Kant's Categorical Imperatives

[James2014]

Poor Kant, I think you are being a bit unfair to him.

Kant's categorical imperatives are true according to Kant regardless of their outcomes, that kind of is their whole point, so to dismiss them because of some bad oucome does not in itself invalidate them. Regarding the whole murderer at the door scenario, it is not clear if Kant's response is meant within a legal or moral context. Indeed in other works Kant has said it is not wrong to lie in general, unless one is breaking a contract or try to con someone, because rational agents are responsible for their own descison to believe the lie or not.

The question is then is if I lie to someone am I using them as a means to an end. I would say no, I'm not.

[Anomalocaris]

My question regards Immanuel Kant's "Categorical Imperatives." I haven't gotten around to reading Kant though he's definitely on my list of future endeavors, so my knowledge of him is limited to other's commentaries and a few Google searches. A few days ago I got into an unproductive argument with an apparently devout follower of Kant whose position it was, like Kant's, that if a murderer were to arrive at your doorstep seeking to slaughter your friend, whom you were harboring, it would be your duty NOT to lie to the murderer, even if the consequence was that your friend would end up getting massacred. I found this, well let's just say, INSANE! I didn't believe at first that that couldn't have actually been what Kant meant. But it appears that it was indeed an early objection to his moral philosophy and Kant never really came to see the problem with it. I'm coming to the issue from the position of, well let's call it "urbane consequentialism." What are your views on Kant in this example? From what I've read of Kant's contributions to the notions of "unalienable" "human rights" and "equality," I think he was on the right track in many ways...but failed to allow that every rule has an exception or two, even imperatives. The example of the murderer must be one of them. It must also be asked, how does a Kantian establish what is a "Categorical Imperative"? What about in the case of suicide?

If you loosen you criteria to embody the trivial, then every philosophical approach can be said to be on the right track in some way. You think kant is on the right track in what way?

[Mudhammam]

Poor Kant, I think you are being a bit unfair to him.

Kant's categorical imperatives are true according to Kant regardless of their outcomes, that kind of is their whole point, so to dismiss them because of some bad oucome does not in itself invalidate them.

Poor Kant!?! Haha. The problem I have is that unless the CI are related to the well-being of humans, then WTF is their point?

If you loosen you criteria to embody the trivial, then every philosophical approach can be said to be on the right track in some way. You think kant is on the right track in what way?

Like I said, in the idea that it is for the betterment of all rational beings to believe that each and every human being is born with an equal endowment of natural rights, and that this should really guide our efforts to establish fairer (and I'd say happier) societies. There does seem to be a truth of some sort in that, even if it's ultimately unjustifiable in any scientific sense.

[Anomalocaris]

Like I said, in the idea that it is for the betterment of all rational beings to believe that each and every human being is born with an equal endowment of natural rights, and that this should really guide our efforts to establish fairer (and I'd say happier) societies. There does seem to be a truth of some sort in that, even if it's ultimately unjustifiable in any scientific sense.

Are you sure by truth of some sort, you don't really mean "in the present circumstance, this is the least controversial position" instead of this is really more truthful than any possible alternative?

[Mudhammam]

Like I said, in the idea that it is for the betterment of all rational beings to believe that each and every human being is born with an equal endowment of natural rights, and that this should really guide our efforts to establish fairer (and I'd say happier) societies. There does seem to be a truth of some sort in that, even if it's ultimately unjustifiable in any scientific sense.

Are you sure by truth of some sort, you don't really mean "in the present circumstance, this is the least controversial position" instead of this is really more truthful than any possible alternative?

Perhaps "truth" doesn't belong in there but I'm not convinced of that yet. Granted that we're concerned about the well-being of humans, I think true and false statements can indeed apply.

[LastPoet]

I've given up on philosophy the moment they made it into the cheap whore it is today

[Anomalocaris]

Are you sure by truth of some sort, you don't really mean "in the present circumstance, this is the least controversial position" instead of this is really more truthful than any possible alternative?

Perhaps "truth" doesn't belong in there but I'm not convinced of that yet. Granted that we're concerned about the well-being of humans, I think true and false statements can indeed apply.

You mean it is true if it leads to greater well-being of humans, false if it does not?

If let's say a world ending asteroid will most certainly factually and materially hit tomorrow and exterminate all mankind. If you let everyone know this, then there will be panick and less wellbeing prior to the inevitable end, where as if you don't, then people will go on happily being well until the end.

Then the fact would be the world will end, but the truth is the world will not, since while the former corresponds to reality, the latter corresponds to greater well being?

[LastPoet]

The world ends for everyone eventually. I just want to wish that eventuality into the far future for as long as possible. To linger in this seems a loss of time.

[Mudhammam]

Perhaps "truth" doesn't belong in there but I'm not convinced of that yet. Granted that we're concerned about the well-being of humans, I think true and false statements can indeed apply.

You mean it is true if it leads to greater well-being of humans, false if it does not?

Basically, yeah. If our measurement for evaluating moral statements is the well-being of sentient beings, specifically our own species in this case, then 'false' statements are those that in practice fail to produce the best possible outcome for the beings effected, relating to their well-being.

If let's say a world ending asteroid will most certainly factually and materially hit tomorrow and exterminate all mankind. If you let everyone know this, then there will be panick and less wellbeing prior to the inevitable end, where as if you don't, then people will go on happily being well until the end.

Then the fact would be the world will end, but the truth is the world will not, since while the former corresponds to reality, the latter corresponds to greater well being?

The truth is that the world will still end. The moral dilemma is whether or not lying would bring about greater well-being for the majority of persons, by keeping them ignorant. I don't know if this is true. It may be, but we must also consider the value that people might gain in knowing their end is drawing near. Perhaps, despite the anxiety, they would spend their final moments in a manner that increases their well-being, which is, at this point, greatly diminished either way (if perception of well-being contradicts one's actual well-being, is it better to eliminate the illusion? I think at least in most circumstances, yes, this would ultimately prove better for one's actual well-being, but not all--hence the value in lying).

[Angrboda]

You mean it is true if it leads to greater well-being of humans, false if it does not?

Basically, yeah. If our measurement for evaluating moral statements is the well-being of sentient beings, specifically our own species in this case, then 'false' statements are those that in practice fail to produce the best possible outcome for the beings effected, relating to their well-being.

But well-being for whom? Suppose we were able to double the well-being of non-blacks at the cost of half the well-being of blacks? Would this be more moral than the current situation? Given the relative numbers, it would seem so. But we would object that this isn't fair, and therefore would not be moral. However, then you're invoking an additional principle beyond the first principle of well-being. One might argue that, in the general case, unfairness leads to less well-being, but in doing so, you would be abandoning your base principle in favor of general rules; you have started a slide away from pure consequentialist utilitarianism to rule-based utilitarianism, and are one step closer to a morality based on imperatives. And is it true that we eschew the unfair solution because of some "generality", or are we reacting to a moral principle that is equally as fundamental as well-being? I'd say the latter.

So if we try to form a deontological ethics, it slides towards consequentialism, and if we attempt to erect a pure consequentialist ethics, it slides towards deontological approaches. The same paradox can be found with virtue based ethics. We pursue virtue for its own sake because it is good, but it is good because of its consequences. This is the problem of ethics. There is no "pure" solution which works in all cases.