Why materialists are predominantly materialists

[bennyboy]

I can see how a certain algorithm would BEHAVE as a conscious agent.  What I can't see is how it would BECOME a conscious agent.

I think Jor is saying that they don't actually become conscious agents.They think they think but they don't. They don't actually feel the feelings they feel. She turns Chalmers's thought problem on its head by saying that ours already is the zombie world.

When I hear that argument, I feel the illusion of annoyance. For a zombie, it's a surprisingly rich illusion that I'm not actually experiencing.

[ApeNotKillApe]

What is that other than processing information?

[bennyboy]

What is that other than processing information?

It's a subjective experience of what things are like, aka qualia. That they are not the same should be obvious by asking two questions:

1) Can you see what my brain's doing? Answer: Yes, to a degree
2) Can you see what I'm experiencing? Answer: No, not at all

Therefore what my brain's doing cannot be experience. If you poke my brain with a stick, you will in fact not be poking my experiences. You might say that experience supervenes on brain function, but you cannot equate them without abusing the English language in a pretty horrible way.

[ApeNotKillApe]

What is that other than processing information?

It's a subjective experience of what things are like, aka qualia.  That they are not the same should be obvious by asking two questions:

1)  Can you see what my brain's doing?  Answer: Yes, to a degree
2)  Can you see what I'm experiencing?  Answer: No, not at all

Therefore what my brain's doing cannot be experience.  If you poke my brain with a stick, you will in fact not be poking my experiences.  You might say that experience supervenes on brain function, but you cannot equate them without abusing the English language in a pretty horrible way.

How does that follow?

[bennyboy]

How does that follow?

If you cannot perform the same function on two things, they are not identical. At best, one is a property of the other.

A simple example: I can eat an apple. I cannot eat "red," even though redness is a property of the apple. It would be pretty deep to say, "the apple is its redness, and the redness is the apple."

So if consciousness arises from the function of a particular layering and bridging of brain functions, you can say that due to the way the parts of the brain interact, the property of conscious arises. You cannot then say that the layers and functions ARE consciousness-- because while there may be definitions of say a "unicorn" in the brain, you cannot find more than correlates for my daydream about unicorns. I think we will all agree that you will not find a unicorn in my head.

[ApeNotKillApe]

With a few well-placed pokes to your brain with a stick I could put some unicorns there.

[Arkilogue]

How does that follow?

If you cannot perform the same function on two things, they are not identical.  At best, one is a property of the other.

A simple example: I can eat an apple.  I cannot eat "red," even though redness is a property of the apple.  It would be pretty deep to say, "the apple is its redness, and the redness is the apple."

So if consciousness arises from the function of a particular layering and bridging of brain functions, you can say that due to the way the parts of the brain interact, the property of conscious arises.  You cannot then say that the layers and functions ARE consciousness-- because while there may be definitions of say a "unicorn" in the brain, you cannot find more than correlates for my daydream about unicorns.  I think we will all agree that you will not find a unicorn in my head.

I'd first look for unicorn poop in your head.

I think we can all agree our experience of being an individual conscious rides on the composite of several layers of sensory input. These are experienced simultaneously as an overlap of fields that the point like nature of the focus of our consciousness can be "pulled into" at any time. You stub your toe, you're no longer thinking about the business meeting you're focused on your physical body and the number of curse words you can weave into a continuous train.

We could list the different layers like the range of visible light and the range of human hearing, the, layer of conscious mental contemplation and the one of subconscious emotional inertia. Then the basic background noise layer of the physical body whether in good health or bad, high function or low, old or young. I'm sure there are more....hopes and dreams, if one has /created/preserved that layer. How many can you think of?


Don't forget the distinction between the space containing nature of consciousness and the things contained that color that space. If you look at a perfectly transparent glass full of red water....you might mistake it for a red glass.

[Edwardo Piet]

Materialists are predominantly materialists because materialism is predominantly about... well, materialism.

I don't understand the OP title it is about as logical is me when I say right now "smells like a chalkboard on pool table".

[Angrboda]

What is that other than processing information?

It's a subjective experience of what things are like, aka qualia.  That they are not the same should be obvious by asking two questions:

1)  Can you see what my brain's doing?  Answer: Yes, to a degree
2)  Can you see what I'm experiencing?  Answer: No, not at all

This is simply begging the question. We cannot currently see what it is that you are experiencing. That doesn't mean we cannot in fact see what you are experiencing. You're assuming your conclusion that brain function and experience are distinct. If they are not, then there may come a day when I can "poke the redness in your brain." And arguing that we cannot poke experience because we currently cannot is an argument from ignorance.

Therefore what my brain's doing cannot be experience.  If you poke my brain with a stick, you will in fact not be poking my experiences.  You might say that experience supervenes on brain function, but you cannot equate them without abusing the English language in a pretty horrible way.

Therefore it doesn't follow that what your brain is doing cannot be experience. It wouldn't follow anyway, as you're just playing games with labels. I may not know that poking a certain part of your brain is poking redness, but if that part of your brain is responsible for redness, that is in fact what I'm doing. That you know it from inside as 'redness' and from the outside as region XJ6C9 makes no difference. You simply have two different labels for the same thing. Concluding that aspirin cannot be salycylic acid because the labels are different is the real abuse of language. All you've done is assumed your conclusion that brain function and experience are distinct. That we cannot currently pinpoint where each of the aspects of experience are produced and what their meaning for experience is says nothing about what we can achieve in principle.

How does that follow?

If you cannot perform the same function on two things, they are not identical.  At best, one is a property of the other.

A simple example: I can eat an apple.  I cannot eat "red," even though redness is a property of the apple.  It would be pretty deep to say, "the apple is its redness, and the redness is the apple."

So if consciousness arises from the function of a particular layering and bridging of brain functions, you can say that due to the way the parts of the brain interact, the property of conscious arises.  You cannot then say that the layers and functions ARE consciousness-- because while there may be definitions of say a "unicorn" in the brain, you cannot find more than correlates for my daydream about unicorns.  I think we will all agree that you will not find a unicorn in my head.

Why on earth would I expect to find a unicorn in your head. I would expect to find the image or representation of a unicorn in your head. And here again you're assuming your conclusion that I can't find that unicorn in your head. You're abusing Liebniz' law beyond belief. What more do we have than correlates for anything. I have a bucket of gasoline. The liquid in the bucket correlates with all the properties of gasoline. You know what we say? "The liquid in the bucket is gasoline." There comes a point where correlation becomes identification. All we have about anything is correlates. Care to show otherwise. You're simply holding our correlating brain function with aspects of experience to a different standard than you hold other things.

[Chas]

The reason to believe in more than the material world is that there is a material world?

I'm not sure why you say "more than."  First, we need a compelling reason to believe in the material world AT ALL.  Then we can start the work of deciding whether there's more than it.

Jump off a tall building.  Your landing will be convincing evidence.