Faith in Science?

[Mudhammam]

The following is from Book V ("We Fearless Ones"), Section 344, of The Gay Science by Friedrich Nietzsche (Walter Kaufmann translation and commentary [in brackets]; bold mine):
---------------------------------------
How we, too, are still pious.—In science convictions have no rights of citizenship, as one says with good reason. Only when they decide to descend to the modesty of hypotheses, of a provisional experimental point of view, of a regulative fiction, they may be granted admission and even a certain value in the realm of knowledge—though always with the restriction that they remain under police supervision, under the police of mistrust.—But does this not mean, if you consider it more precisely, that a conviction may obtain admission to science only when it ceases to be a conviction? Would it not be the first step in the discipline of the scientific spirit that one would not permit oneself any more convictions?

Probably this is so; only we still have to ask: To make it possible for this discipline to begin, must there not be some prior conviction—even one that is so commanding and unconditional that it sacrifices all other convictions to itself? We see that science also rests on a faith; there simply is no science "without presuppositions." The question whether truth is needed must not only have been affirmed in advance, but affirmed to such a degree that the principle, the faith, the conviction finds expression: "Nothing is needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything else has only second-rate value."

This unconditional will to truth—what is it? Is it the will not to allow oneself to be deceived? Or is it the will not to deceive? For the will to truth could be interpreted in the second way, too—if only the special case "I do not want to deceive myself" is subsumed under the generalization "I do not want to deceive." But why not deceive? But why not allow oneself to be deceived?

Note that the reasons for the former principle belong to an altogether different realm from those for the second. One does not want to allow oneself to be deceived because one assumes it is harmful, dangerous, calamitous to be deceived. In this sense, science would be a long-range prudence, a caution, a utility; but one could object in all fairness: How is that? Is wanting not to allow oneself to be deceived really less harmful, less langerous, less calamitous? What do you know in advance of the character of existence to be able to decide whether the greater advantage is on the side of the unconditional mistrust or of the unconditionally trusting? But if both should be required, much trust as well as much mistrust, from where would science then be permitted to take its unconditional faith or conviction on which it rests, that truth is more important than any other thing, including every other conviction? Precisely this conviction could never have come into being if both tuth and untruth constantly proved to be useful, which is the case. Thus—the faith in science, which after all exists undeniably, cannot owe its origin to such a calculus of utility; it must have originated in spite of the fact that the disutility and dangerousness of "the will to truth," of "truth at any price" is proved to it constantly. "At any price ': how well we understand these words once we have offered and slaughtered one faith after another on this altar!

Consequently, "will to truth" does not mean "I will not allow myself to be deceived" but—there is no alternative—"I will not deceive, not even myself"; and with that we stand on moral ground. For you only have to ask yourself carefully, "Why do you not want to deceive?" especially if it should seem—and it does seem!—as if life aimed at semblance, meaning error, deception, simulation, delusion, self-delusion, and when the great sweep of life has actually always shown itself to be on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi [refers to Homer's characterization of Odysseus: much travelled, versatile, wily, and manifold]. Charitably interpreted, such a resolve might perhaps be a quixotism,[referring to Don Quixote] a minor slightly mad enthusiasm; but it might also be something more serious, namely, a principle that is hostile to life and destructive.—"Will to truth"—that might be a concealed will to death.

Thus the question "Why science?" leads back to the moral problem: Why have morality at all when life, nature, and history are "not moral"? No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, nature, and history; and insofar as they affirm this "other world"—look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this world, our world?—But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests—that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine.—But what if this should become more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more unless it were error, blindness, the lie—if God himself should prove to be our most enduring lie?—
---------------------------------------

Do you agree or disagree with Nietzsche?

[Alex K]

I took the liberty to post the original because it is easier for me to read and it just flows so naturally in comparison.


