Defying Occam's Razor to Explain Random Events
May 3, 2014 at 3:48 pm
(This post was last modified: May 3, 2014 at 3:53 pm by Coffee Jesus.)
We often put forth explanations for events that would otherwise seem random, as with the fine-tuning argument. This has given me some problems in thinking about evidence in probabilistic terms, but I think I'm figuring it out.
By "evidence in probabilistic terms", I mean:
An observation supports the hypothesis if the conditional probability of the observation assuming the hypothesis is true is greater than its probability otherwise.
In this thread, a "random event" will be any event that only happened because some event of that type had to happen. For example, Bob had to roll a number 1-6 when he rolled the die. If Bob rolled a 3, it's only because he had to roll something. The 3 was presumably a random event.
The principle I propose:
Whenever some event occurs, we can use that as evidence that the event had an elevated probability under the condition that the event was not random (A1), but we cannot use it as evidence that the event was not random unless we can give an independent justification that the event still would have had an elevated probability under the condition that the event was not random regardless of whether it had occured (A2). Example:
After rolling the 3, Bob might argue, "Because the probability of rolling a 3 would be much higher if the dice were loaded on 3, my roll of 3 supports that hypothesis." In a way, this is right.
The simpler hypothesis is that the dice were loaded, but Bob tacitly tacks on the part about them being loaded on 3. If the dice had an equal probability of being loaded on any number, then Bob's roll of 3 does not support the hypothesis that the dice were loaded. If Bob wants to argue that the dice were loaded, he should argue that the dice, if loaded, would have had an elevated probability of being loaded on 3 (A2). Nonetheless, it is true that if the dice were loaded, then they were probably loaded on 3. (A1)
This can be applied to the fine-tuning argument. Scientists have said that our universe had an extremely low probably of being fit for life if the our universe's physical constants were set randomly. They argue that this is evidence for their non-random scenario in which an supreme being capable of anticipating the future got to decide the physical constants. Certainly A1 is true. If there is such a supreme being, it probably wanted there to be life. This could be one reason why so many gods were depicted having concerns about our going-ons. To argue that there is such a being, however, you need an A2. This is a bit harder.
I think this reasoning could be used to argue that the religions that have had believers are more likely to be true than hypothetical religions that nobody ever believed.
If people occasionally serve as channels for the divine, then the world's religions were not random, and there is an increased probability that the pagan gods really exist. Okay, you think, but we have no reason to think people ever serve as channels of the divine. However, if it's possible (however improbable) that they occasionally do, then the existence of pagans gods has a higher probability of existence than that of the globoprasaurus that I just invented two seconds ago.
By "evidence in probabilistic terms", I mean:
An observation supports the hypothesis if the conditional probability of the observation assuming the hypothesis is true is greater than its probability otherwise.
In this thread, a "random event" will be any event that only happened because some event of that type had to happen. For example, Bob had to roll a number 1-6 when he rolled the die. If Bob rolled a 3, it's only because he had to roll something. The 3 was presumably a random event.
The principle I propose:
Whenever some event occurs, we can use that as evidence that the event had an elevated probability under the condition that the event was not random (A1), but we cannot use it as evidence that the event was not random unless we can give an independent justification that the event still would have had an elevated probability under the condition that the event was not random regardless of whether it had occured (A2). Example:
After rolling the 3, Bob might argue, "Because the probability of rolling a 3 would be much higher if the dice were loaded on 3, my roll of 3 supports that hypothesis." In a way, this is right.
The simpler hypothesis is that the dice were loaded, but Bob tacitly tacks on the part about them being loaded on 3. If the dice had an equal probability of being loaded on any number, then Bob's roll of 3 does not support the hypothesis that the dice were loaded. If Bob wants to argue that the dice were loaded, he should argue that the dice, if loaded, would have had an elevated probability of being loaded on 3 (A2). Nonetheless, it is true that if the dice were loaded, then they were probably loaded on 3. (A1)
This can be applied to the fine-tuning argument. Scientists have said that our universe had an extremely low probably of being fit for life if the our universe's physical constants were set randomly. They argue that this is evidence for their non-random scenario in which an supreme being capable of anticipating the future got to decide the physical constants. Certainly A1 is true. If there is such a supreme being, it probably wanted there to be life. This could be one reason why so many gods were depicted having concerns about our going-ons. To argue that there is such a being, however, you need an A2. This is a bit harder.
I think this reasoning could be used to argue that the religions that have had believers are more likely to be true than hypothetical religions that nobody ever believed.
If people occasionally serve as channels for the divine, then the world's religions were not random, and there is an increased probability that the pagan gods really exist. Okay, you think, but we have no reason to think people ever serve as channels of the divine. However, if it's possible (however improbable) that they occasionally do, then the existence of pagans gods has a higher probability of existence than that of the globoprasaurus that I just invented two seconds ago.
