Who throws the dice for you?

[Rampant.A.I.]

Doesn't anyone get tired of "we don't know: therefore God" being presented as a valid argument?

"If God didn't exist, there could be no order."

"Everything is too complex for there to be no God."

"Randomness? That must be God too!"

[Angrboda]

1. If God exists, there will be unexplained behavior.
2. If God does not exist, there will not be unexplained behavior.
3. There is unexplained behavior.
C. Therefore God exists.

This seems an equivalent formulation with no question begging. Am I missing something?

You have to assume 1 and 2 in order for C to be true. There's no proof stating that "God" is the only explanation for unexplained behavior, or that unexplained behavior can't happen without God.

Picture it this way: you live in an ancient culture that doesn't know that the earth spins, which causes the sun to "rise" and "set", making this behavior unexplained:
1. If Apollo exists, he will ferry the sun across the sky in his chariot.
2. If Apollo does not exist, the sun will not move across the sky.
3. The sun moves across the sky.
C. Therefore, Apollo exists.

Do you see the problem there?

I see you have a problem with the soundness of certain premises, however begging the question relates to the validity of the syllogism, not its soundness. In premises 1 and 2, the existence of Apollo is contingent, not assumed, so I don't see how either premise is an example of begging the question.

[Ben Davis]

I see you have a problem with the soundness of certain premises, however begging the question relates to the validity of the syllogism, not its soundness. In premises 1 and 2, the existence of Apollo is contingent, not assumed, so I don't see how either premise is an example of begging the question.

It was the 'only' that negated the contingency and created the assumption. Heywood since removed the 'only' which removed the negation thus the assumption. Til that time, my assessment was accurate (see the IF, THEN, ELSE analogy).

[Angrboda]

Sorry, I don't follow how that works.

[Ben Davis]

Sorry, I don't follow how that works.

The initial first premise 'weird things happen only if god exists' is equivalent to 'weird things happen because god exists' therefore is an assumption rather than a contingency. Heywood later revised this to 'weird things happen if god exists' which corrects the premise from an assumption to a contingency.

[Jackalope]

Sorry, I don't follow how that works.

The initial first premise 'weird things happen only if god exists' is equivalent to 'weird things happen because god exists' therefore is an assumption rather than a contingency. Heywood later revised this to 'weird things happen if god exists' which corrects the premise from an assumption to a contingency.

I don't agree. It's equivalent to "weird things happen if-and-only-if god exists", and I fail to see the distinction between that and 'weird things happen if god exists".

Honestly, I don't get the controversy. Heywood has admitted that the premise is false and the argument unsound, which makes it pretty much irrelevant - whether it's fallacious or not.

[Ben Davis]

I don't agree. It's equivalent to "weird things happen if-and-only-if god exists", and I fail to see the distinction between that and 'weird things happen if god exists".

'Only if' and 'if & only if' = 'because'. How's this for an example:
- If there's one possible reason, it's not an 'if'
- Only if there's one possible reason is it not an 'if'
See how the construction of the second statement makes it an assumption?

Honestly, I don't get the controversy. Heywood has admitted that the premise is false and the argument unsound, which makes it pretty much irrelevant - whether it's fallacious or not.

Yeah, fair enough. It's not controversial, I was feeling pedantic. It did give me the chance to state that hypothesis though. I feel quite proud of that one

[Jackalope]

'Only if' and 'if & only if' = 'because'. How's this for an example:
- If there's one possible reason, it's not an 'if'
- Only if there's one possible reason is it not an 'if'
See how the construction of the second statement makes it an assumption?

This http://math.stackexchange.com/questions/...if-and-iff appears to support your position. I withdraw my argument.

[Angrboda]

I don't agree. It's equivalent to "weird things happen if-and-only-if god exists", and I fail to see the distinction between that and 'weird things happen if god exists".

'Only if' and 'if & only if' = 'because'. How's this for an example:
- If there's one possible reason, it's not an 'if'
- Only if there's one possible reason is it not an 'if'
See how the construction of the second statement makes it an assumption?

I think you're over-interpreting things. To me, your two statements imply different sets of entailments, but neither is a synonym for "because." I think you're substituting a causal notion for a logical one.

- If a pie is tasty to me, then I like that pie.
- Only if a pie is tasty to me, then I like that pie.

There may be other reasons that I like that pie (perhaps its color). The first sentence implies a sufficient condition for me to like that pie, but it doesn't state that the condition is a necessary pre-condition for my liking that pie. The second specifies a condition that is both sufficient and necessary for me to like that pie. Neither states that I like that pie "because" it is tasty to me. (Although that might be a valid inference, it might not; I might just happen to find all pies of a certain color tasty, purely coincidentally, and it's the color I like, not the taste.)

In other words:
B, if A means A -> B; B, only if A means ((A->B) and (B->A)), logically. It says nothing about cause, nor does it imply anything about the truth values of A or B, and it doesn't assume A.

Anyway. Obviously still not seeing it.

---

A better, less contrived example involves drownings, air temperature, and ice cream sales. It's known that the frequency of drownings rises along with rises in ice cream sales. This is because most drownings occur during swimming season which coincides with warmer temperatures because people go swimming more often when it's warm. The correlation with ice cream sales is a confounding variable. Nonetheless, the following is true:

1. Frequency of drownings is high only if volume of ice cream sales is high.

The rest of his original syllogism remains:
1. Frequency of drownings is high only if volume of ice cream sales is high.
2. Volume of ice cream sales is high.
Conclusion: Frequency of drownings is high.

This is a valid syllogism, its premises are sound, there is no begging the question, and the "only if" in premise one does not mean "because." Am I missing something?

[Heywood]

Doesn't anyone get tired of "we don't know: therefore God" being presented as a valid argument?

"If God didn't exist, there could be no order."

"Everything is too complex for there to be no God."

"Randomness? That must be God too!"

I get tired of you claiming this a God of the Gaps argument when it is not. We do know these observations cannot be explained by local physical phenomena. There is no gap in scientific understanding that is being filled by God.

Suppose that ancient Greeks had discovered that lightening could not be the result of local physical causes. Such a finding would be evidence supporting the Zeus hypothesis. It wouldn't be proof of the existence of Zeus, but it is an observation that would be expected to be made if Zeus did indeed exist.

Certain known artifacts of our reality....not gaps in our understanding....are suggestive of the existence of God. You're just going to have to learn to live with that.