Inwiefern auch wir noch fromm sind. – In der Wissenschaft haben die Ueberzeugungen kein Bürgerrecht, so sagt man mit gutem Grunde: erst wenn sie sich entschliessen, zur Bescheidenheit einer Hypothese, eines vorläufigen Versuchs-Standpunktes, einer regulativen Fiktion herabzusteigen, darf ihnen der Zutritt und sogar ein gewisser Werth innerhalb des Reichs der Erkenntniss zugestanden werden, – immerhin mit der Beschränkung, unter polizeiliche Aufsicht gestellt zu bleiben, unter die Polizei des Misstrauens. – Heisst das aber nicht, genauer besehen: erst, wenn die Ueberzeugung aufhört, Ueberzeugung zu sein, darf sie Eintritt in die Wissenschaft erlangen? Fienge nicht die Zucht des wissenschaftlichen Geistes damit an, sich keine Ueberzeugungen mehr zu gestatten?... So steht es wahrscheinlich: nur bleibt übrig zu fragen, ob nicht, damit diese Zucht anfangen könne, schon eine Ueberzeugung da sein müsse, und zwar eine so gebieterische und bedingungslose, dass sie alle andren Ueberzeugungen sich zum Opfer bringt. Man sieht, auch die Wissenschaft ruht auf einem Glauben, es giebt gar keine "voraussetzungslose" Wissenschaft. Die Frage, ob Wahrheit noth thue, muss nicht nur schon vorher bejaht, sondern in dem Grade bejaht sein, dass der Satz, der Glaube, die Ueberzeugung darin zum Ausdruck kommt "es thut nichts mehr noth als Wahrheit, und im Verhältniss zu ihr hat alles Uebrige nur einen Werth zweiten Rangs". – Dieser unbedingte Wille zur Wahrheit: was ist er? Ist es der Wille, sich nicht täuschen zu lassen? Ist es der Wille, nicht zu täuschen? Nämlich auch auf diese letzte Weise könnte der Wille zur Wahrheit interpretirt werden: vorausgesetzt, dass man unter der Verallgemeinerung "ich will nicht täuschen" auch den einzelnen Fall "ich will mich nicht täuschen" einbegreift. Aber warum nicht täuschen? Aber warum nicht sich täuschen lassen? – Man bemerke, dass die Gründe für das Erstere auf einem ganz andern Bereiche liegen als die für das Zweite: man will sich nicht täuschen lassen, unter der Annahme, dass es schädlich, gefährlich, verhängnissvoll ist, getäuscht zu werden, – in diesem Sinne wäre Wissenschaft eine lange Klugheit, eine Vorsicht, eine Nützlichkeit, gegen die man aber billigerweise einwenden dürfte: wie? ist wirklich das Sich-nicht-täuschen-lassen-wollen weniger schädlich, weniger gefährlich, weniger verhängnissvoll: Was wisst ihr von vornherein vom Charakter des Daseins, um entscheiden zu können, ob der grössere Vortheil auf Seiten des Unbedingt-Misstrauischen oder des Unbedingt-Zutraulichen ist? Falls aber Beides nöthig sein sollte, viel Zutrauen und viel Misstrauen: woher dürfte dann die Wissenschaft ihren unbedingten Glauben, ihre Ueberzeugung nehmen, auf dem sie ruht, dass Wahrheit wichtiger sei als irgend ein andres Ding, auch als jede andre Ueberzeugung? Eben diese Ueberzeugung könnte nicht entstanden sein, wenn Wahrheit und Unwahrheit sich beide fortwährend als nützlich bezeigten: wie es der Fall ist. Also – kann der Glaube an die Wissenschaft, der nun einmal unbestreitbar da ist, nicht aus einem solchen Nützlichkeits-Calcul seinen Ursprung genommen haben, sondern vielmehr trotzdem, dass ihm die Unnützlichkeit und Gefährlichkeit des "Willens zur Wahrheit", der "Wahrheit um jeden Preis" fortwährend bewiesen wird. "Um jeden Preis": oh wir verstehen das gut genug, wenn wir erst einen Glauben nach dem andern auf diesem Altare dargebracht und abgeschlachtet haben! – Folglich bedeutet "Wille zur Wahrheit" nicht ich will mich nicht täuschen lassen", sondern – es bleibt keine Wahl – "ich will nicht täuschen, auch mich selbst nicht": – und hiermit sind wir auf dem Boden der Moral. Denn man frage sich nur gründlich: "warum willst du nicht täuschen?" namentlich wenn es den Anschein haben sollte, – und es hat den Anschein! – als wenn das Leben auf Anschein, ich meine auf Irrthum, Betrug, Verstellung, Blendung, Selbstverblendung angelegt wäre, und wenn andrerseits thatsächlich die grosse Form des Lebens sich immer auf der Seite der unbedenklichsten ποιιτφοποι gezeigt hat. Es könnte ein solcher Vorsatz vielleicht, mild ausgelegt, eine Don Quixoterie, ein kleiner schwärmerischer Aberwitz sein; er könnte aber auch noch etwas Schlimmeres sein, nämlich ein lebensfeindliches zerstörerisches Princip... "Wille zur Wahrheit" – das könnte ein versteckter Wille zum Tode sein.- Dergestalt führt die Frage: warum Wissenschaft? zurück auf das moralische Problem- wozu überhaupt Moral, wenn Leben, Natur, Geschichte "unmoralisch" sind? Es ist kein Zweifel, der Wahrhaftige, in jenem verwegenen und letzten Sinne, wie ihn der Glaube an die Wissenschaft voraussetzt, bejaht damit eine andre Welt als die des Lebens, der Natur und der Geschichte; und insofern er diese "andre Welt" bejaht, wie? muss er nicht eben damit ihr Gegenstück, diese Welt, unsre Welt – verneinen?... Doch man wird es begriffen haben, worauf ich hinaus will, nämlich dass es immer noch ein metaphysischer Glaube ist, auf dem unser Glaube an die Wissenschaft ruht, – dass auch wir Erkennenden von heute, wir Gottlosen und Antimetaphysiker, auch unser Feuer noch von dem Brande nehmen, den ein Jahrtausende alter Glaube entzündet hat, jener Christen-Glaube, der auch der Glaube Plato's war, dass Gott die Wahrheit ist, dass die Wahrheit göttlich ist... Aber wie, wenn dies gerade immer mehr unglaubwürdig wird, wenn Nichts sich mehr als göttlich erweist, es sei denn der Irrthum, die Blindheit, die Lüge, – wenn Gott selbst sich als unsre längste Lüge erweist? –

