1, use of the term ‘indicates’ designates a sign-significance relationship. But in physical terms, one physical thing cannot be ‘about’ another.

These 3 fail for the exact same reason. And you seem to entirely discount epiphenomenological explanations and descriptions.

So, since the subject of science is limited to the natural world, the scientific method, by virtue of its self-imposed limitation, cannot inquire into the cause or experiential character of mental properties. Nor can scientific findings, like evolutionary processes, be used to support any moral philosophy.

Not particularly interested into getting into this unless you really want to.

[Neo-Scholastic]

What do you mean categories of being? First you'd have to define "being". And then state what your criteria is for categorizing things. What properties are you looking at?

Who are you? Bill Clinton? I do not have a fully developed philosophy about categories, nor do I think it necessary. For this discussion, I refer to two types of properties: qualitative and quantitative. These see to be generally acknowledged as distinct types of knowledge. Physical objects and process have measurable empirical features and outcomes. Those features make them quantifiable. Psychological properties and processes have experiential features not subject to third-party measurement. Those features are qualitative.

..."Importance" in this context can clearly be seen to mean "in the best interests of enabling, promoting and/or preserving its continued existence".

Then you should not have included in your definition the phrase “best interests”. Best is a value judgment. Interests refer to goals.

... you seem to entirely discount epiphenomenological explanations and descriptions.

I take it you do not see epiphenomenalism as a problem.

... Very few metaphysical naturalists philosophers I know of would say that their worldview prohibits qualitative assessments...

In some sense, you can measure qualitative properties. You could perform a survey of people’s job satisfaction in the office. The soft sciences rely on this kind of data. I contend that this data is not empirical and puts the data of the soft sciences into a different category. You aren’t dealing with features of physical reality, but rather psychological responses to reality.

The metaphysical naturalist may assume that these psychological responses have an unspecified physical basis. A fully physical basis for qualitative properties would propose that such properties are one of the following: 1) emergent, 2) reductive, 3) illusory, or 4) some combination of these.

Unless you have a specific position with which you identify, I’m reluctant to fully expound on my objections to each; although, I can summarize them as follows:

Main objection to 1): Most proponents of emergence use emergent properties as shorthand descriptions for complex and unpredictable physical interactions. It’s mostly a semantic veneer on a reductionist position. No novel properties or processes actually appear. Which gives you position 2)…

Main objection to 2) Reductionist theories claim that mental processes are identical to physical processes. That is the thrust of this thread. Reduction is a bare assertion. No one has yet supplied a way to translate first-person qualitative experiences into fully quantitative observations without leaving out that which needs to be explained. Which gives you position 3)…

Main objection to 3) Position 3 is incoherent . If psychological properties are illusions, just a trick of the brain, then of what are they illusions. This is a case where the “illusion” is the phenomena to be explained. You cannot explain the existence of something by saying that it does not actually exist.

Main objection to 4) If none of the above are viable then no combination of them would be either.

While the metaphysical naturalist position has the advantage of parsimony, its aesthetic appeal is about all it has. That’s a very weak hand. Moreover parsimony cuts both ways. You could just as easily say that all physical properties reduce to mental ones. The measurements you take of reality come to you through your subjective experience of them. Perhaps physical reality is the illusion and does not exist apart from observation. If some form of monism is true then you face the dilemma of “no matter, never mind.”

I will consider both mental and physical properties to be distinct and real phenomena, which is what they appear to be, until there is some actual evidence or proof to the contrary. At this point, you may suggest that if my dualist position relies entirely on my objections to rival theories then it is an argument from ignorance. Since when is it an argument from ignorance to suppose that things are as they appear until shown otherwise. The burden of proof is always on the side of the counterintuitive theory.

As a matter of fact, my positive claims follow from this fact: everything known to exist, exists as something. Thus every object embodies two principles: 1) a propensity to exist and 2) an informing essence. Thus to know about a thing is to simultaneously recognize both its being and something about it. Now you could say that an identity is something we assignas a way to to parcel up reality. If that were true then the underlying reality is a seamless continuum. Differentiation of that continuum is arbitrary and illusory. Contrasted with this, I believe differentiation occurs at a higher level. Objects retain their identity even in the absence of a particular knowing subject, i.e. if no one sees the tree in the forest, it is still a tree. Or to say it another way, things retain their essential being while undergoing change.

[Angrboda]

[Brakeman]

And in this edition of "Stupid theistic apologies:"

Chad Wooters, a star god apologist, no, not just a star, the very very best that god has to offer, makes a stunning argument that imperfect human communication proves shit about the existence of the mighty WooHoo god and 'dat dastardly debbil!

Tune in next time when Chad Wooters Sez...