Euthyphro dilemma

[The Grand Nudger]

It doesn't have to be.  A person can pick either option and accept the consequences..regardless of whether it has to do with human or divine morality.  The dilemma doesn't go away when we change the subject of it.

We could all say "yes, there's a standard of goodness that we don;t create and which doesn't originate explicitly from ourselves".  

-But then you aren't the author of morality.  

Correct, just a communicator, is there a problem with the message?  


Or we could all say, "Sure, we create morality and it originates explicitly from ourselves."

-But that makes it arbitrary.

Sure does, now do what we say or we'll hit you with a brick and/or burn you alive.  

Is that so hard?

[Mystic]

My general purpose is to recover necessary concepts that have been lost because of radical skepticism of the sort you peddle. You are not the only one that seems incapable of purging herself of the language of teleology and essential properties. Are you really going to try to tell me that an electron doesn't have a nature? Or that the form of an amino acid isn't just as important as it's chemical composition? Or that various composites do not have have unique dispositions? Without the connection between quantitative and qualitative properties there is no coherent way to understand anything because you've basically undermined the very notion that there actually are things, objects capable of existing independent of a knowing subject's interpretation. And yes it means something to be an oak as opposed to something else, just like it means something to be human, or an electron, or a star, or any other thing that is a thing.

Physical properties aren't analogous to moral properties.  So you've just made a bunch of false analogies.

You are right, the latter requires opinionated perception, a witness who sees, and that opinion must be absolute and true.  You are right, it is unlike a physical thing, moral properties exist through vision and luminosity from that seeing living being.

[SteveII]

That's the point. I don't have any problem with #2. It no longer is the equivalent of "it is right because God commands it". It removes the arbitrary objection. It is good because the nature of God would be the exemplification of goodness, not that his decrees would be good because of other qualities (omniscience for example) or just a desire to do good when it suited him or to achieve some other goal.

The reason it was objected that in the original formulation that the meaning of morals would be arbitrary was because there was no other reason besides the fact that it comes from God for giving it moral weight.  You haven't removed the arbitrariness, you've just moved it down a notch.  There's still no rational reason for accepting God's standards and character other than the fact that they are his.  That makes them arbitrary.  You have no rational justification for your claim that God's nature is not arbitrary.

No, the reason for horn #2 to be objectionable in the original is that God's decrees are arbitrary and therefore morality could be one way at one point and another way at a different point. Yes, I did move it back on step and that makes a big difference. Now, we do not have the possibility that God's decrees (morality) could be one way at one time and some other way at another time. You are right that we are still basing our morality it the nature of God (and therefore God) but every moral system needs an explanatory ultimate--a stopping place that makes sense otherwise every moral system has an infinite regress.

That God is bound to his nature is just the definition of nature. If he was not bound to his moral goodness, then it would not be a nature, it would be a preference. Free will does not mean "can do anything". One's nature would always be a limiting factor to available choices. 

Your God is becoming smaller by the minute.  It is certainly within God's physical power to do evil.  Free will means the ability to do anything within one's power.  If you say he is not free to act within his power, that he is determined by his nature, then you are indeed denying his free will.  "Nature" is just another word for saying that his choices are determined.

For God to be able to do evil he would have to violate his nature (the paradigm of goodness). That is definitionally not possible. If he could, it would not be his nature. Free will is not defined as the ability to do the opposite, but to choose without external constraints. 

The definition of God is the greatest conceivable being.  As I have shown, there is no dilemma with such a concept. If you want to redefine God as something other than the traditional definition, go ahead. It does not apply to me.

You consistently claim to have shown things that you have not indeed shown.  You're the biggest braggart on the block.  Regardless, I've shown in the past that the notion of a greatest conceivable being is incoherent, though you didn't understand the last time so I'm not optimistic that explaining it again will help.  When you say that God is the greatest conceivable being, you're saying that God has all the good qualities.  But goodness is a subjective judgement, so greatest possible being is a judgement made up of subjective judgements.  For every subjective judgement that says X is a great making quality, there is an equally valid subjective judgement which says that X is a bad making quality.  The reason is because qualities and properties are neither good or bad in and of themselves, they only become so when a subject attaches a value to them.  You cannot construct a greatest anything out of properties that are inherently neutral. So "greatest conceivable being" has no meaning other than as a religious catchphrase.

Greatest Conceivable Being theology does not define God as having all the "good" qualities. It defines God as having all "great-making" properties.  Moral perfection is better than moral defect. We don't actually need to know what moral perfection is, only that it is better than moral defect (which is obviously so). So, no subjective judgement needed on our part. 

I don't agree.  If part of the definition of God means that his moral nature would be the exemplification of moral goodness, that means that moral goodness has reasoning behind it. It can not be there are more than one set of exemplifications of moral goodness. God's moral nature is an objective standard.

You're gonna argue with the definition of objective now?  Good luck with that.  If God's actions are determined by his "nature", which is whatever it is that God reasons with, then his nature is indeed subjective.  God's "nature" is internal to God, therefore it's subjective. You say that God's moral goodness has reasoning behind it?  What is this reasoning?  Explain why I should accept his arbitrary nature as a standard of good?  You're just as bad as Neo, you talk about things being intrinsically good or bad, and having natures, without bothering to accept the vast weight of metaphysical baggage that comes along with such concepts.  Explain to me what it means for a person or being to be "intrinsically good" or how this supposed good nature of God communicates itself to the human intellect.  If you can't do that, all you've got is a bunch of handwaving.