---

Interesting though, he does not seem to question the ability of science to pursue truth here but takes that - and what it means to pursue truth, as a given. His question of faith is situated at a deeper level, apparently - whether the pursuit of truth is useful and recommended in the first place. That is not what most people mean today when it is argued that science requires faith. Nietzsche doesn't seem to talk all that specifically about science, is my impressjon.

[bennyboy]

First of all, I might be off the mark in "getting" what this passage really means. I'm a reasonably smart guy, but when I read this kind of stuff, I feel my IQ bumping against the ceiling. That being said:

Nietzsche is considering, if I can bring in a reference from law, "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth" in very absolutist terms. If asked in court to take such an oath, most people do so without hesitation, ignoring the fact that they must necessarily break that oath due to incapacity and linguistic limitations. If asked to describe a criminal I clearly saw, for example, I would be forced to give a very course verbal description-- I could not explain, for example, the true chain of causality that led to a criminal behavior, even if I sincerely tried to.

But anyway let's look at the case of morality. It is not true, for example, that there is any objective morality-- that which we simply MUST not do because it is an evil no matter how you look at it. But do we raise our children to be moral, or to be amoral? I don't think any of us would teach our children that stealing can provide great benefits so long as we identify and execute on various techniques to avoid detection and capture. We are more likely to to say, "It's bad to steal, and people who steal often are not good. They are bad members of society." The objective truth of this is not known-- it may be, for example, that stealing overall represents a redistribution of wealth that increases the viability of a society and even the species. It is therefore impossible to speak on the issue of morality without at least RISKING self-deception or the deception of others.

So can the scientific conviction-- that all OTHER presuppositions except an absolute demand for objective truth by eliminated-- itself be made a hypothesis, and "brought into" the world of valid scientific ideas?

I don't think it matters, because this isn't actually how scientists, and the scientific community, work. Personal presuppositions and even deceptions are fully acceptable in science, given that we follow certain procedural points to keep them from arriving at untruthful results. In a sense, we've learned to dance with the devil of our various untruths and convictions, and still come up with something pure at the end.

[Christian]

Faith in science? lol

[Jackalope]

Faith in science? lol

Quiet, child. Us adults are having an adult conversation.

[bennyboy]

Faith in science? lol

. . . because funny memes are a great replacement for actually reading and thinking about things.

[JuliaL]

I'm a big believer in natural selection for ideas as well as genomes.
In the case of memeplexes, natural selection results in the survival of some truths and some untruths. We recognize that some truths and some untruths are represented. When I read the exerpt above, I see Nietzsche asking why we prefer the truths.
(My definition of truth: A proposition is true in direct proportion to the degree to which that proposition serves to correctly predict the future.)

I think we prefer truths as observation of the apparent past has shown that possession of truths allows better prediction of future events (a tautology according to the above definition of truth,) more control of them and the ability to guide them into preferred configurations (for we happy bags of reduced entropy.) Methodological naturalism (as used in science) is the best process we've found to intentionally isolate truths that can subsequently be used to our advantage.
OTOH, the universe has chosen to allow the persistence of certain systems of untruths; religious assertions contrary to observed reality. Their flourishing contradicts the presupposition that truth is preferable to untruth at least from their viewpoint.
But for me and my house, I will follow the truth.

