Ontological Arguments - A Comprehensive Refutation

[Alex K]

Ontological arguments fail because argument must be valid and sound. Sound means the premises from REALITY must be true. If there are no premises argument is empty.

The ontological arguments which I know do involve premises.

[tor]

Ontological arguments fail because argument must be valid and sound. Sound means the premises from REALITY must be true. If there are no premises argument is empty.

The ontological arguments which I know do involve premises.

Which are false.

[Alex K]

The ontological arguments which I know do involve premises.

Which are false.

Or are begging the question...

[MindForgedManacle]

Sorry to be dim, but I don't think I'm getting it.
Neither position seems to have reason to believe. If they exist, where are the real possible worlds? At least the fictional possibles only claim to be hypothetical. That makes sense.

You're not dim, this topic is a weird one. xD I would assume that, to a modal realist, the question "Where are these other possible worlds?" is a category error, a misapplied question, sort of like "What happened before time began?" The possible worlds are wherever they are (not sure I understand myself to be honest!).

I looked up indexical and I hope I'm using the right definition: that an indexical term's meaning will differ with usage and context.
Using that definition, in what context is the "this world is real" claim made other than in the world we find ourselves?

Under modal realism, that claim would be true if made in any possible world, including ours,, because they all exist on that view.

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What defines what is actually possible in any given universe and what is not? How do we know God is possible in any universe? Is it, for example, possible in another universe that Scooby Doo is a living creature with all of the characteristics of the cartoon character? Same for Bugs Bunny, Daffy Duck et al.

Well, we mustn't confuse a possible world with a universe. A possible world is a way the world could have been. There could be a possible world with no universe, one universe or a multiverse.

To be possible would simply to be logically consistent and consistemt with other things about that possible world methinks.

If we assume that there is a possible universe where God exists can we also assume that there is a possible universe where he doesn't? If there is a universe that exists without God then that universe was not created by him. If its possible for there to be a universe without God the creator then no universe needs a creator and therefore God doesn't exist in any possible universe.

Maybe. Theists try to define God such that he exists in ALL possible worlds. Of course, since this requires accept modal realism, one could say that there is a possible world where God does not exist since that is logically coherent.

Even if there is a universe where God exists how does he get from there to here? Surely, if he can visit any universe (omnipresence) then there can't be a single universe without him, but, some of those possible universes weren't created by him so he isn't really God there.

See above.

Actually there are about a dozen more of these but I think they are all on similar lines. I am probably making all sorts of false arguments (argument from ????). Perhaps you could point a few of them out?

I think the real problem is that they're trying to define God in such a way that it makes holding to modal realism practically untenable. They have to affirm that "God exists" is true of all possible worlds, even though "God does not exist" seems like a plausibly true statement of one or more possible worlds. They can't really be consistent here, in other words.

For example, a world with endless, gratuitous suffering of innumerable living beings for no higher good is a possible world, it's logically coherent. But Christians and Muslims must say that possible world cannot be because God exists in all possible worlds. Yet, that scenario is a possible world that... cannot possibly be? This is one of the many ways modal realism makes Abrahamic theists fall on their own sword, another being the previously mentioned polytheism entailment.

[JesusHChrist]

Can't there be a possible world with no gods at all? Seems logically consistent...

[Alex K]

Can't there be a possible world with no gods at all? Seems logically consistent...

[ontological nonsense]
If god does not exist in all possible worlds, it is not god. Therefore, god exists in all possible worlds
[/ontological nonsense]

[JesusHChrist]

[ontological nonsense]
If god does not exist in all possible worlds, it is not god. Therefore, god exists in all possible worlds
[/ontological nonsense]

Ah, I see. Poof! goes a god/gods!

So my dear FSM lives! That's a relief as he hasn't called lately.

[Neo-Scholastic]

@MFM, I agree with your modal factionalism position and have nothing to contribute.
With respect to sensible objects, I generally agree that every form has a substance and also the reverse, every substance has a form. However, your thought problem (one by one eliminating all properties) only applies to accidental properties.
For example, a pencil, a table, and a tool shed, may all be made from wood. Wood, as a substance, can take many forms, even if it always takes on some shape. In any collection of sensible objects, all the objects manifest being, not from an actually distinct formless substance (like you say), but with a substance capable of manifesting any form. Thus it makes sense to posit a fundamental substance (primal matter) having only one property, the propensity to be, that never occurs apart from an informing principle.

The above analysis would be incomplete without discussing the need for an informing principle. A different collection of objects like a granny smith apple, a blade of grass (be careful as you pass), and an a glass of Green River, all have the formal property of reflecting visible light between 5000 and 6000 angstroms.* Like the substance example above, in any collection of sensible objects, none exist as a disembodied form, but as an informing principle capable of manifesting in various substances . Thus it makes sense to posit a fundamental informing agency that acts through, but never apart from, primal matter.

*Here I careful distinguish between physical features of the sensible objects and the psychological responses of the mind, e.g. “green.”

[MindForgedManacle]

The problem is you're positing something both unnecessary and I think incoherent. You seem to merely be saying that there is a substance whose only attribute is to be. But what does that even mean? To be, we effectively mean to be aware of something based on some property we can detect. I see things because they reflect loght, I feel other things because they rebuff my advancement into their physical space, and so on.

A substance whose only feature is existence makes no sense, for in what sense can one ever be aware of it? By your own admission, it must be through some other property it manifests that is observable (in the broad sense, meaning to be aware of in some manner). But if that is the case, your primal matter becomes an ad hoc ontological commitment for which we can only assume exists, for all we have are the the properties by which it makes its existence known. by which all things make it known.

Of course, I could just be misunderstanding your rebuttal, which I admit use terms I'm not really familiar with (they seem archaic and have the sound of old forays into metaphysics).

[max-greece]

@MFM, I agree with your modal factionalism position and have nothing to contribute.
With respect to sensible objects, I generally agree that every form has a substance and also the reverse, every substance has a form. However, your thought problem (one by one eliminating all properties) only applies to accidental properties.
For example, a pencil, a table, and a tool shed, may all be made from wood. Wood, as a substance, can take many forms, even if it always takes on some shape. In any collection of sensible objects, all the objects manifest being, not from an actually distinct formless substance (like you say), but with a substance capable of manifesting any form. Thus it makes sense to posit a fundamental substance (primal matter) having only one property, the propensity to be, that never occurs apart from an informing principle.

The above analysis would be incomplete without discussing the need for an informing principle. A different collection of objects like a granny smith apple, a blade of grass (be careful as you pass), and an a glass of Green River, all have the formal property of reflecting visible light between 5000 and 6000 angstroms.* Like the substance example above, in any collection of sensible objects, none exist as a disembodied form, but as an informing principle capable of manifesting in various substances . Thus it makes sense to posit a fundamental informing agency that acts through, but never apart from, primal matter.

*Here I careful distinguish between physical features of the sensible objects and the psychological responses of the mind, e.g. “green.”

Its funny how sometimes I find the answer I give in one thread fits others.

With regard to the fundamental informing agency I'm see no reason as to why there has to be only one. In fact it would seem to me that there could be a series.

I could see a fundamental material from which everything comes - although it appears there is no reason for that material to actually be nothing(ness).





(That is the video I posted yesterday in the why is there something thread).

From the above we get to a formed universe where gravitation forms galaxies, stars, planets etc.

Turning to earth we have chemical reactions that take place forming complex chemicals, chain molecules and so on.

Then we get life and the fundamental informing agency of evolution under natural selection.

Later on, as sexual reproduction cuts in we get the further guiding principle of sexual selection in addition to natural selection.