The Category Error of Scientism

[Angrboda]

I perceive, therefore, that though there is in general a great, resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is not universally true, that they are exact copies of each other. We may next consider how the case stands with our simple, perceptions. After the most accurate examination, of which I am capable, I venture to affirm, that the rule here holds without any exception, and that every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it, and every simple impression a correspondent idea. That idea of red, which we form in the dark, and that impression which strikes our eyes in sun-shine, differ only in degree, not in nature. That the case is the same with all our simple impressions and ideas, it is impossible to prove by a particular enumeration of them. Every one may satisfy himself in this point by running over as many as he pleases. But if any one should deny this universal resemblance, I know no way of convincing him, but by desiring him to shew a simple impression, that has not a correspondent idea, or a simple idea, that has not a correspondent impression. If he does not answer this challenge, as it is certain he cannot, we may from his silence and our own observation establish our conclusion.

Thus we find, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other; and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm in general, that these two species of perception are exactly correspondent. Having discovered this relation, which requires no farther examination, I am curious to find some other of their qualities. Let us consider how they stand with regard to their existence, and which of the impressions and ideas are causes, and which effects.

The full examination of this question is the subject of the present treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing one general proposition, THAT ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS IN THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE ARE DERIVED FROM SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS, WHICH ARE CORRESPONDENT TO THEM, AND WHICH THEY EXACTLY REPRESENT.

In seeking for phenomena to prove this proposition, I find only those of two kinds; but in each kind the phenomena are obvious, numerous, and conclusive. I first make myself certain, by a new, review, of what I have already asserted, that every simple impression is attended with a correspondent idea, and every simple idea with a correspondent impression. From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions I immediately conclude, that there is a great connexion betwixt our correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the one has a considerable influence upon that of the other. Such a constant conjunction, in such an infinite number of instances, can never arise from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions. That I may know on which side this dependence lies, I consider the order of their first appearance; and find by constant experience, that the simple impressions always take the precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the contrary order. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter, I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the impressions by exciting the ideas. Our ideas upon their appearance produce not their correspondent impressions, nor do weperceive any colour, or feel any sensation merely upon thinking of them. On the other hand we find, that any impression either of the mind or body is constantly followed by an idea, which resembles it, and is only different in the degrees of force and liveliness, The constant conjunction of our resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the one are the causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas of our impressions.

To confirm this I consider Another plain and convincing phaenomenon; which is, that, where-ever by any accident the faculties, which give rise to any impressions, are obstructed in their operations, as when one is born blind or deaf; not only the impressions are lost, but also their correspondent ideas; so that there never appear in the mind the least traces of either of them. Nor is this only true, where the organs of sensation are entirely destroyed, but likewise where they have never been put in action to produce a particular impression. We cannot form to ourselves a just idea of the taste of a pine apple, without having actually tasted it.

~ Davide Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Part I, Section I, Of The Origin Of Our Ideas

[Neo-Scholastic]

Ready, Fire, Aim. If you truly understood what you read you wouldn't need to rely on others to carry your water.

[Angrboda]

Ready, Fire, Aim. If you truly understood what you read you wouldn't need to rely on others to carry your water.

I love it when you talk trash. I understand it's all that you've got. *hugs*

[Neo-Scholastic]

@ Rae,

I use the term ‘know’ as a synonym for “awareness of” which is a commonly accepted usage. I use the term “idea” as a synonym for “the meaning or significance of a thing”.

The Hume quote you posted in fact discusses two distinct kinds of knowledge: sensations and conceptions. I think you would agree that Hume considers the difference between the sight of a green apple and the memory of it a difference of degree, not of kind. Both are ideas. He claims that the second idea is more vague and less rich of an experience than that of the first idea. This is true, but has no relevance to this discussion. In that quote, Hume did not address the distinction between the being aware of a thing and the content of that awareness.

My guess as to why you would post this particular quote is that you object to my acceptance to the Thomist proposition, “ ideas are the means by which we know.” In doing do, you missed the mark. I use the term ‘know’ as a synonym for ‘awareness of’ which is a commonly accepted usage. I use the term ‘idea’ as a synonym for “the meaning or significance of a thing”. The following statement serves as an example of how these terms work in everyday language: Smith knows that a gnomon is a sundial’s shadow-casting part.

In my example, Smith is the knowing subject. Knowing is what Smith does. ‘Meaning’ is that which Smith knows. ‘Gnomon’ is sign which the knowing subject understands. So in the example you can see three distinct concepts: an interpreter, a sign, and the sign’s significance. You must preserve these distinctions in order to develop a valid philosophy of mind.

@Reality Salesman,

Writing about values, concepts, and identity you stated, “These are all subjective things…” And you are correct. The question raised by the OP is the relationship between subjective qualitative experiences and objectively quantifiable observations. The position of the OP which I defend is this: scientism fails to maintain the distinction between the qualitative and the quantifiable.

[The Reality Salesman01]

Chad, you said a mouthful, and I responded with as much. You gave me a single sentence response. I can only assume that this sentence is all that keeps you from revising your position. Is this true?

If science can somehow quantify categories of subjective quality, then you will concede that God is an incoherent concept?

Surely not. You seem plagued by a distortion of perspectives. If I move my arm, the third person understanding can explain the neurophysiological processes that occurred within the neurons and synapses that sent signals through my nerves and causing the muscles in my arms to contract and cause movement. The first person perspective is more or less a bystander that experiences these phenomena and takes complete credit for the result. But that is just the effect. The cause lies within the 3rd person perspective. If we examine only the aspect of effect that is perceived in experience, it appears to be unanswerable, but this is only because we are not examining the sum of the events. Only certain aspects that make up the sum. I make continued comparisons to computers because I find the parallel to be quite comparable. If we allow ourselves to imagine and synthesize the perspective of an avatar controlled by a 3rd party, then it is easy to understand why this avatar would be persuaded to take credit for it's physiological actions. It's because it would only account for the perspective it understands, and be unable to factor in ours that controls and explains it. While the first person perspective adds an interesting dimension to the entire account of what takes place, it does not create an additional dimension for which it occurs. It's only perspective that changes. At the root, it's all very much physical.

[Angrboda]

Actually, that had nothing to do with why I posted that quote. And you accuse me of projecting? Balls!