I was not clear. When I said that God's moral goodness has reasoning behind it, I meant that it was structured and not arbitrary. God's moral nature would only be subjective if it was reasoned by God into existence. However, being that his nature is and always was the paradigm of goodness, morality was not the result of reasoning. 

God communicated moral truths to the Jews in the OT and then more perfectly in Christ. When Jesus was asked what the greatest commandment was (a trick), he answered: “‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. This is the first and greatest commandment. And the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself. All the Law and the Prophets depend on these two commandments.” (Matthew 22:39ff). 

Further, God illustrated perfect love toward us by providing a path to redemption. The concepts of human love, redemption, self-sacrifice, nurture, etc. are illustrations (albeit imperfect) of a morality based in the nature of God.

[Angrboda]

You consistently claim to have shown things that you have not indeed shown.  You're the biggest braggart on the block.  Regardless, I've shown in the past that the notion of a greatest conceivable being is incoherent, though you didn't understand the last time so I'm not optimistic that explaining it again will help.  When you say that God is the greatest conceivable being, you're saying that God has all the good qualities.  But goodness is a subjective judgement, so greatest possible being is a judgement made up of subjective judgements.  For every subjective judgement that says X is a great making quality, there is an equally valid subjective judgement which says that X is a bad making quality.  The reason is because qualities and properties are neither good or bad in and of themselves, they only become so when a subject attaches a value to them.  You cannot construct a greatest anything out of properties that are inherently neutral. So "greatest conceivable being" has no meaning other than as a religious catchphrase.

Greatest Conceivable Being theology does not define God as having all the "good" qualities. It defines God as having all "great-making" properties.  Moral perfection is better than moral defect. We don't actually need to know what moral perfection is, only that it is better than moral defect (which is obviously so). So, no subjective judgement needed on our part. 

No, Steve, it's not "obvious" that this is so, because it's not true at all. In the sense of being an objective fact, it is simply not true that moral perfection is better than moral imperfection. The universe as a whole could care less whether you are morally perfect or not. The universe is indifferent to questions of moral perfection. To it, the one is just as good as the other. If the universe doesn't care one way or the other, then it is not an objective fact. You have utterly failed to provide any so-called great-making property, because there are none. Perhaps in the eyes of a thinking being, one property is "better" than another. But in the eyes of the universe, one is just as good as another.

[Neo-Scholastic]

In the sense of being an objective fact, it is simply not true that moral perfection is better than moral imperfection.  The universe as a whole could care less whether you are morally perfect or not.  The universe is indifferent to questions of moral perfection.  To it, the one is just as good as the other.  If the universe doesn't care one way or the other...

And she claims not to be a nihilist.

[Whateverist]

In the sense of being an objective fact, it is simply not true that moral perfection is better than moral imperfection.  The universe as a whole could care less whether you are morally perfect or not.  The universe is indifferent to questions of moral perfection.  To it, the one is just as good as the other.  If the universe doesn't care one way or the other...

And she claims not to be a nihilist.  

The refusal to imagine the cosmos as animated and infused with objective values is a very long way from not having very strong values oneself.  Did you mean to deliberately misrepresent her position?  People who can only feel justified so long as everyone agrees there is no alternative as righteous as their own are themselves morally deficient.

[Angrboda]

In the sense of being an objective fact, it is simply not true that moral perfection is better than moral imperfection.  The universe as a whole could care less whether you are morally perfect or not.  The universe is indifferent to questions of moral perfection.  To it, the one is just as good as the other.  If the universe doesn't care one way or the other...

And she claims not to be a nihilist.  

I was going to preface this with "According to traditional Christianity our universe is without meaning or value." I chose not to do so, seeing as the basis of the discussion was already traditional Christian assumptions. That you infer something from that is your own error.

[Neo-Scholastic]

How dodgey. The Christian view is not what you say. The Christian view is that in the absence of God the universe is without meaning; whereas, a universe with God is richly endowed with meaning.

---

The refusal to imagine the cosmos as animated and infused with objective values is a very long way from not having very strong values oneself.  Did you mean to deliberately misrepresent her position?

Either values have ontological status or they don't. In the first instance they are part of the lawful order of the universe. In the second they are self-referencial psychological preferences, whims, and fancies.

[Kernel Sohcahtoa]

And she claims not to be a nihilist.  

The refusal to imagine the cosmos as animated and infused with objective values is a very long way from not having very strong values oneself.  Did you mean to deliberately misrepresent her position?  People who can only feel justified so long as everyone agrees there is no alternative as righteous as their own are themselves morally deficient.

I find it interesting when a member a particular theistic starting point assumes that people who are of a non-theistic starting point are nihilists because they lack an "objective basis for morality"[1].  From my observations, the objective morality purported by theists rests on the following assumptions: the existence of a supernatural world; a deity who exists in this supernatural world and whose morality is the objective basis of this supernatural world; supernatural morality is connected to the natural world around us.  Now, since none of these assumptions have been conclusively proven, then this "objective basis" for supernatural morality is ultimately in the unproven category, and therefore, regardless of their faith in a supernatural morality, theists have not escaped the problem of  subjective moral dilemmas. 

[1] P.S. Since an objective basis for supernatural morality has not been conclusively proven, then why is it not equally valid for a practitioner of a secular moral system to refer to a practitioner of a supernatural moral system as a nihilist? If people can be ethical and humane to themselves and to each other and live meaningful and valuable lives via different moral/ethical systems, then why not establish methods of  co-existence aimed at understanding each other, rather than finding new ways to judge, label, and divide our species?

[Amarok]

And she claims not to be a nihilist.

Because she is not 

You are however a disingenuous asshole.