[Mudhammam]

Interesting though, he does not seem to question the ability of science to pursue truth here but takes that - and what it means to pursue truth, as a given. His question of faith is situated at a deeper level, apparently - whether the pursuit of truth is useful and recommended in the first place. That is not what most people mean today when it is argued that science requires faith. Nietzsche doesn't seem to talk all that specifically about science, is my impressjon.

Kudos for the fact that you read German. There are so many classic works that I would love to be able to read in their original language.

To add to what you, benny, and Julia said, I take Nietzsche to be saying something to the effect that "Truth" is to science what the categorical imperatives are to religion; that is, a "thou shalt..." (fill-in-the-blank; example: "...pursue Truth by this means as opposed to that.") No matter to what extent a person would like to reject faith, especially as it relates to religious propositions, one must have faith... in something, whether it's one's own goals or a societal utopia or it's the utility of the scientific enterprise or again, fill in your own blank. To live completely without faith in anything or anyone is to be Nietzsche's "ubermensch," to be "beyond good and evil," to "live dangerously," as he liked to say. I think he's to some extent (er, to paraphrase what I believe he states elsewhere) correct that humanism is basically an adoption of the Christian ethic but without God or superstition. What I love about Nietzsche is that he's all about questioning everything, having an "intellectual conscience," and not taking yourself too seriously.

Another thing I wonder is if he's suggesting that all faiths are equally beneficial or dangerous depending on the individual. So, for example, say I don't care about whether or not science can describe the origins and demise of the Universe, or the cause for each and every human thought and behavior; say, the thing I care most about is being happy, feeling hopeful, that my life has purpose; these are natural needs and cravings that every person has, and it seems like the most rational thing I could care about. If the only thing that a person finds satisfaction in with regards to these ideals is a self-delusion, isn't it on some level perfectly reasonable to accept this delusion as my truth? Hasn't our species by and large survived on delusion anyway?

What if certain truths (or the "Truth") are dangerous in the end? Would it still be rational to pursue it, or to share it? Should some truths be ignored or suppressed? By the way, there's an excellent little philosophical narrative found in Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett's book The Mind's Eye called "The Riddle of the Universe and Its Solution" by Christopher Cherniak that deals with a similar theme. (You can read a brief synopsis of it here or the full story here).

[bennyboy]

I'm getting a little suspicious that equivocations on the word "faith" are going to lead to some misunderstandings. It seems to me that Nietzsche's "faith" is equivalent to what we'd call pragmatic philosophical assumptions.

For example, you could argue that the believe in an obective world is "faith." You can't really know what's behind it, but you act as though you can. But you could also see this assumption as a definition of the human context: things are true which are true with our senses and way of thinking as human beings. It doesn't matter if we are in the Matrix or the Mind of God or whatever, because all the things that are true in this context still hold.

[JuliaL]

What if certain truths (or the "Truth") are dangerous in the end? Would it still be rational to pursue it, or to share it?

I ask the same questions. Is this truth hunt really a good idea?
It may be in ones best interest to know the truth. It might lead one to the best course of action to a selected goal, be that personal happiness, conquest or something else. But there is a mid-ground in science between ignorance and knowledge. 30 years ago we honestly thought that burning lots of coal would solve our energy problems. We did not realize the pitfalls. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and the hubris that motivates the pursuit of truth goes before a fall. We really think we can do it. But Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you miserable.
If the Persians had prayed to Allah (PBUHN (peanut butter under his nose)) for the full millennium and a half of Islam's existence, they still couldn't have built a nuclear device. That took science.
Christianity grew over a full 2000 years of suffering, but it wasn't until science gave us a lever with which to unbalance ecosystems that we became influential enough to rival an asteroid hit in number of caused species extinctions.
Admittedly, physicians used to be able kill their patients with bleeding, physics or dead pigeons on the forehead, but real deadliness comes from doctors who think they know what they are doing armed with drugs with actual potency. If I remember correctly, it was the NIH that had to up its estimate of doctor caused fatalities by over 100%. I think they originally estimated 100,000/year in the U.S. Now that's just the deaths cause by pharmacological "side effects."
http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articl...t-one.aspx

106,000 -- non-error, negative effects of drugs

I use Larry, the creator of YHWH, Allah etc, the first meta-god, followed by Moe and Curley against presups. But the real master of our multi-verse is Murphy.
A co-worker of mine says there are only three possible reactions to an event, laugh, cry or yell. I choose to laugh.